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Abstract
Three main theories have attempted to characterise autism at the cognitive level: theory of 
mind, executive function and central coherence; but none are able to account for all the 
behavioural manifestations seen across different children. This thesis is concerned with 
heterogeneity within the autism spectrum that might exist at the cognitive level and how 
this relates to behaviour. 57 high-functioning 7-12 year olds with autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD) and 28 normally-developing children participated in tasks tapping into these three 
cognitive domains, as well as intelligence and head size. Their parents completed 
interviews concerning their behavioural symptoms. Support for the relevance o f all three 
theories to ASD was found, with significant group differences between the ASD and 
control groups. Approximately 50% of the children with ASD displayed a detectable 
theory of mind impairment, 33% executive dysfunction and 20% weak central coherence, 
and all possible combinations of impairment were found. A further puzzling 40% of 
children displayed no detectable impairment, indicating either a misdiagnosis, that the tests 
were not sensitive enough, or that there was an additional cause not investigated here. 
Theory of mind and executive function abilities were found to be closely related, whilst 
central coherence was independent of these skills, indicating that at least two cognitive 
subtypes were present in the current sample. The emerging hypothesis was that theory of 
mind impairment adversely affected performance in unstructured executive function tests 
through a lack of understanding of implicit task demands. Only theory of mind and verbal 
ability were found to predict specific aspects of the behavioural triad. In addition, the 
presence of weak central coherence was related to the increased head size found in 20% of 
ASD cases, providing a possible endophenotype for this cognitive skill.
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Chapter I: Cognitive theories of autism
Autism is a disorder that was first recognised as a clinical entity in the 1940s by two 
independent clinicians. Both Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944) described groups of 
children who had various symptoms or behaviours in common; notably from Kanner ‘an 
autistic aloneness, a desire for sameness and islets o f ability’, and from Asperger ‘difficulties 
with social integration, eye gaze and voice tone’. Since then, interest in autism has greatly 
increased, particularly over the last 25 years, resulting in a better knowledge of the core 
features (Wing & Gould, 1979), the course (Schonauer, Klar, Kehrer & Arolt, 2001) and 
the prevalence (Baird et al., 2006) o f the disorder, as well as earlier detection (Baird et al., 
2000) and standardised diagnostic tools (Lord et al., 2000). Autism is now widely 
acknowledged to be a neurodevelopmental disorder with a genetic basis (Rutter, 2000), 
resulting in atypical development of the brain (Bauman & Kemper, 1985). Despite this 
assertion, very little is known about the exact genetic or biological abnormalities underlying 
the disorder and so diagnosis still relies upon a defined set o f behavioural criteria. These 
are often referred to as the typical triad of impairments: problems with social interaction; 
problems with communication; and restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns of 
behaviour, interests and activities (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 2000; ICD- 
10, World Health Organisation, 1993).
While the stereotypical image of an individual with autism is of a child lost in their own 
world, unaware o f even the presence o f others and strongly reactive against any changes 
perceived to affect their world, higher-functioning individuals, who are now known to 
make up a sizeable proportion o f the autistic population (45% with IQs greater than 70; 
Baird et al, 2000), reveal that social behaviours are not absent, but rather abnormal. Poor 
comprehension and poor use of facial expressions, gestures and vocal prosody are a 
common giveaway (Tantam, Holmes & Cordess, 1993), and language and conversation,
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rather than absent, is commonly repetitive and egocentric (Tager-Flusberg, 1999), one­
sided and non-reciprocal (Fine, Bartolucci, Szatmari & Ginsberg, 1994). Whilst the 
defining social and communication impairments appear to overlap, this may simply be a 
result o f the way in which they are defined (Tager-Flusberg, 1999), with some behaviours 
such as social aspects o f communication being used to define both areas. Similarly, 
repetitive behaviours can be expressed in a number of different ways, including basic 
behaviours such as motor mannerisms and sensory preoccupations, but more complex 
behaviours such as circumscribed interests and repetitive language tend to be more 
commonly seen in higher-functioning individuals (Bodfish, Symons, Parker & Lewis, 2000).
Although necessary, a behavioural diagnosis has the disadvantage of heterogeneity; there 
can be many different reasons for or causes of the same behaviour. Equally, different 
behaviours in different individuals can result from the same underlying cause due to 
interaction with other factors, such as general ability, education, temperament and family 
situation (Rutter, 2000). Indeed, parents and clinicians often comment that every autistic 
child is different and has their own individual needs, yet seem happy to acknowledge that 
autism is a single unified disorder (Jackson, 2003). In order to accommodate such 
behavioural heterogeneity, the notion of an autism spectrum has been introduced (Wing & 
Gould, 1979), varying in multiple directions including severity o f symptoms and the pattern 
o f symptoms present at different developmental stages and general ability levels. (For ease, 
the term ‘autism’ is used to refer to the whole autism spectrum for the remainder of this 
chapter, unless reference to specific diagnoses are o f importance.)
Such heterogeneity at the behavioural level of course makes the identification of the 
biological or genetic underpinnings o f autism extremely difficult (Folstein & Rosen- 
Sheidley, 2001). At the biological level, an independent marker of autism is lacking, leaving 
diagnosis at the mercy of unrefined behavioural measures. An intermediary level of 
explanation between biology and behaviour is therefore helpful, describing the functions of
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the brain in terms o f the cognitive systems they may mediate. This can be termed the 
cognitive level o f description and allows a range o f behaviours to be linked to a unitary 
cause. A number of theories have attempted to characterise the key behavioural symptoms 
of autism at the cognitive level; most notably the mentalising theory, the executive function 
theory and the central coherence theory. This thesis will be concerned with these three 
theories only; whilst other theories do exist at the cognitive level, these either have not 
stood the test of time or attempt to explain only very specific behaviours. These three key 
theories equally do not attempt to explain all aspects of autistic behaviour but do attempt 
to draw a variety o f different behaviours together through a common cognitive cause. The 
remainder of this chapter will therefore evaluate these three theories briefly; more detailed 
discussion o f particular paradigms tapping into these cognitive domains can be found in 
the experimental chapters 3-5.
I. I Mentalising
A widely tested and prominent cognitive theory o f autism is the mentalising or ‘Theory of 
Mind’ (ToM) theory (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith, 2003b; Leslie & Frith, 1990). Individuals 
with autism are thought to show delay in or lack the ability to represent other people’s 
mental states (such as desire, knowledge and belief) as distinct from their own, an ability 
which allows us to intuitively understand and predict other’s behaviour on the basis o f their 
thoughts. In normal development, the explicit ability to represent mental states appears to 
emerge at a distinct point in time between 3 to 5 years of age (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). 
The universality o f this achievement across different cultures is impressive (Callaghan et al., 
2005). However, there is consensus that this achievement is preceded by the implicit ability 
to take account of others’ mental states (Astington, 1993; Flavell, 1999) although a number 
of developmental milestones in the understanding of others’ minds are typically seen. Thus 
from 9 months o f age, infants are able to implicitly attribute goals and intentions to actions 
(Csibra, 2003). At about the same time, infants engage in joint attention, sharing their
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attention both with another person and an object in the environment, indicative of a desire 
to communicate and share their own visual experience (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). 
Children as young as 18 months are able to perform and therefore to understand the 
concept of pretend play, where reality is suspended and mental representations o f both 
reality and pretence are necessary (Leslie, 1987). An understanding of other people’s 
desires and emotions as different from one’s own is displayed explicidy by about 3 years 
and children of this age can talk about these concepts in mental state terms (Wellman & 
Liu, 2004). By 4 years of age children explicidy display an understanding of more complex 
terms, such as belief, and particularly belief that goes against reality, commonly known as 
false belief; by this age, children appear to understand that people’s minds are not copies of 
reality but are representations that can change and may be false (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983).
It is not clear at this stage whether one or more underlying cognitive components come on 
line for this gradual development to proceed. Leslie (1987) suggested a cognitive 
component known as an expression raiser to be necessary, though not sufficient, for the 
development of a ToM. This expression raiser allows multiple mental representations to 
exist at the same time, each representing a different mental view of the world, without 
being in competition with each other. Whilst normally developing children possess this 
component, they may not display behaviour consistent with its use at an early age, due to 
other factors. For example, a child must be able to form such representations at all before 
they can be dissociated, must have a certain level o f experience of how humans interact 
with the environment, must be able to inhibit their own representation of reality or reality 
itself in order to acknowledge another’s mental state distinct from this, and, at least for 
false belief tasks, must have the verbal ability to understand and express such mental state 
terms in language. Other theoretical accounts of ToM also exist, including the ‘theory’ 
theory (Pemer, 1991; Wellman & Gelman, 1998) and simulation theory (Harris, 1992), 
although the debate surrounding these different theories is outside the scope of this thesis.
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I. I. I Mentalising in autism
The mentalising theory proposes that in autism either an implicit ToM never emerges as 
the necessary expression raiser is absent or faulty (Leslie & Frith, 1990) or it appears only 
after a gross delay (Baron-Cohen, 1989b, 1991). Thus in its strongest form, children with 
autism should not be able to represent other people’s minds as representations distinct 
from both reality and their own mental states. While this theoretical stance is only a 
hypothesis, its validity can be tested as the cognitive phenotype can be defined in terms of 
behavioural predictions independent of an autism diagnosis, thus avoiding circularity. 
Support for the theory therefore came initially from behavioural experiments using false 
belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985) on which individuals with autism were 
predicted to and did perform more poorly than comparison groups matched for age, 
mental age or language ability, despite their mental age being above 4 years. On the other 
hand, children with autism had no problem solving false photograph (Leekam & Pemer,
1991) or false drawing tasks (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992), indicating that their 
problem lay in the realm o f mental rather than pictorial representation.
This robust result has been reproduced by different researchers over numerous paradigms 
and mental states, providing converging evidence o f a ToM impairment in autism. For 
example, Pemer, Frith, Leslie & Leekham (1989) found children with autism to perform 
poorly on a seeing-leads-to-knowing task; Baron-Cohen (1989a; 1992) noticed a failure to 
distinguish mental and physical entities, an unawareness of the mental function of the 
brain, a lack o f understanding of the appearance-reality distinction, and problems with 
deception through a simple penny hiding game in children with autism; and Tager-Flusberg 
& Sullivan (1994) showed that children with autism were worse at giving mental state 
explanations for actions. Similarly, whilst children with autism are capable o f labelling 
emotions and explaining actions, they find it much more difficult to identify the causes of 
internal states (Capps, Losh & Thurber, 2000). Furthermore, some of the earlier
manifestations of mental state understanding, such as joint attention and pretend play, are 
absent or deviant in autism (Charman, 1998; Wing & Gould, 1979).
1. 1.2 Brain basis of mentalising in autism
More recently, functional neuroimaging studies have begun to define a network o f brain 
regions involved in mental state attribution and reasoning with remarkable consistency, 
including medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus & the temporal pole (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1999b; Berthoz, Armony, Blair & Dolan, 2002; Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle & 
Decety, 2000; Castelli, Happe, Frith & Frith, 2000; den Ouden, Frith, Frith & Blakemore, 
2005; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher & Frith, 2004; Gallagher et al., 2000; Gallagher, Jack, 
Roepstorff & Frith, 2002; German, Niehaus, Roarty, Giesbrecht & Miller, 2004; Goel, 
Grafman, Sadato & Hallett, 1995; Mason, Banfield & Macrae, 2004; McCabe, Houser,
Ryan, Smith & Trouard, 2001; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom & Cohen, 2004; Spiers & 
Maguire, 2006; Takahashi et al., 2004; Vogeley et al., 2001). Activity in these regions has 
been shown to be reduced in individuals with autism whilst performing mentalising tasks 
(Castelli, Frith, Happe & Frith, 2002; Happe et al., 1996; Nieminen-von Wendt et al.,
2002), as has connectivity between visual areas and this network (Castelli et al., 2002). 
Structural imaging also supports these findings, with increased grey matter volume localised 
to this network of brain regions in autism (Abell et al., 1999; Waiter et al., 2004). Two 
recent experiments have measured blood flow in the brain as an indicator o f cortical 
activity and have found it to be reduced in autism in those brain regions associated with the 
ToM network. The first study indicated reduced blood flow in the superior temporal 
sulcus (Gendry Meresse et al., 2005) and the second showed reduced blood flow in medial 
prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate gyrus and right medial temporal lobe (Ohnishi et al.,
Several studies involving patients whose lesions lie in brain regions involved in this 
mentalising network have been studied. A number of authors have found that patients 
with frontal lesions show impairments on ToM tasks (Happe, Malhi & Checkley, 2001; 
Rowe, Bullock, Polkey & Morris, 2001; Stuss, Gallup & Alexander, 2001) and similar 
findings have emerged for patients with damage to the temporoparietal junction (Apperly, 
Samson, Chiavarino & Humphreys, 2004; Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino & Humphreys, 
2004). In another study, those with orbitofrontal but not dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
lesions showed similar patterns of performance on mentalising tasks to adults with 
Asperger Syndrome (Stone, Baron-Cohen & Knight, 1998). However, one study involving 
a patient with medial frontal lobe damage found no evidence of mentalising problems 
despite extensive testing (Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith & Husain, 2004). In general, these 
studies seem to suggest that damage to either medial prefrontal cortex or the superior 
temporal sulcus may be sufficient but not necessary to cause ToM impairment.
1.1.3 Broader phenotype
A new direction that has helped to inform the search for the cognitive basis o f autism has 
been the study of the broader phenotype: the presence o f similar cognitive patterns of 
performance in unaffected relatives of individuals on the autism spectrum, indicative of a 
genetic basis for the cognitive impairments seen. Ozonoff, Rogers, Famham & 
Pennington (1993) were the first to attempt this kind o f study in siblings of children with 
autism and found no differences in performance on ToM tasks; however, power analyses 
indicated the measures used were not sensitive enough to detect group differences. More 
recently, Dorris, Espie, Knott & Salt (2004) have found siblings of children with Asperger 
Syndrome to have mild mentalising problems on the reputedly more sensitive Eyes test 
(Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997b). Using this same test, Baron- 
Cohen et al. (2006) found mothers and fathers o f children with autism to show decreased 
activity in the network o f brain areas associated with mentalising whilst showing good
22
behavioural performance on the task. Shaked, Gamliel & Yirmiya (2006) found no 
difference between the younger siblings of children with and without autism on ToM 
measures however but this may simply reflect poor sensitivity given the findings of Baron- 
Cohen et al. (2006).
1. 1.4 Relation to  symptoms
The mentalising theory o f autism has the advantage of being able to explain plausibly many 
of the social and communication problems seen in individuals with autism spectrum 
disorders and therefore a large range of symptoms. If ToM provides a basis on which to 
understand others thoughts, intentions and behaviour, a ToM impairment would make it 
difficult to interact in a flexible and responsive way to people and to communicate 
reciprocally. Indeed, the first study to compare ToM task performance to everyday 
behaviour in individuals with autism found those who passed false belief tasks to show 
more insightful social behaviour and better verbal and communication skills than those 
who failed, although even the passers were behaving below the level expected for their age 
and ability (Frith, Happe & Siddons, 1994; see also Hughes, Leboyer & Bouvard, 1997a). 
Capps, Kehres & Sigman (1998) also found that false belief task performance in children 
with autism was related to the ability to contribute novel information to a conversation and 
Hale & Tager-Flusberg (2005) found a similar relationship between performance on a 
battery o f ToM tasks and the ability to maintain the topic of conversation initiated by their 
conversational partner and therefore to make relevant utterances. Ability on ToM tests in 
children with autism has also been linked to the understanding o f non-literal language 
(Martin & McDonald, 2004) and the ability to understand other people’s embarrassment 
(Hillier & Allinson, 2002).
Surprisingly, it has also been suggested that the ToM impairment could provide an 
explanation for some o f the routine and ritualistic behaviours that are one o f the diagnostic
criteria, as a secondary consequence (Baron-Cohen, 1989c); if a ToM impairment results in 
social impairment, this in turn may produce distress in social interactions due to difficulties 
in understanding others’ intentions and predicting why they act in a particular manner, 
hence producing predictable but routine & ritualistic behaviours in compensation. These 
sorts o f arguments may suffer from circularity though, making it difficult to establish 
external validity. In any case, Joseph & Tager-Flusberg (2004) recendy found that ToM 
deficits were linked only to communication difficulties in autism, but not to the social or 
repetitive behaviours seen and Turner (1996) found the degree of repetitive behaviour 
present in autism to be unrelated to mentalising ability or IQ.
The two experiments reporting reduced blood flow in autism in brain regions associated 
with the ToM network (see section 1.1.3), also related this measure to certain symptoms, 
making a link from brain through cognition to behaviour. Reduced blood flow in the 
superior temporal sulcus was found to be correlated with the overall extent of symptoms 
(Gendry Meresse et al., 2005) as measured by a standard parental interview (ADI-R; Lord, 
Rutter & Le Couteur, 1994), while reduced blood flow in medial prefrontal cortex & 
anterior cingulate gyrus was associated with the level o f social and communication 
impairments, and reduced blood flow in right medial temporal lobe was associated with the 
degree o f desire for sameness (Ohnishi et al., 2000) as measured by a short parental 
interview (CARS; Schopler, Reichler, DeVellis & Daly, 1980).
1. 1.5 Negative findings
Despite the mentalising theory being able to account for much of the variety of social 
symptoms, heterogeneity can still be observed at the cognitive level. The mentalising 
impairment is generally observed to be less severe in children with Asperger syndrome and 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS) than in children 
with autism (02onoff, Rogers & Pennington, 1991b; Sicotte & Stemberger, 1999; Ziatas,
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Durkin & Pratt, 1998, 2003), although some researchers do not find such differences 
(Buitelaar, van der Wees, Swaab-Bameveld & van der Gaag, 1999; Dahlgren & 
Trillingsgaard, 1996), and in some cases of adults with Asperger Syndrome none or very 
little impairment may be found (Bowler, 1992; Hill, Sally & Frith, 2004). Indeed, even in 
the first study supporting the mentalising theory with low-functioning children (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1985), 20% of the autistic children passed the false belief task. Furthermore, a 
small number of negative findings exist which are difficult to reconcile. Russell & Hill 
(2001) found no evidence of impairment in reporting own intentions that differed from the 
outcome of a task in autistic children, and Yirmiya & Shulman (1996) found no differences 
between children with autism and those with mental retardation on a standard false belief 
task. A minority o f autistic individuals also show evidence of mentalising even in everyday 
life (Frith et al., 1994) and those with Asperger Syndrome are thought to have better social 
insight compared to those with high-functioning autism (Ozonoff et al., 1991b).
Negative findings are difficult to interpret as they could result for a number of different 
reasons: the tasks may be insensitive to the underlying impairment, the clinical group may 
be heterogeneous, improvement and compensation may occur, or the theory may simply 
be wrong. It is important to remember that in many of these experiments, mentalising 
ability is measured through a simple task that will also depend on a range of other abilities 
and which may possibly be passed in a number of different ways. Task difficulty and 
sensitivity are therefore important factors when interpreting such results, particularly when 
floor and ceiling effects are involved. Indeed, ToM task performance does undergo 
developmental change over time in people with autism (Steele, Joseph & Tager-Flusberg,
2003) but, though less severe, mentalising impairments have still been documented in high- 
functioning individuals including adults when performing more complex tests, for example, 
advanced mentalising stories (Happe, 1994; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999a; Kaland et al., 
2002), judging mental state from the eyes or from the voice (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b; 
Golan & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Kleinman, Marciano & Ault, 2001; Rutherford, Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2002), understandm g^/^/w i (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, 
Jones & Plaisted, 1999a), video-clips o f situations that are close to real life encounters 
(Channon, Charman, Heap, Crawford & Rios, 2001; Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen & 
Rutter, 2000) and silent animations (Abell, Happe & Frith, 2000; Castelli et al., 2002; Klin, 
2000).
1. 1.6 Improvement and compensation
One important observation indicating that factors other than mental state understanding 
may play a role in ToM task performance is the relationship between verbal ability and 
mentalising ability (Happe, 1995; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked & Solomonica-Levi, 1998).
Children with autism were found to have a 80% probability of passing the standard false 
belief task when they reached a verbal mental age of more than 13 years, more than 7 years 
later than the normally developing child. This indicates that although their ToM 
impairment delays the age at which they can pass this task, at a certain level of verbal skill 
they are capable o f producing the correct solution. Fisher, Happe & Dunn (2005) also 
recently showed that the relationship between ToM and verbal ability was stronger in 
children with autism than those with moderate learning difficulties or normal development, 
indicating a greater reliance on verbal ability to perform these tasks.
Exactly what this apparent improvement with age and verbal ability means is still 
unresolved; it may be that verbal skill causes this insight into ToM understanding 
(Astington & Jenkins, 1999) or that a third factor causes both verbal ability to increase and 
social insight to develop. Alternatively, improved ToM task performance may not be 
indicative of the development or acquisition o f an implicit ToM; rather it may indicate 
some, possibly verbal, method o f compensation (Happe, 1995; Tager-Flusberg, 2000) or a 
conscious method o f ‘hacking out’ the solution (Frith, Morton & Leslie, 1991). Indeed, it 
has been suggested that ToM development is both delayed and deviant in autism (Baron-
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Cohen, 1989b, 1991) and there is some evidence for the existence of a qualitatively 
different pattern of ToM development (Serra, Loth, van Geert, Hurkens & Minderaa,
2002). For example, children with autism are more likely to use desire terms in 
conversation than children with Specific Language Impairment (SLI) or controls, who are 
more likely to use thought and belief terms (Ziatas et al., 2003). Similarly, children with 
autism are as likely as children with Downs Syndrome to talk about desire, perception & 
emotion but are less likely to use mental states and to ask for another’s attention (Tager- 
Flusberg, 1992) and have a better understanding of intentions than beliefs (Carpenter, 
Pennington & Rogers, 2001).
Still further suggestions for the relationship between verbal ability and language have been 
made: poor mentalising skill may actually limit language learning, as this may require the 
child to understand a speaker’s intentions (Bloom, 2000). Then again, the relationship may 
be spurious and a product o f the task design, as performance on a non-verbal mentalising 
task (the Eyes test, Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b) was found to be unrelated to language 
ability in autism, indicating that the relationship may be a result o f the language component 
o f the majority o f ToM tasks (Senju, Tojo, Konno, Dairoku & Hasegawa, 2002).
A number of task manipulations have been shown to aid children in their performance on 
false belief tasks. Wellman et al. (2002) used thought bubbles as a physical representation 
o f the mind and found this helped autistic children to pass false belief tasks. Swettenham 
(1996) taught children with autism to understand the mind as a camera and that, as photos 
can be out o f date, so can the mind. He found that, similar to Wellman et al., the children 
could use this analogy to successfully predict the subsequent behaviour o f agents; however, 
they still could not predict the agents’ mental states accompanying the behaviour.
Unfortunately, although the belief term use of children with autism develops in line with 
their ToM task performance (Ziatas et al., 1998) and explicit teaching about mental states 
improves false belief task performance, it does not appear to affect social competence in
the same way (Ozonoff & Miller, 1995). Similarly, the translation of learnt social 
knowledge into novel environments and real life situations appears to be extremely poor 
(Parsons & Mitchell, 2002). It seems therefore that improvement may occur in autism in 
either the domain of social competence or the domain of mental states through explicit 
teaching but that this knowledge is not transferable either between or within domains, 
lending support to the idea that improvement may indeed be through compensation and 
that the skills acquired are not the same as the skills o f normally developing children, who 
have an implicit understanding of mental states as well as an explicit one (Frith, 2004).
1. 1.7 Heterogeneity
For the most part, therefore, research suggests that ToM deficits are wide ranging in 
autism, particularly in children. However, there is some recent evidence that ToM 
problems are not present in all children with autism even when using a battery of tasks 
(Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin & Maley, 2006; 68% of children performed more than 1 SD 
below the control mean). Indeed, Murphy (2006) found highly variable performance 
within a group of autistic adults, despite significant differences between this group and 
other clinical patients. The issue still remains therefore o f whether these individuals who 
pass even advanced mentalising tasks truly have a mentalising problem. If  mentalising is 
really intact in these cases, it would be extremely important to explain their social 
impairments in everyday life by some other concept.
1. 1.8 O ther explanations of social failure in autism
While often seen as part and parcel of mentalising ability, poor joint attention (Sigman & 
Mundy, 1989), lack o f imitation & pretend play (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993; Rogers & 
Pennington, 1991) and poor affective contact (Hobson, 1990) have all been proposed as 
possible causes of autism themselves with mentalising failure as a secondary consequence. 
Whilst it is undeniable that these more basic problems exist in individuals with autism, it
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can also be argued that they result from a ToM deficit. Furthermore, while many o f these 
abilities appear in normal development prior to explicit mental state understanding, it has 
already been argued that signs of an implicit ToM appear at a much earlier age (see 
introduction to section 1.1). The most notable of these more basic problems is the striking 
lack of pretend play (Wing & Gould, 1979) which would normally be seen in early 
childhood; pretence involves the decoupling of one’s own representation o f reality from 
the make-believe representation (Leslie, 1987), exacdy the problem proposed by the 
mentalising theory. Similarly, joint attention is known to be impaired in young children 
with autism (Charman, 1998); this also requires mentalising skill as the child must 
understand another’s direction of eye gaze to be meaningful and therefore to consider their 
thoughts or intentions in order to look to the same place to gain the same information 
(Baron-Cohen, 1989d). The imitation deficits seen in autism (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling 
& Rinaldi, 1998) may occur due to a lack of understanding o f the other person’s intentions 
and a poor representation of that person in relation to themselves.
1. 1.9 Specificity of mentalising impairment to  autism
In a meta-analysis of ToM performance across children with autism, those with mental 
retardation and normally developing children, Yirmiya et al. (1998) found no differences 
between the former two groups of children and thus suggest that autism does not differ 
from certain other disorders involving mental retardation when careful group matching is 
employed. A number of studies have also indicated that children with specific language 
impairment (SLI) may perform poorly on false belief tasks compared to IQ-matched 
controls (Bishop, 1997; Farmer, 2000; Shields, Varley, Broks & Simpson, 1996), and it has 
been suggested that mentalising ability may rely on language development and 
communicative competence. However, one study has indicated that in everyday life 
children with SLI use belief and thought terms in speech in the same way as normally 
developing children do, whilst those with autism are more likely to refer to desires (Ziatas
et al., 2003), indicating that their poor performance on the false belief task may not result 
from mentalising failure. Additionally, another recent study found good false belief task 
performance in children with SLI when the linguistic demands of the task were reduced 
(Miller, 2004), supporting the idea that these children fail such tasks due to their linguistic 
complexity rather than their mentalising demands.
Furthermore, ToM task performance has been found to be impaired in children who are 
congenitally deaf (Peterson & Siegal, 1995) or blind (Minter, Hobson & Bishop, 1998). 
However, the ToM development of deaf children has also been shown to be delayed but 
not deviant in its progression (Peterson, Wellman & Liu, 2005) and deaf children with deaf 
parents who therefore have access to fluent sign-language from birth have normal ToM 
task performance (Courtin, 2000). It seems likely that both language learning and 
experience are necessary for good ToM task performance, as well as an implicit ToM, and 
it is these former factors that are deficient in deaf and blind children and the latter in 
children with autism.
There does however appear to be robust evidence of ToM deficits in schizophrenia (Frith,
1992), with a number o f studies reporting impaired performance (Harrington, Langdon, 
Siegert & McClure, 2005; Langdon, Coltheart & Ward, 2006; Mazza, De Risio, Surian, 
Roncone & Casacchia, 2001; Murphy, 2006) even below own control task performance. It 
appears that only a subpopulation of individuals with this diagnosis have such difficulties 
however, namely those with negative or disorganised symptoms, and that the impairment 
in these patients is not as severe as in autism (Pickup & Frith, 2001). As in autism, 
mentalising ability seems to predict social functioning (Roncone et al., 2002). However, the 
differences between autism and schizophrenia in terms of onset of the disorder may be key 
in differentiating them and retaining their specificity.
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1.2 Executive function
The second major cognitive theory o f autism, executive function, was initially suggested 
due to similarities in behaviour that were noted between patients with acquired frontal lobe 
damage and individuals with autism, particularly repetitive and socially inappropriate 
behaviour (Damasio & Maurer, 1978; Ozonoff et al., 1991b; Prior & Hoffmann, 1990; 
Rumsey, 1985). Frontal lobe patients commonly have problems with tasks tapping 
executive functions, including planning, flexibility, inhibition, working memory, 
generativity and self-monitoring, all thought to be involved in maintaining a problem­
solving set for attainment of a future goal (Duncan, 1986).
1.2 .1 Executive function in autism
A number o f experiments have now reported similar deficits in autistic populations across 
the different executive functions. Problems with planning have been seen on the Tower of 
Hanoi task (or its variants the Tower of London, the Nepsy Tower and the Stockings of 
Cambridge), revealed in less efficient strategy use particularly for more complex problems 
(Bennetto, Pennington & Rogers, 1996; Hughes, Russell & Robbins, 1994; Joseph, 
McGrath & Tager-Flusberg, 2005a; Landa & Goldberg, 2005; Ozonoff et al., 2004; 
O zonoff & Jensen, 1999; Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991a), as well as on Milner 
mazes (Prior & Hoffmann, 1990) and the Luria bar task (Hughes, 1996). Ozonoff et al. 
(2004) have recently found this to be the case across a wide range o f ages and ability levels.
The most commonly used test of mental flexibility is the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task 
(WCST). Individuals with autism typically have problems with unprompted shifting 
between sets, tending to perseverate with the previously used strategy despite feedback 
after each trial (Bennetto et al., 1996; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; O zonoff et al., 1991a; 
Prior & Hoffmann, 1990; Rumsey, 1985; Shu, Lung, Tien & Chen, 2001; Steel, Gorman & 
Flexman, 1984; Szatmari, Tuff, Finlayson & Bartolucci, 1990). The Trail-making test, in
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which individuals must shift flexibly between consecutive numbers and letters, has also 
revealed flexibility impairments in autism (Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988), as has the Intra- 
/Extra-Dimensional Shift Task (ID /ED ); in this task, problems were limited to shifting 
between sets (ED) rather than general response perseveration (Hughes et al., 1994; 
Ozonoff et al., 2004). Again, similar to the planning domain, it seems that these problems 
occur at all ages and ability levels (Ozonoff et al., 2004). Courchesne et al. (1994) have 
suggested that such problems with mental flexibility may reflect a difficulty in switching 
attention between stimuli or tasks. This is also supported by evidence that individuals with 
autism are slower to orient to peripheral stimuli (Wainwright & Bryson, 1996) and slower 
at responding to cues compared to controls (Townsend, Harris & Courchesne, 1996; 
Wainwright-Sharp & Bryson, 1993).
Tests o f inhibition and working memory have less often been used with individuals with 
autism. A few inhibition tasks have highlighted problems in children with autism; on the 
Windows task requiring the participant to point away from a reward in order to receive it 
(Hughes & Russell, 1993; Russell, Hala & Hill, 2003; Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe & Tidswell, 
1991), on a G o/N o-G o task requiring inhibition o f a prepotent response (Ozonoff,
Strayer, McMahon & Filloux, 1994), on the similar Knock-Tap task requiring the child to 
knock in response to the experimenter’s tap and vice versa (Joseph et al., 2005a) and on 
antisaccade and delayed saccade tasks requiring the individual to either look in the opposite 
direction from a peripheral stimulus or to look at the stimulus after its offset (Luna, Doll, 
Hegedus, Minshew & Sweeney, 2006). Indeed, Luna et al. found this to be true over a 
range of ages, but for development to occur at the same rate as in normal development 
despite this delay. Working memory problems have been located in both adults and 
children with autism through spatial working memory tasks, such as the block span task 
and the CANTAB spatial working memory task (Bennetto et al., 1996; Goldberg et al., 
2005; Joseph et al., 2005a; Landa & Goldberg, 2005; Morris et al., 1999). Verbal working 
memory deficits have also been observed (Digit Span backwards: Kenworthy et al., 2005).
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Generativity is a further area o f executive function that has been investigated in autism.
This is normally assessed through fluency tasks, in which the participant must produce 
responses according to a particular category given to them. This has been found with 
verbal fluency tasks (Boucher, 1988; Kleinhans, Akshoomoff & Delis, 2005; Minshew, 
Goldstein, Muenz & Payton, 1992; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988; Turner, 1999), as well as 
in ideational fluency (Turner, 1999) and design fluency (Lewis & Boucher, 1995). 
Furthermore, the strategies used to produce responses tend to be more repetitive; Williams, 
Moss, Bradshaw & Rinehart (2002) found that individuals with autism were more likely to 
repeat the previous digit than controls in a random number generation task and Rinehart, 
Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton & Tonge (2006) observed repetitive strategies such as 
alternating between two responses.
1.2.2 Brain basis of executive function in autism
As already mentioned in section 1.1.2, abnormalities in prefrontal cortex are known to exist 
in autism and executive dysfunction is naturally associated with frontal lobe dysfunction in 
patients with acquired brain lesions. Whether any o f these prefrontal abnormalities are 
associated with executive functions has recently begun to be investigated through 
functional imaging studies. Muller, Pierce, Ambrose, Allen & Courchesne (2001) required 
their adults to plan and perform a simple finger movement task and found identical but 
increased activation in the autism group compared to controls in areas of prefrontal cortex. 
More recently, Schmitz et al. (2006) also found increased activity in areas o f the parietal & 
frontal lobes when adults with autism performed tasks o f inhibition (G o/N o-G o, Stroop) 
and flexibility. These authors suggested that this increase in activity may be due to 
compensation as no behavioural differences were observed between the groups. One 
further study has shown reduced activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the 
posterior cingulate in adults with autism whilst performing a spatial working memory task 
(Luna et al., 2002). Furthermore, Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana & Minshew (2006)
compared brain activity on a planning task (Tower o f London) and, whilst finding very 
similar brain activity in adults with autism and controls, found lower synchronization 
between frontal and parietal areas in autism, indicative o f underconnectivity and therefore a 
lack of integration of information. However, despite these positive results, it is still a 
matter of debate whether executive dysfunction and prefrontal abnormalities are primary in 
autism, are the result of abnormalities in other related brain areas or are purely comorbid 
due to proximity of brain areas responsible for executive functions and for other functions 
primary to autism.
1.2.3 Broader phenotype
Evidence for the existence of the broader phenotype in autism in the domain of executive 
function comes from a number of studies looking at different aspects of executive 
dysfunction. Ozonoff et al. (1993) were the first to study the siblings of children with 
autism, finding impaired performance compared to the siblings o f learning disabled 
children on a planning task (Tower o f Hanoi) and a flexibility task (WCST; borderline 
significance). Similarly, Hughes et al. (1997a; 1999) tested parents and siblings of children 
with autism and found poor planning (Tower of London), flexibility (ID /ED ) and 
generativity (verbal fluency; siblings only) but good or even superior working memory 
(verbal and spatial memory span) and Piven & Palmer (1997) showed that two parents of 
autistic children performed worse than the parents of children with Downs Syndrome on 
both performance IQ tests, thought to tap into executive dysfunction, and a planning task 
(Tower of Hanoi). However, more recently Bolte & Poustka (2006) found no differences 
between parents of children with autism, early onset schizophrenia or learning difficulties 
on tests of planning (Tower o f Hanoi and Trail-making) or flexibility (WCST) but this may 
have been due to issues of task sensitivity.
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1.2.4 Relation to  mentalising
Russell (1997) argues that an inability to inhibit prepotent responses may not only be able 
to explain the pattern o f executive results but also those supporting the mentalising theory. 
Specifically, an inability to stop oneself from responding to the prepotent stimulus could 
explain the failure of many autistic children on false-belief tasks. More generally, this 
would suggest that individuals with autism are unable to think about others’ mental states 
as their own mental state is too potent. Although the false photograph task (Charman & 
Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leekam & Pemer, 1991) was designed to rule out exactly this 
problem, Russell, Saltmarsh & Hill (1999b) claim that a novel version of this task is just as 
difficult for children with autism as the false belief task, indicating a general inability to 
inhibit prepotent responses.
From this hypothesis, correlations between performance on mentalising and prepotent 
inhibition tests would be expected, or at least co-occurrence of deficits. Very few studies 
have measured abilities on both types of task in the same individuals with autism and those 
that do, do not always report such relationships (eg. Pellicano et al., 2006). The first study 
to compare these abilities examined the proportion of individuals passing both mentalising 
and executive function tasks and found fewer children to be impaired on mentalising than 
executive function tasks (Ozonoff et al., 1991a), possibly indicative o f primacy of executive 
function in autism. However, this may say more about the levels of task difficulty than 
about underlying impairments. In addition though, these abilities were also correlated in 
Ozonoff et al.’s study. More recently, Joseph & Tager-Flusberg (2004) found that ToM 
performance only related to performance on the Knock-Tap test o f prepotent inhibition, 
not to other executive measures, after accounting for general ability and language level.
However, two problems also immediately arise with this hypothesis. Firstly, individuals 
with autism have difficulty with some mentalising tasks that do not involve prepotent 
responses, for example, the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b) and silent geometric
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animations (Abell et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2002; Klin, 2000). Secondly, executive 
function may not be the limiting factor in mentalising task performance in children with 
autism. From the literature on normal development, there is some indication that both 
mentalising skills and the ability to inhibit prepotent responses are necessary to pass false 
belief tasks (Roth & Leslie, 1998). These authors also suggest that the pattern of 
performance in 3 year olds and children with autism on false belief tasks is different; whilst 
3 year olds may fail due to poor executive control needed to allow false beliefs to 
conceptually stand out, they suggest that autistic children may fail due to an impairment in 
the mentalising mechanism.
1.2.5 Relation to  symptoms
The executive function theory attempts primarily to account for many of the non-social 
features of autism, particularly the obsessive interests, rituals, insistence on sameness, and 
repetitive & stereotyped thoughts, words & behaviour, although some accounts go so far as 
to explain the social features as well (eg. Russell, 1997). However, many of these 
behaviours are also found in individuals with other developmental disorders and more 
generally in learning disability, so they may not be specific to autism or a defining feature 
(Hagerman, 1999; Mazzocco, Baumgardner, Freund & Reiss, 1998). This opens the 
question of specificity, hence only those studies accounting for IQ will be considered in 
this section and other developmental disorders will be addressed in section 1.2.8. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that repetitive behaviours may emerge after other autistic 
features (Cox et al., 1999; Stone et al., 1999), possibly indicating that they are secondary 
features; alternatively, this late emergence may be due to brain maturation affects and 
genetic influences coming online later in development.
The first study to consider the relationship between executive function and the symptoms 
of autism found strong relationships between each of inhibition and generation with
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specific classes of repetitive behaviours (Turner, 1996). More recently, a number of studies 
have also begun to investigate this relationship in other aspects of executive function and 
the behavioural triad. Verte, Guerts, Roeyers, Oosterlaan & Sergeant (2006) found that 
performance on tasks of working memory, planning and generativity by children with 
autism was related to the overall severity of symptoms seen. Liss et al. (2001) found that 
performance on a number of different tests of executive dysfunction in autism was related 
to the severity of social impairments and repetitive behaviours, although these relationships 
were no longer significant after accounting for verbal ability. More specifically, spatial 
working memory has been shown to be weakly related to the impaired social behaviours 
seen in autism (Landa & Goldberg, 2005) and perseveration to joint attention and social 
interaction skills, independent o f verbal ability (although the correlation was calculated 
across both the autism and control groups; McEvoy, Rogers & Pennington, 1993). 
Furthermore, flexibility has been found to predict later social functioning (Berger, Aerts, 
van Spaendonck, Cools & Teunisse, 2003). Gilotty, Kenworthy, Sirian, Black & Wagner 
(2002) reported correlations between a parental report of executive problems and both 
social and communication abilities in children with autism and Happe, Booth, Charlton & 
Hughes (2006) report similar findings from tests of executive function. Bishop & Norbury 
(2005a) also found correlations between both verbal and non-verbal fluency and 
communication abilities in children with autism as well as children with pragmatic language 
impairment and specific language impairment. In the domain o f restrictive and repetitive 
behaviours, Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff & Lai (2005) found relationships between the 
presence of these behaviours and flexibility, working memory and inhibition but not 
planning and generativity tasks.
However, Joseph & Tager-Flusberg (2004) found that executive functions could only 
explain significant variance in communication ability after accounting for language, but not 
in social or repetitive behaviours. Furthermore, Stahl & Pry (2005) found no relationship 
between flexibility and joint attention in young children with autism, Bishop & Norbury
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(2005b) found no relationship between verbal and non-verbal inhibition and any aspect of 
autistic symptomatology, O zonoff et al. (2004) found no relationship between either a 
planning task (stockings o f Cambridge) or a flexibility task (ID /ED ) and any aspect of 
autistic symptoms or adaptive behaviour, and Teunisse, Cools, van Spaendonck, Aerts & 
Berger (2001) found no relationship between executive dysfunction and symptomatology. 
Such mixed results are likely to reflect the range o f measures used, both in the cognitive 
and behavioural domains, making it difficult to draw any firm conclusions.
1.2.6 Negative findings
The executive dysfunction theory o f autism has proved more difficult to replicate from 
experiment to experiment than the mentalising theory and this lack o f group differences 
across a number of studies should be taken especially seriously for a deficit theory as 
impaired performance is generally expected in a clinical sample. This is the case across all 
aspects of executive function, although more so for some than others, implying that some 
aspects of executive function may be impaired whilst others may not be. It is also common 
to find double dissociations within the literature, with some authors, for example, finding 
intact planning but impaired flexibility and vice versa. Again, it is important to remember 
that there can be a number of different explanations for negative results: task sensitivity, 
heterogeneity, improvement and compensation, or an incorrect theory.
Relatively few negative results appear to be present in the domains o f planning and 
flexibility. Goldberg et al. (2005) found good planning (Stockings of Cambridge) and 
flexibility (ID /ED ) performance compared to normally developing children and those with 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Flexibility was also intact in a number 
of studies showing good performance on the WCST (Minshew et al., 1992; Nyden,
Gillberg, Hjelmquist & Heiman, 1999; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999) and on the ID /E D  task 
(Edgin & Pennington, 2005). Indeed, on the ID /E D  task, Landa & Goldberg (2005)
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found problems with the ID component of the task, where perseveration of the same rule 
despite non-critical stimuli changes is favoured, and enhanced ED  ability, which is thought 
to reflect cognitive flexibility. Similarly, Kleinhans et al. (2005) found enhanced 
performance in adults and adolescents with autism on the Trail-making task.
In the areas of working memory and generativity, a similar proportion o f negative findings 
exist. A number of studies have reported no problems with spatial working memory in 
autism compared to controls (Edgin & Pennington, 2005; Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001). Both 
Minshew, Goldstein & Siegal (1995) and Scott & Baron-Cohen (1996) found little evidence 
of generativity problems on verbal fluency tasks, as did Turner (1999) on a design fluency 
task, and Kleinhans et al. (2005) actually found superior performance on a design fluency 
task.
A much larger number of negative results exist in the domain of inhibition, which therefore 
may be relatively intact in autism. Intact performance has been found on the Stroop 
(Eskes, Bryson & McCormick, 1990; Goldberg et al., 2005; O zonoff & Jensen, 1999) and 
one study even found superior performance on this task (Kleinhans et al., 2005), indicating 
a lack of the normal interference effect seen; this was not due to poor reading automaticity 
as reading ability was within the normal range. On a G o/N o-G o task, Ozonoff et al.
(1994) found intact inhibition of neutral responses; both O zonoff & Strayer (1997) and 
Brian, Tipper, Weaver & Bryson (2003) have found normal levels of inhibition on a 
negative priming task requiring suppression o f a response to irrelevant distractors; and 
Ozonoff & Strayer also reported normal performance on a stop-signal task requiring the 
inhibition of a motor response to neutral and prepotent stimuli. Russell, Jarrold & Hood 
(1999a) similarly found intact performance on a day-night task, where the child must first 
respond correctly to day and night pictures and later give the opposite response, and on the 
tubes task, where the child must predict where an object dropped down a bent tube will 
land (directly below the drop point or directly below the base of the bent tube).
39
Russell (1997) provides a possible explanation for the rather mixed inhibition findings. He 
suggests that individuals with autism have an inability only to inhibit prepotent responses, 
those with an existing affordance attached to them. Russell goes further in explaining why 
this specific problem occurs, suggesting that children with autism have problems following 
arbitrary rules, which is particularly the case when inhibiting a prepotent response. This 
begins to address some of the difficulties individuals with autism have with other executive 
tasks that require the child to perform tasks with arbitrary rules that would not normally 
occur in everyday life. This appears to explain some but not all of the discrepant results. 
However, more recently Biro & Russell (2001) have suggested that individuals with autism 
also have problems with self-monitoring through inner speech. A common strategy for 
solving executive tasks with arbitrary rules is to use verbal mediation or inner speech to 
verbally encode the rules in order to prompt and monitor oneself throughout the task.
This strategy can only be used when a verbal response does not need to be made; when a 
verbal response is involved, interference between the response and inner speech makes this 
strategy counterproductive. Russell therefore suggests that problems will occur for 
individuals with autism only on non-verbal tasks when arbitrary rules are present.
In addition to those studies showing intact inhibition o f neutral responses and impaired 
inhibition of prepotent responses, a couple o f studies specifically provide support for 
Russell’s hypothesis. Hughes’ (1996) study using the Luria hand game found that 
inhibition of a prepotent response was impaired and was related to self-awareness and self- 
control o f thoughts, as well as to verbal ability, indicating an inability to use language in the 
control of thoughts in this task. Joseph, Steele, Meyer & Tager-Flusberg (2005b) found 
that high-functioning children with autism had problems with visual working memory tasks 
only when verbal encoding was possible from meaningful as opposed to non-meaningful 
pictures. Furthermore, their verbal memory span was not impaired, indicating a problem 
with using verbal mediation to monitor goals rather than with remembering the stimuli. 
However, it was unclear from this study whether the children with autism were not
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processing the stimuli as meaningful objects, rather than not verbally labelling them. In 
addition, a study by Kleinhans et al. (2005) revealed the opposite pattern with problems on 
verbal but not non-verbal tasks.
It seems that careful group matching is particularly critical for studies of executive function 
as IQ has a huge effect on executive function performance (Duncan, Burgess & Emslie, 
1995); indeed this may go some way towards explaining some of the discrepant findings.
In addition, it may be that executive problems are related to the presence of 
neuropathology rather than autism per se and so would be undetectable in lower functioning 
individuals with learning disabled comparison groups. Furthermore, a number of studies 
using very young children with autism have found a lack of group differences across a wide 
range of executive tests (Dawson et al., 2002; Griffith, Pennington, Wehner & Rogers,
1999; Rutherford & Rogers, 2003), suggesting either that these problems are secondary to 
autism and develop later or that all young children also show executive problems, albeit for 
different reasons. At the other end of the age range, Happe et al. (2006) recently found no 
differences in executive abilities between older high-functioning children with autism (13 
years) and IQ-matched controls, whilst seeing stark differences in the younger but equally 
high-functioning sample (9 years), indicating improvement in function with age. Only a 
narrow age window may be available in which to locate executive dysfunction. This may 
indicate that executive control does not develop immediately in young normally-developing 
children and that it can be overcome or compensated for with age and ability.
Alternatively, this may simply indicate that the tasks used are not sensitive to the underlying 
impairments at different ages due to ceiling or floor effects.
1.2.7 Heterogeneity
As will now be obvious, the literature on executive function deficits in autism is highly 
inconsistent (Hill, 2004b), despite its explanatory power particularly in terms o f the non-
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social symptoms. In such a case, there is merit in investigating individual results; these are 
rarely reported, making it hard to assess whether executive functions are impaired in a 
subgroup of the autistic population. A small number o f studies do provide such 
information on individual performance however. Whereas Ozonoff et al. (1991a) reported 
executive dysfunction, as assessed by the WCST and Tower of Hanoi task, in 96% of their 
autism sample, few replications of this level of universality have since been reported. 
Pellicano et al. (2006) report executive impairment in at most 50% of individuals across a 
range of executive tasks, as do Kenworthy et al. (2005) on tasks of inhibition, flexibility, 
planning and working memory, Berger et al. (2003) on a range of flexibility tasks, Teunisse 
et al. (2001) on a flexibility task, Liss et al. (2001) on the WCST and Ozonoff & Jensen 
(1999) on the WCST and Tower o f Hanoi task. Although this may say more about test 
sensitivity than universality, the estimate of less than 50% of the autism population having 
a detectable executive function deficit seems fairly robust across studies (Hill, 2004a).
1.2.8 Specificity of executive dysfunction to  autism
Probably the most challenging problem for the executive function theory of autism is that 
o f discriminant validity: whether the executive deficits that are seen are specific to autism 
or also seen in other disorders. In particular, many other developmental disorders have 
been linked to executive dysfunction, including but not limited to attention deficit 
disorders, phenylketonuria, Tourette’s Syndrome, oppositional defiant disorder and 
conduct disorder, indicating that such specificity is not present (Diamond, Prevor, 
Callender & Druin, 1997; Sergeant, Geurts & Oosterlaan, 2002; Toupin, Dery, Pauze, 
Mercier & Fortin, 2000; Watkins et al., 2005). It is currently unknown whether different 
aspects of executive function can discriminate between these different disorders and 
therefore which aspect is impaired in autism, or whether all of these disorders have the 
same underlying problem that therefore cannot discriminate between disorders, explain 
disorder specific-behaviour or be causal to them.
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An explosion of experiments comparing different clinical groups has occurred over the last 
five years as the merits of this methodology have come to light. Two studies have 
indicated planning problems in autism in comparison to ADHD (Geurts, Verte,
Oosterlaan, Roeyers & Sergeant, 2004; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999) and Tourette’s Sydrome 
(Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999), a number have indicated flexibility problems in comparison to 
ADHD (Geurts et al., 2004; Gioia, Isquith, Kenworthy & Barton, 2002; Ozonoff & Jensen, 
1999) and Tourette’s Sydrome (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Ozonoff et al., 1994) and 
inhibition of a prepotent response has also been suggested as a problem in comparison to 
Tourette’s Syndrome in one study (Verte, Geurts, Roeyers, Oosterlaan & Sergeant, 2005). 
Generativity has also been identified as a problem in autism in comparison to both ADHD 
(Happe et al., 2006) and Tourette’s Sydrome (Verte et al., 2005). Children with ADHD on 
the other hand tend to show problems with inhibition (Gioia et al., 2002; Happe et al.,
2006; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999). However, a handful o f studies find no differences 
between children with autism and those with ADHD on tasks tapping planning (Booth, 
Charlton, Hughes & Happe, 2003; Goldberg et al., 2005), flexibility (Goldberg et al., 2005; 
Tsuchiya, Oki, Yahara & Fujieda, 2005), or inhibition and spatial working memory 
(Goldberg et al., 2005), or with those with Tourette’s on a range of working memory tasks 
(Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001). Again, mixed results dominate the literature.
A recent interest in the role of language in performance of executive function tasks has 
utilised the same methodology with language-impaired groups in comparison to autism.
Liss et al. (2001) compared children with autism to those with specific language impairment 
and found more perseverative responses on the WCST in children with autism but 
comparable performance on a planning task. However, these differences disappeared 
when differences between the groups in verbal ability levels were controlled. Similarly, 
Bishop & Norbury (2005b) compared children with autism to those with either specific or 
pragmatic language impairment on tasks o f verbal and non-verbal inhibition and found
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worse performance compared to controls across all three groups. These results indicate 
that language may play an important role in performance on executive function tasks.
1.3 Central coherence
The central coherence theory is quite different in nature to the mentalising and executive 
function theories as it proposes a different information processing style rather than a 
specific deficit (Happe & Frith, 2006). Individuals with autism are thought to be good at 
processing ‘local’ details of information rather than applying the context and extracting the 
‘global’ meaning. This enhanced ability to perceive the elements rather than the whole and 
the subsequent lack of drive for gist or gestalt has therefore been termed ‘weak central 
coherence’ (Frith, 1989).
1.3 .1 Central coherence in autism
Initial experiments supporting this theory involved mainly visuo-spatial tasks requiring 
attention to detail, such as the Embedded Figures Test (Shah & Frith, 1983) & Block 
Design subtest o f the WISC (Shah & Frith, 1993). Specifically, these tasks required the 
participant to disengage from the overall image and focus on smaller components within 
the image. Individuals with autism typically perform better than normally developing 
individuals on such tasks, a surprising finding especially given superiority relative to a 
typically developing group is difficult to find in any disordered population. Indeed, the 
Block Design result was a particularly interesting finding as performance on this task was 
compared to performance when the designs were pre-segmented, a condition that greatly 
aided the normally developing children but not those with autism. This was a strong 
indicator that the children with autism were naturally perceiving the designs to be 
composed o f their constituent parts. These results have been replicated by a variety of 
authors with participants o f differing ages and abilities (Embedded Figures: Edgin & 
Pennington, 2005; Jarrold, Gilchrist & Bender, 2005; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997;
Morgan, Maybery & Durkin, 2003; Ropar & Mitchell, 1999; van Lang, Bouma, Sytema, 
Kraijer & Minderaa, 2006b; although see section 5.1 for a more detailed analysis o f these 
results) (Block Design: Caron, Mottron, Berthiaume & Dawson, 2006).
Another popular method utilised to investigate central coherence involves the use of 
Navon letters; these are large letters made up of multiple smaller letter components, hence 
introducing a single global element made up o f multiple local elements (see section 5.2 for 
examples and a more detailed review). Although the exact paradigms used vary, individuals 
with autism generally show enhanced detection of local over global targets compared to 
controls, particularly when their attention is not directed to a particular level within the 
stimuli (Plaisted, Swettenham & Rees, 1999). Similarly, children with autism often show 
interference from local information when performing global processing whilst controls 
tend to show the opposite pattern (Behrmann et al., 2006; Plaisted et al., 1999; Rinehart, 
Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton & Tonge, 2000).
In addition to these commonly used techniques, a range of different paradigms across 
different modalities have been employed at both high and low levels of processing to 
support the existence o f weak central coherence in autism. In the visual domain, Happe 
(1996) found evidence o f a lack of integration of features in autism through a range of 
illusion tasks tapping into low level visual perceptual processes; individuals with autism 
were less likely to succumb to these illusions. Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen (1997) found a trend 
towards superior performance in adults with autism on a novel version of the Rey Figure 
test, replicated by Ropar & Mitchell (2001). Mottron, Belleville & Menard (1999a) noted 
that children with autism were more likely to first produce local elements when attempting 
a copying task whilst controls tended to start with the global outline. Additionally, they 
were less affected by figure impossibility than controls, indicating a lack of effect of 
perception of the global object on their drawing. Similar results were also reported by 
Booth, Charlton, Hughes & Happe (2003) in comparison to a clinical ADH D group.
Jarrold & Russell (1997) showed that normally developing children were quicker at 
counting dots when they were arranged canonically (as on dice) rather than randomly, 
whereas children with autism showed no advantage from canonical arrangement. This 
finding has since been replicated by Gagnon, Mottron, Bherer & Joanette (2004).
However, the individual results in Jarrold & Russell’s study did not indicate that this 
pattern o f performance was present in more individuals in the autism group than the 
control group, instead possibly indicating a stronger effect in those children with autism 
who did show it. Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen (2001) showed that adults with autism were 
worse than controls at mentally integrating separate puzzle pieces to recognise an object, 
whilst performing as well as controls when recognising an object from a single puzzle 
piece. Interestingly, as in Jarrold & Russell’s study, these authors comment on individual 
performance and indicate that this pattern of abnormal performance is present in the 
majority of the participants diagnosed with autism but fewer of those with Asperger 
Syndrome.
More recendy, studies have involved other domains such as language and audition, 
indicating that this is indeed a general processing style rather than restricted to a single 
domain. In the auditory domain, Mottron, Peretz & Menard (2000) found that individuals 
with autism were better at detecting local changes in melody such as pitch changes o f single 
notes that did not affect the overall pitch contour, whilst being matched to controls in 
global changes such as contour change or transpositions. Using a more rigorous method 
of defining local and global changes in pitch, Foxton et al. (2003) also showed that adults 
with autism do not show the normal interference from global structure in an auditory pitch 
change direction-matching task.
In the verbal domain, the most commonly used paradigm involves homographs: two words 
that are spelt the same but have different pronunciations and meanings. Individuals with 
autism have been shown a number of times to make more errors with the less frequent
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word pronunciation, whilst controls modulate their pronunciation dependent on the 
context in which the word is presented (Burnette et al., 2005; Frith & Snowling, 1983; 
Happe, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999b). This may indicate that, instead o f reading a 
sentence for the overall global meaning, individuals with autism may be more inclined to 
read word by word.
The other main area o f language that has been investigated in autism and related to weak 
central coherence is text comprehension. In order to comprehend language and create a 
global representation o f meaning, information must not only be integrated across sentences 
(as in the homographs above) but also between sentences across whole passages of text. In 
addition, language is commonly used in such a way that it is assumed the listener will make 
inferences that are implied in the text, not explicitly supplying such information as it would 
be redundant; this also requires the listener to have a global understanding of the implied 
meaning of the text. Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen (1999b) have shown that individuals with 
autism had problems with exactly this sort of language processing as they had difficulty 
making simple inferences across sentences. The same authors (2000) also found that adults 
with autism were worse at arranging sentences coherently and at making inferences and 
that these abilities were related to each other. Similarly, Norbury & Bishop (2002) found 
that high-functioning individuals with autism were poor at making inferences in story 
comprehension whilst showing good performance on literal understanding of a text. 
Interestingly, whilst previous research has shown comprehension problems in specific 
language impairment (SLI) and pragmatic language impairment (PLI) as well as autism 
(Bishop & Adams, 1992), these authors found that individuals with SLI and PLI who have 
problems with inferences also have problems with literal understanding, indicating that 
their problems are more general than in autism.
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1.3.2 Brain basis of central coherence in autism
Unlike the mentalising domain, there has been very litde research using imaging studies to 
investigate central coherence. Ring et al. (1999) scanned adults with autism whilst 
performing the Embedded Figures Task and found greater activation in the visual system 
in comparison to control adults, suggesting that the adults with autism were analysing 
object features more whilst the controls were performing the same task through top down 
control and working memory. Belmonte & Yurgelun-Todd (2003) conducted a functional 
brain imaging study with adults with autism that indicated that low level problems with 
selective attention arose from overconnectivity and hyperarousal but reduced selectivity, 
resulting in a WCC processing style. However, these experiments need to be extended to 
include proper control tasks and the area of central coherence generally needs further 
investigation before conclusions about the brain systems involved can be formed. One 
recent scanning study o f the Embedded Figures task in normal adults has used a more 
strict control task and found activation in left inferior and superior parietal cortex (Manjaly 
et al., 2003). Further replication and application to autism, as well as more rigorous 
comparison conditions, are therefore required to make sense of these disparate findings.
At the biological level, a number of suggestions have been made concerning the cause of 
weak central coherence. In their recent review, Dakin and Frith (2005) discuss the 
possibility that the magnocellular pathway, an early section o f the dorsal visual stream 
processing primarily motion information, is deficient in autism. Children with autism show 
impaired detection of motion coherence using random dot kinematograms (Milne et al., 
2002; Spencer et al., 2000) and performance on this task is related to perfomance on the 
Embedded Figures Test (Pellicano, Gibson, Maybery, Durkin & Badcock, 2005).
However, children with autism also show retained low level dorsal stream functioning 
through a flicker contrast sensitivity paradigm (Pellicano et al., 2005) and a Gabor patch 
detection paradigm (Del Viva, Igliozzi, Tancredi & Brizzolara, 2006), indicating that
abnormalities in this pathway do not occur until a later stage of processing and are 
therefore unlikely to indicate magnocellular abnormalities. On the other hand, Mottron, 
Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert & Burack (2006) claim that, consistent with these results, 
differences should only be seen at later stages of visual processing as these later stages are 
likely to tap into global as well as local processing.
A further suggestion considers the possibility that weak central coherence results from 
neuronal under-connectivity. This under-connectivity may result from either structural or 
functional differences, due to a lack of synchronisation in activation (Brock, Brown, 
Boucher & Rippon, 2002) or abnormal physical connectivity (Just, Cherkassky, Keller & 
Minshew, 2004) between relevant brain areas resulting in a lack of binding of parts into 
wholes, or numerous and inefficient feedback connections resulting in a lack of top-down 
modulation of early sensory processing through a lack of integration o f sensory processing 
with cognitive monitoring (Frith, 2003a). All o f these ideas predict that the under­
connectivity would give rise to a preserved or enhanced ability for exemplar-based 
information processing, in addition to a reduced ability to generalise across examples or 
process information in context, reminiscent o f the style of processing proposed by the 
central coherence theory.
One of the most consistent neurobiological findings, which was also noticed by Kanner 
(1943), is o f increased head and brain size and weight in autism. Approximately 20% of 
the autistic population are thought to have macrocephaly, when defined as having a head 
circumference greater than the 97th percentile of the normal population (Bailey et al., 1995; 
Lainhart et al., 1997; Stevenson, Schroer, Skinner, Fender & Simensen, 1997) and two 
postmortem studies of increased brain weight have supported this finding (Bailey et al., 
1993; Bauman & Kemper, 1985). This enlargement appears to be general across the whole 
of the cerebral cortex (Hazlett et al., 2005). Very recently, a possible genetic mutation in
the PTEN gene has been suggested as the cause of macrocephaly in autism (Butler et al., 
2005).
However, macrocephaly cannot normally be detected until approximately 2 years of age 
(Courchesne et al., 2001; Lainhart et al., 1997; Stevenson et al., 1997) although a recent 
brain imaging study indicated that the increased rate of head growth starts at about 12 
months of age (Hazlett et al., 2005). These findings suggest a decrease in the neuronal 
elimination processes of pruning and apoptosis, which take place early on in postnatal 
development, leading to an excess number of neurones. After an initial proliferation of 
synapses early in development, pruning occurs in normal development to eliminate faulty 
feedback connections and optimise co-ordinated neural functioning. Furthermore, such 
elimination is dependent on the information entering the system so that feedback 
connections particularly can be refined. Additionally, there is evidence that feed forward 
connections are established very early in development whereas feedback connections are 
continually refined (Price et al., 2006); this coincides with the increased rate of head growth 
from about 12 months of age. This suggestion is therefore consistent with the under­
connectivity hypotheses mentioned above and therefore also with weak central coherence. 
Furthermore, a computational model of autism has been constructed in which a lack of 
generalisation results from an increase in units (Cohen, 1994; Gustafsson, 1997).
1.3.3 Broader phenotype
It has been suggested that there may be a continuum in processing style from weak to 
strong central coherence and therefore that weak central coherence may also be present in 
the normal population albeit less commonly (Happe, 1999), although there is limited 
evidence that this processing style is qualitatively different in autism (Jarrold et al., 2005). 
The presence of weak central coherence in the unaffected parents o f individuals with 
autism has been investigated and indicates that fathers show a piecemeal processing style
across a number of tasks (Happe, Briskman & Frith, 2001), as well as showing similar levels 
on an individual basis of preference for non-social activities and detail-focussed processing 
on self-reports (Briskman, Happe & Frith, 2001). This finding was replicated by Bolte & 
Poustka (2006) using the Embedded Figures Test, although they found no effects for the 
Block Design task. Furthermore, Baron-Cohen et al. (2006) recently found that parents of 
children with autism show reduced activity in extrastriate visual brain areas whilst 
performing the Embedded Figures Test, and engineers and other scientists have been 
found to be over-represented among the unaffected parents of children with autism 
(Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2001), indicating that this processing style may be 
advantageous for these professions.
1.3.4 Relation to  mentalising and executive function
Weak central coherence may therefore be a beneficial skill to possess in some cases. How 
then might this processing style be related to the problems seen in autism? It was originally 
proposed that weak central coherence might be the primary abnormality responsible for all 
key features of autism (Frith, 1989), causing the mentalising impairment as well as savant 
skills. However, Frith later abandoned this notion (Frith & Happe, 1994) as this would not 
fit with the idea of a continuum across the normal population or correlational evidence that 
performance in these domains is unrelated (Happe, 1994; Pellicano et al., 2006) (although 
see Jarrold, Butler, Cottington & Jimenez, 2000 for evidence in favour of the existence of 
such a relationship). Weak central coherence is therefore now seen as an independent 
factor from ToM in terms of its causal effect in autism. One alternative suggestion has 
been that, in combination with the mentalising deficit, this processing style allows less 
compensation and therefore more severe symptomatology (Happe, 2000), although this has 
yet to be investigated.
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The central coherence account of autism is also similar to the executive function theory in 
that both attempt to explain non-social features o f autism. It has been suggested that 
executive dysfunction could be the result of a lack of top-down control leading to reduced 
inhibition (Frith, 2003a), a hypothesis reminiscent of the poor feedback connections 
suggested in the central coherence theory. One study has shown these two cognitive 
abilities to be related in autism (Pellicano et al., 2006), although this may have been due to 
overlap in requirements of the tasks involved, whilst a second study found no support for a 
relationship (Teunisse et al., 2001), with weak central coherence being present equally in 
autistic individuals with good and poor executive function.
1.3.5 Relation to  symptoms
As weak central coherence is seen as an independent causal factor in autism, it does not try 
to explain many of the defining diagnostic features of autism and indeed symptom profiles 
do not appear to be related to central coherence test performance. Morgan et al. (2003) 
found central coherence to be unrelated to joint attention, pretend play or verbal ability 
and central coherence does not seem to predict later social functioning in adults (Berger et 
al., 2003). Teunisse et al. (2001) also found no relationship between weak central 
coherence and any aspect o f autistic symptomatology. Rather, weak central coherence 
attempts to account for some of the non-social features, particularly obsessive interests, 
attention to detail, poor comprehension, literal understanding of language, hypersensitivity, 
savant skills, indiscriminate approach to people and the uneven spikey IQ profile that is 
typically seen. To mention one of these, savant skills are present in a higher proportion of 
individuals with autism than in the general population and it is thought that piecemeal 
processing may be advantageous in developing such skills, for example, segmenting ability 
for artistic talent (Pring & Hermelin, 2002; Pring, Hermelin & Heavey, 1995). Mottron & 
Belleville (1993) reported the case of an artistic savant who showed a local bias in Navon 
and other central coherence tasks. Furthermore, it has been suggested that central
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coherence may explain some o f the face processing peculiarities seen in autism (Davies, 
Bishop, Manstead & Tantam, 1994), such as the use o f high spatial frequencies to match 
faces (Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner & Tardif, 2004) and the reduced activity in face specific 
brain areas and increased activity in areas normally recruited to process objects or perform 
visual search when processing faces (Hubl et al., 2003). Indeed, face processing ability has 
been correlated to performance on the Navon task (Behrmann et al., 2006).
1.3.6 Negative findings & heterogeneity
The central coherence theory has met with even greater opposition than the mentalising 
theory, not in terms o f plausibility but, similar to the executive function theory, in terms of 
negative findings. Again, it should be remembered that negative results may occur for a 
number of reasons: task sensitivity, heterogeneity, changes over time and strategy use, or 
that the theory is incorrect. A lack of group differences between controls and individuals 
with autism have been found on the Embedded Figures Test and other disembedding tasks 
(Brian & Bryson, 1996), the Block Design subtest (Ozonoff et al., 1991a) and in 
susceptibility to visual illusions (Hoy, Hatton & Hare, 2004; Ropar & Mitchell, 1999). 
Mottron et al. (1993; 1999a; 2003), Ozonoff et al. (1994) and Edgin & Pennington (2005) 
found no group differences on a Navon task and suggested particularly a lack of evidence 
for impaired global processing. Furthermore, whilst finding impairments on the 
homographs test, Burnette et al. (2005) also found impaired performance on the block 
design test, Embedded Figures Test and a pattern construction task. Whilst some o f these 
findings appear to result from methodological issues, such as group matching, task design 
and instructions (see Chapter 5 for a discussion o f the issues surrounding the Embedded 
Figures Test and Navon tasks), the quantity of negative results is notable.
A further problem for the theory is encountered when examining experiments testing weak 
central coherence across tasks and domains. Ropar & Mitchell (2001) found no
relationship between performance of individuals with autism on visual illusions and the 
Embedded Figures Test, Block Design or the Rey Figure test. Lopez & Leekham (2003) 
found evidence in support o f weak central coherence in an autism group on verbal but not 
visual tasks involving processing complex information in context, although this may have 
been due to task difficulty. Moreover, the global impairment in using context mainly 
comes from evidence in the verbal domain and it is possible that these problems are purely 
linguistic rather than general, given the frequent presence of language impairment in autism 
(Norbury, 2005). Indeed, the group differences found by Hoy et al. (2004) on the 
homographs task appeared to be mediated by verbal ability; these vanished when verbal 
ability was accounted for. Burnette et al. (2005) also found performance on the 
homographs task to be related to performance on ToM tests, while other central coherence 
measures were not. It is as yet unknown how these domains within central coherence 
relate to each other and whether it is possible to have weak central coherence manifested in 
one domain only, with different domains affected in different individuals.
The original version of the theory has therefore developed and transformed over the years 
to accommodate many of these findings. A more recent and detailed version of the central 
coherence theory states that, rather than being poor at global processing, autistic 
individuals are simply either superior at, have a bias towards or have a preference for local 
processing when both are in competition but are quite capable o f global processing if 
required under the right conditions (Happe, 1999; Happe & Frith, 2006). Indeed, there is 
now general consensus in the field that global processing is intact (Mottron et al., 2006). 
This goes some way towards incorporating those studies finding a lack of group differences 
or finding intact global processing, particularly those when global and local processing are 
not in competition. Equally, the idea of heterogeneity of this processing bias in the autistic 
population has rarely been studied so this may be a further reason. One recent study 
showing individual results however, reported that some aspect of weak central coherence 
was present in almost all o f the young children with autism tested on a battery of
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visuospatial tasks (Pellicano et al., 2006), although some of these tasks may have produced 
deviant performance for other reasons, such as their executive demands.
1.3.7 O ther explanations of intact and superior abilities in autism
The symptoms o f autism that are addressed by the theory of weak central coherence have 
also been addressed by other theories. Rather than a higher-level cognitive phenomenon, 
both Mottron et al. (2006) and Plaisted, Saksida, Alcantara & Weisblatt (2003) have 
suggested that the local bias may result instead from a difference in low level sensory 
processing, termed ‘Enhanced Perceptual Functioning’ by Mottron et al.. This alternative 
theory emphasises strengths in cognitive processes even more than the central coherence 
theory. The main difference between these theories is whether the local bias results from 
superior bottom-up sensory processing or impaired top-down cognitive control. Evidence 
supporting superior low-level processes comes from findings that children with autism do 
not show the normal advantage for familiar over novel stimuli in a discrimination task 
(Plaisted, O'Riordan & Baron-Cohen, 1998a), indicating enhanced discrimination o f stimuli 
features. Similarly, a group of children with autism had faster reaction times on a 
conjunctive visual search paradigm, indicating enhanced item detection but a lack of 
collation of information (Plaisted, O'Riordan & Baron-Cohen, 1998b). Caron et al. (2006) 
also found that individuals with autism, unlike controls, were unaffected by increasing the 
perceptual cohesiveness of the Block Design task, whilst performing well on a number of 
task manipulations requiring global processing, indicating that whilst being capable of 
processing global information, this did not aid their already superior performance any 
further. All these findings have been attributed to low-level perceptual abnormalities.
These results could be incorporated by either theory and there is currently no evidence to 
enable these theoretical positions to be differentiated. In fact, one recent experiment 
(Pellicano et al., 2006) supports neither position, instead finding normal performance on a
Navon task aimed to differentiate the theories. In the discussion, Plaisted suggests a 
modified theoretical position, that the intact and superior abilities seen in autism could be 
explained rather by a difficulty in moving between local and global processing, specifically 
in the direction local-to-global. While this is reminiscent of executive function theories of 
attention switching in autism (Courchesne et al., 1994), the directionality of the switch 
would be problematic for a general executive theory. Interestingly, this reintroduces the 
idea of a deficit as opposed to a processing style and still leaves open the question of 
whether the origins are in bottom-up or top-down processes. Mann & Walker (2003) 
found that children with autism found it harder to attend to stimuli outside their current 
focus of attention and Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton & Tonge (2001) found worse 
performance on global stimuli in a Navon task when a shift in attention was demanded by 
the proceeding trial requiring local processing. Iarocci, Burack, Shore, Mottron & Enns 
(2006) found that, despite normal performance in global and local visual search tasks, 
children with autism were more sensitive than controls to an implicit local task bias. These 
results appear to be consistent with the idea of a bias towards local processing, resulting in 
performance that is only sometimes deficient or enhanced, rather than an absolute deficit 
or enhancement and that the origin of this bias may conceivably be in attentional 
processes.
1.3.8 Specificity of weak central coherence to  autism
Weak central coherence has not as yet been thoroughly investigated in other clinical 
disorders. William’s Syndrome is thought to involve some element of featural processing, 
such as when drawing (Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai & St George, 2000), but 
individuals with this disorder show normal Embedded Figures Test performance and 
instead show weak mental imagery (Farran, Jarrold & Gathercole, 2001). Patients with 
schizophrenia have been found to show impaired performance when processing motion 
stimuli requiring global visual processing (Chen, Nakayama, Levy, Matthysse & Holzman,
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2003; Johnson, Lowery, Kohler & Turetsky, 2005), although they conversely appear to 
show a local deficit on a Navon task (Bellgrove, Vance & Bradshaw, 2003) and even an 
abnormal global advantage (Granholm, Cadenhead, Shafer & Filoteo, 2002). Patients with 
depression or anxiety with negative mood tend to show a local bias (Hesse & Spies, 1996); 
however, depressed patients also appear to perform more poorly than controls on the 
Embedded Figures Test (Calamari, Pini & Puleggio, 2000). It seems that research on 
central coherence within each o f these disorders is inconsistent and positive results would 
require further replication before a lack of specificity of weak central coherence to autism 
can be assumed.
1.4 Conclusion
It can thus be seen that none of the three major cognitive theories appear to be able to 
account for all the behavioural manifestations of autism. Particularly, none can account for 
the diversity of experimental findings and behaviours seen in different children. Indeed, no 
autism theory or theorist really claims to be able to explain all the features of autism; it is 
generally accepted that autism is likely to include a number of different deficits, and indeed 
the evidence so far supports this concept (Frith, 1996; Frith & Happe, 1994; Hill & Frith, 
2003; Ronald et al., 2006; Tager-Flusberg, Joseph & Folstein, 2001). However, it is also 
generally accepted that each theory is true for all individuals on the autism spectrum; as can 
be seen, this has been less well investigated.
The idea that the autism spectrum varies quantitatively, including different severities as well 
as different combinations of symptoms, can possibly be extended to also include qualitative 
differences at the cognitive level, with different children having different underlying 
aetiologies. Indeed, even at the behavioural level, my own anecdotal observations of 
autistic children lead me to believe that certain children diagnosed with autism, particularly 
some of those who are high-functioning, are socially impaired in a different way to the
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majority of autistic children. Some o f these children appear to have a sense or knowledge 
of what is socially appropriate but do not act accordingly, whilst more typical autistic 
children appear unaware of appropriate social behaviour. This leads to the hypothesis that 
there may be subtypes within the autism spectrum with different underlying aetiologies 
producing some similar behaviours. This calls for the investigation of cognitive 
phenotypes, which may be a more pertinent way of classifying children than through 
behaviour.
Indeed, the introduction of different cognitive phenotypes within autism makes sense of 
the heterogeneity within the disorder, as only those individuals who are affected by the 
particular cognitive impairment are included in the explanation. Furthermore, the 
problems of lack of specificity and heterogeneity may also result from studying children 
grouped by diagnosis, rather than by symptoms, given that diagnostic categories are 
composed of ‘pick and mix’-style criteria. Relating cognition to behaviour is therefore 
essential to reduce heterogeneity, increase specificity and provide validity for the cognitive 
theories. Ideally, the search for biological markers would also occur in order to search for 
consistency across levels, but this is mostly beyond the scope of this thesis.
A further dilemma is that these theories are currently being investigated through tests with 
unproven sensitivity and unknown psychometric properties. The assumption made in this 
thesis is therefore that, despite holes and gaps in knowledge, rigorous methodology can be 
applied in order to tie together performance across tests guided by psychological theory 
and behavioural symptoms.
1.5 Aim
The aim of this PhD is therefore to assess each o f the three main cognitive theories of 
autism in a selected sample o f children in order to study their relationship to each other 
with selected tests. This enables cognitive subtypes to be located within the autism
spectrum, at least for a selected sample, and for these to be related to the symptoms seen at 
the behavioural level. In order to do this, I have collected data from tasks tapping 
mentalising, executive functions and central coherence, as well as verbal and performance 
IQ, head-size and information on behavioural symptoms, from a large number of high- 
functioning children on the autism spectrum, as well as normally developing children, 
providing data on possible cognitive (and one biological) markers. This is a multiple case 
study design where individual performance can be assessed within each domain and related 
across domains (see White et al., 2006). Rather than attempting to create new definitions 
of autism or within autism, this study rather attempts to investigate the adequacy of current 
behavioural tests in their ability to tap into the hypothesised cognitive impairments and 
their ability to explain everyday symptoms.
Only one other study has addressed all three cognitive domains in the same children and 
related these to symptoms. Pellicano et al. (2006) studied the relationship of weak central 
coherence with mentalising and executive function in high-functioning 4-7 year old 
children with autism compared to controls. Whilst revealing distinct heterogeneity at least 
within the mentalising and executive function domains, this study needs to be extended 
using different measures to evaluate whether any effects were test dependent, and whether 
they were tied to particular children and methods of diagnosis. Furthermore, it has great 
potential to be extended by also assessing the critical relationship between mentalising and 
executive function and more extensively comparing the cognitive theories to behavioural 
manifestations of the disorder.
Chapter 2: Population
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2 .1 Sample characterisation
The population I have chosen to study is high-functioning junior-school children with a 
range of autism spectrum disorders, as well as normally developing control children.
(From here on I use the term ‘autism spectrum disorder’ or ‘ASD’ to refer to diagnoses 
anywhere on the spectrum, including autism and Asperger Syndrome, not just Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS).) The majority of recent 
research into the cognitive impairments found in ASD has been conducted in higher- 
functioning populations as they have a broader behavioural repertoire and are able to cope 
with higher task demands. Given that the demands of my battery of tests was high, 
involving 3-4 hours of testing, it was considered essential that the children should be 
relatively able and have good concentration. Additionally, as general ability would be 
within the normal range, any effect that general mental retardation might have on 
performance could be eliminated. Furthermore, the use of a sample with intelligence in the 
normal range circumvents the problem of comparison to younger normally developing 
children as well as age and intelligence matched controls. The limited age group here also 
makes the group more homogeneous, making task performance easier to interpret. Even 
more crucially, many high-functioning children, particularly those with Asperger Syndrome, 
are not diagnosed until about 7 years so a junior age but not a younger sample is likely to 
pick up these later-diagnosed children. On the other hand, older children are more likely 
to have received some form of remediation or be compensating for their problems so this 
possibility is minimised in a junior age sample. Thus the choice of this young but high- 
functioning group aims to maximise the presence of abnormal behaviours whilst allowing a 
large battery of tasks to be utilised.
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O f course the disadvantage o f using such a high-functioning population is that some 
abnormal behaviours or performance may have been overlooked or compensated for and 
the results therefore have a more limited application and generalisation to the whole autism 
spectrum. Any conclusions in this thesis therefore must be viewed within these limits. 
However, whilst this type of sample could not be described as the classic ‘text book’ 
description of ASD, these high-functioning children still have significant problems in 
everyday life. Furthermore, such children are numerous and a burden on the educational 
system, thus deserving investigation and recognition.
2 .1. 1 Recruitment
In order to recruit these children, the head Educational Psychologist at both Surrey and 
Sutton Local Education Authorities was contacted and, through this contact, all 
mainstream schools with statemented children on the autism spectrum were approached. 
Approximately 50% of these schools agreed to send consent forms to parents and 
approximately half of the parents approached gave consent. Each school that provided a 
positive consent form for a child on the autism spectrum was also asked to recruit a 
control child of approximately the same age, gender, ethnicity and general ability as the 
child with ASD. N ot every school was able to provide a control child for the study 
however. In addition, specialist schools within Greater London and Surrey with provision 
for children at the high-functioning end of the autism spectrum were approached and a 
small number of these schools were able to recruit children to take part. The Surrey 
branch o f the National Autistic Society also included an advertisement in its newsletter and 
a number o f parents subsequently contacted me directly in order to become involved in the 
study.
In total, 84 children on the autism spectrum and 31 control children were recruited for the 
study. This imbalance in numbers between the groups was intentional, partly because a
greater drop-out was expected in the ASD group but also to allow for sufficient power 
once subgroups had been created within this group. O f these 115 children, 2 control 
children and 3 children with ASD dropped out after the first session due to a change of 
school, 1 control was excluded after the first session due to an additional diagnosis of 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) and possible Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD), and 22 children with ASD were excluded due to an inability to understand and 
comply with the task demands. The remaining 28 control children and 59 with ASD 
therefore comprise the data set. O f the children with ASD, the majority came from 
mainstream primary schools, 8 were recruited through autism units attached to mainstream 
schools (although all these children spent the majority of time in mainstream education) 
and 10 attended schools specialising in autism and related disorders (but these children can 
be considered high functioning given they were able to complete an intensive battery of 
tests).
2 .1.2 Prior diagnoses
All 59 children in the ASD group had previously received a diagnosis somewhere on the 
autism spectrum from a qualified clinician, most commonly from a Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatrist at the local Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service. 10 children had 
received diagnoses o f autism, 31 of Asperger Syndrome, 16 of autism spectrum disorder or 
PDD-NOS and two of semantic pragmatic disorder (SPD) related to the autism spectrum; 
these latter two children were not excluded as it is thought that pragmatic language 
impairment is related to the autism spectrum (Bishop, 1989; Bishop & Norbury, 2002). 
Furthermore, both children were dealt with by the schools in the same way as other 
children on the spectrum; they had been identified as having similar needs and given the 
same help, support and provision. O f all the children involved, 3 also had diagnoses of 
ADHD, one of dyspraxia and one of mild Tourette’s Syndrome. 45 o f these children had 
statements of special educational needs.
2 .1.3 Verification of diagnoses
Interviews are commonly used with parents at diagnosis, in conjunction with behavioural 
observation, in order to obtain a detailed history of the child’s development as well as 
information on the child’s present behaviours. A number of standardised interviews have 
been developed (Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R); Lord, Rutter & Le 
Couteur, 1994; Diagnostic Interview for Social and Communication Disorders (DISCO): 
Wing, Leekam, Libby, Gould & Larcombe, 2002) although many of these are lengthy and 
impractical in a research setting. One such interview, the Developmental, Dimensional and 
Diagnostic Interview (3Di: Skuse et al., 2004) has recendy been developed to be shorter 
and more suitable for research purposes, as well as being particularly suitable for detecting 
mild and high-functioning cases. As the children in the present sample would have been 
diagnosed by different clinicians, possibly using different criteria, diagnoses were verified 
using the 3Di. Interviews were conducted with one or both parents of each child involved 
in the study, both those with ASD and control children, after all testing had been 
completed. In addition to verifying diagnoses, the data collected from the parental 
interview was also useful as a measure of the severity of the behavioural symptoms o f ASD 
present in each child.
The 3Di provides information on the triad of symptoms used for diagnosis: the social and 
communication impairments as well as the presence of repetitive behaviours. Each area of 
the triad is composed of a number of categories that correspond to those given in ICD-10 
(World Health Organisation, 1993), each category of a number of items and each item o f a 
number o f questions. In the social domain, for example, one of the categories is peer and 
sibling relationships, one of the items within this category concerns imaginative play with 
others and one o f the questions within this item asks whether the child ever plays 
imaginative games with other children. This structure creates quantitative measures of 
impairment in each of the three areas critical for diagnosis. Along these three continua,
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cut-offs for clinically significant impairment are provided in order to provide a categorical 
diagnosis. Children above the cut-offs for all three areas are then considered eligible for an 
autism or Asperger Syndrome diagnosis, dependent on the presence or absence o f language 
delay (see below), while those meeting criteria for one or two o f the areas only would meet 
criteria for a diagnosis o f atypical autism or Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not 
Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS). Additionally, those children with significant impairment 
in only the communication area may be classed as showing a pragmatic language 
impairment.
On the basis of the cut-offs advised by the 3Di, 1 control was excluded due to high scores 
on two of the three diagnostic areas as well as a referral to the Child and Adolescent 
Mental Health Service for suspected ASD and ADHD after testing had been completed, 
and 2 children in the ASD group were excluded due to not reaching criteria for an ASD on 
any o f the three areas of the triad. Interestingly, both of these children had very early 
childhood diagnoses (one o f autism, one of ASD), were relatively low-functioning and 
attended special schools. The remaining sample therefore consisted of 57 children with 
ASD as well as 27 control children. 3Di data was unavailable or incomplete for 4 children 
with ASD due to parental non-compliance; whilst these children therefore cannot be 
included in analyses involving behavioural symptoms, they were not excluded from other 
analyses as there was no reason to believe their original diagnoses were not valid.
Data from the 3Di are shown in Table 2.1 and, as would be expected, indicate severe 
impairment in all three domains in the ASD group (social /(77.1)=13.6,^><.001; 
communication /(78)=19.5, ^ <.001; repetitive behaviours /(60.7)=13.1,^?<.001). The 
communication domain appears to be the best discriminator between the groups with no 
overlap in the ranges, although the other two domains only show minimal overlap and a 
clear shift in their distributions. Within the communication domain, all children with ASD 
fell above the cut-off whereas this was not the case for the other two domains. While this
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Table 2 .1 Means (and standard deviations) with range for the three diagnostic domains 
of the 3Di: social interaction, verbal and non-verbal communication, and 
repetitive and stereotyped behaviours and mannerisms; high scores indicate 
impairment.
Control group (27) ASD group (53)
Social *** 3.3 (2.0) 13.2 (4.5)
(30 max; 10 cut-off) .3-8.9 5.9-22.5
Communication *** 3.7 (1.7) 14.8 (3.4)
(26 max; 8 cut-off) .7-6.7 8.2-22.9
Repetitive behaviours *** .3 (.5) 5.1 (2.5)
(12 max; 3 cut-off) 0-2 .6-10
* * *  / K . 0 0 1
may be dependent on the characteristics of the particular sample used here, it may be that 
the cut-offs provided by the 3DI are not consistent across the different areas of the triad, 
with the communication cut-off being relatively low compared to the other two areas. The 
pattern of above cut-off symptoms present in different children is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2 .1 Venn diagram showing the presence of above cut-off symptoms on the 
different 3Di domains for each child in the ASD group; S=social, 
C/Comm= communication, R/Rep Beh=repetitive behaviour.
CommSocial
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The 7 ASD children presenting with only a communication impairment (C) on the 3Di 
showed a lesser degree of communication problems than the remaining 46 children with 
ASD, who all had additional domains o f impairment (/(51)=2.9, jf>=.006), indicating that 
they generally had milder symptoms. Similarly, the 32 children with all three areas of 
impairment (CSR) showed more severe communication problems (/(38)=2.3,^)=.024) and 
more repetitive behaviours (/(20.9)=2.8,y>=.010) than the 8 children with just 
communication impairment and repetitive behaviours (CR), indicating that they generally 
had more severe symptoms. However, the 6 children with only social and communication 
problems (CS) were similarly impaired to those children with all 3 impairments (CSR) in 
both the social (/(36)=1.4) and communication domains (/(36)=1.7), indicating that severity 
might be more highly related between the social and communication impairments than 
with the presence o f repetitive behaviours. All three areas of the triad were highly 
correlated to each other within the ASD group (S&C: r =.67,^K.001; S&R: r =.46,^<.001; 
C&R: r =.45,_/><.001; see Figure 2.2) although the relationship between the social and 
communication domains was strongest. This supports the idea that the autism spectrum is 
a continuum of severity across the three domains rather than a collection of similar 
disorders with different domains affected. In the control group, the relationships were 
weaker or non-significant (S&C: r  =. 53, />=.001; S&R: r  =.15, ns\ C&R: r =.49,/)=. 010), 
most likely due to the smaller range of results and smaller sample size, although again the 
relationship between the social and communication domains was the strongest. This 
supports the idea that social and communication domains may overlap, either in terms of 
their underlying cause or in terms of the manner in which they are defined.
Given that autism and Asperger Syndrome are differentiated on the basis of early language 
abilities, the presence o f language delay was explored in the ASD group. 36% of these 
children had a significant language delay (defined as not producing single words by 2 years 
or meaningful phrases by 3 years); this was present in 40% of the children displaying all 3 
symptom impairments (CSR), 38% of the children with communication impairment and
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Figure 2.2 Summary of correlations between the 3Di data on the three areas of the 
triad: social, communication and repetitive behaviour; the dotted lines 
indicate the cut-offs from the 3Di and scores above this indicate abnormal 
behaviour.
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repetitive behaviours (CR), 33% of the children with social and communication impairment 
(CS), and 14% in the children with only communication impairment (C). Again, this 
possibly indicates a general lower severity in the children with only communication 
impairment, although this difference was not significant (x2(l)—1.6). However, when 
comparing those children with language delay to those without, no differences on the 
social, communication or repetitive behaviour domains were found.
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Table 2.2 Classification of children according to prior diagnoses and 3DI diagnoses;
shaded cells show the equivalent diagnosis under the two classification 
schemes.
3Di diagnosis
Autism
(13)
Asperger
Syndrome
(19)
Atypical 
autism/PDD 
-NOS (14)
Pragmatic 
language 
impairment (7)
Autism (9) 7 1 1 0
Prior
Asperger Syndrome (30) 1 16 9 4
diagnosis ASD/PDD-NOS (12) 5 2 4 1
Semantic pragmatic 
disorder (2) 0 0 0 2
In terms of diagnosis therefore, the 3Di would class 13 children with autism, 19 with 
Asperger Syndrome, 14 with atypical autism, and 7 with pragmatic language impairment 
(see above for definitions of these groups); the latter two groups may be classed as PDD- 
NOS under some schemes. Table 2.2 indicates that this is fairly consistent with prior 
diagnoses although two main differences stand out. It appears that almost half of the 
children originally diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome were not showing impairment in all 
three areas of the triad on the 3Di; this may be due to the common use of the label to refer 
to high-functioning, milder cases. Similarly, a number of children originally diagnosed with 
ASD were classified as having autism or Asperger Syndrome by the 3Di; this may be due to 
the use of ASD to refer to the whole of the spectrum when the clinician does not want to 
make a more specific diagnosis. However, the above analyses suggest that the severity of 
symptoms (quantitative differences) across all 3 domains may be a better characterisation 
of these children than using a cut-off approach (qualitative differences) as those children 
with more areas of the triad affected also show a greater severity.
Indeed, many authors assume that the autism spectrum is a continuum rather than a group 
of related but distinct disorders (de Bruin, Verheij & Ferdinand, 2006; Frith, 2004; South,
Ozonoff & McMahon, 2005; Verte, Geurts, Roeyers, Oosterlaan & Sergeant, 2006a; Verte 
et al., 2006b) and the data here supports this notion. This also strengthens the idea that the 
communication cut-off may be relatively low compared to the other two cut-offs. The data 
from the 3Di will therefore mainly be used quantitatively for the remainder of this thesis.
2 .1.4 Novel everyday behaviour questionnaire
In addition to the 3Di, a novel questionnaire was developed for the present study that 
aimed to tap behaviours indicative of mentalising, central coherence and executive function 
deficits, based loosely around an existing questionnaire (Frith, Happe & Siddons, 1994). 
This was sent to parents along with questionnaires regarding background data for the 3Di 
and can be found in Appendix 1. Each item in the questionnaire was designed to tap into a 
behaviour thought to be related to one, two or all three of the cognitive domains to be 
evaluated in this thesis. The items of interest however were those tapping the domains 
independently and only these items were analysed. As the executive function and 
mentalising domains were often difficult to separate, triplets of items were developed that 
referred to similar situations but differed only in their executive or mentalising 
requirements. For example, the item ‘supplies important missing information’ was 
accompanied by the mentalising item ‘aware that each person’s knowledge depends on 
their experience’ and the executive item ‘can solve puzzles with missing information eg. 
hangman’. Items were balanced to include equal numbers of positive and negative 
statements. Parents were asked to score each item on a three point scale: does not apply, 
applies somewhat, or definitely applies, producing an overall rating of the percentage of 
such behaviours shown by each child in each domain. Parents of children with ASD rated 
their children as showing on average 56%, 68% and 44% respectively of the theory of 
mind, central coherence and executive function impairments listed, whilst ratings from 
parents of control children were significantly lower at 8%, 39% and 7% (/(78)>6,/><0.001).
The high scores in the control group on the central coherence questionnaire may support 
the idea that this area o f cognition is represented in a continuum across the general 
population (Happe, 1999). Additionally, the parents o f control children may see the 
behaviours indicative o f weak central coherence as positive assets and are therefore more 
likely to rate their children as showing these than the more negative behaviours in the 
mentalising and executive function questionnaires. For example, ‘good at remembering 
lists of items, eg. phone numbers’ is a central coherence item on which ‘definitely applies’ 
would indicate weak central coherence and which is generally seen as a socially appropriate 
asset to possess, whereas ‘recognises embarrassment in others’ is a mentalising item on 
which ‘does not apply’ would indicate mentalising problems and which is generally seen to 
be a negative quality to possess. The high proportion of behaviours indicative o f weak 
central coherence in the controls may therefore be a result of the positive central coherence 
items being more common and more socially acceptable everyday behaviours in the general 
population.
2 .1.5 Dysexecutive Questionnaire for Children
A further standardised questionnaire known as the Dysexecutive Questionnaire for 
Children (DEX-C) from the Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome for 
Children (BADS-C: Emslie, Wilson, Burden, Nimmo-Smith & Wilson, 2003) was 
completed by the parents of each child. This questionnaire is designed to tap into the 
everyday behavioural problems displayed by individuals with executive dysfunction. This 
questionnaire has been validated in adult patients and has been shown to be related to 
performance on a number of executive tests, including some of those involved in the 
BADS (Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie & Wilson, 1998). The questionnaire consists o f 
20 statements concerning specific areas of behaviour that must each be rated in terms of 
their frequency of occurrence on a 5 point scale, from ‘never’ to ‘very often’. High scores 
are therefore indicative of the presence of dysexecutive symptoms. O ut o f a maximum
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score o f 80, the ASD group scored an average of 52 (SD 21) whilst the controls scored 
only 11 (SD 11), producing a robust group difference (F(l,79)=65.62,y><.001).
2 .1.6 Comorbid diagnoses
The 3Di also contains some additional components that can be used to look for related or 
comorbid disorders, such as Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) and Conduct 
Disorder (CD). One child met criteria for ADD, 14 for ODD, one for socialised CD, one 
for CD confined to the family, two for ADD and ODD, and one for ADHD and CD 
confined to the family. None of these children were excluded as it was felt that many of 
the behaviours necessary for such diagnoses could be explained by the social problems 
accompanying ASDs. Indeed, the majority of the children in the ASD group showed at 
least mild signs of inattention and impulsivity; additionally, DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) recognises this by discounting ADHD diagnoses when ASDs are 
present.
2.2 T est battery
All the children completed a battery of tests lasting approximately 3.5 hours, split into 3 
sessions conducted over the course of a year for the majority of children, although some 
children had up to 7 testing sessions. This battery consisted of a range of tests tapping into 
mentalising, executive function and central coherence abilities (see chapters 3, 4 and 5 
respectively), as well as testing general intelligence levels and recording the child’s head 
circumference.
2 .2 .1 Intelligence testing
Given that the cognitive deficits present in ASD may affect performance, both positively 
and negatively, on IQ tests (Happe, 1994), reliability o f such measures is obtained by 
combining results from a range o f different tests rather than using a single test. As it was 
extremely important for this project to obtain reliable individual measures o f verbal and 
performance IQ, the most obvious measure to use was therefore the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children III-UK (WISC: Wechsler, 1992). This measure includes 5 verbal and 5 
performance subtests over which performance is averaged, as well as an additional subtest 
of verbal working memory (digit span), and was administered according to the manual. 
Performance IQ was tested in the first test session and verbal IQ in the second test session 
for the majority o f children.
2.2.2 Head size
Head circumference was measured with a standard flexible tape measure and 
measurements were then converted to standardised z-scores, adjusted for age and sex 
according to available norms (Farkas, 1994). This measurement was performed in the last 
test session with each child. As only Caucasian norms were available, measurements were 
disregarded for any non-Caucasian children (2 controls and 5 children with ASD).
Previous research has shown that macrocephaly exists in some children with ASD until at 
least the age of 12 years (Aylward, Minshew, Field, Sparks & Singh, 2002) and so it was 
expected that the range o f ages of the children involved would still be sensitive to this 
measure.
2.2.3 Group matching
While the two groups o f children were well-matched for age (age at time of first test 
session given in Table 2.3; /(82)=.56), gender (%2(1)=1.384; 7 ASD girls, 6 control girls) and
72
Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics for age, intelligence and head circumference; means 
(and standard deviations) with range', head circumference only available for 
25 control and 52 ASD Caucasian children.
Control group (27) ASD group (57)
Age (years) 9.1 (1.3) 8.9 (1.5)
6.6-11.3 6.8-12.0
Verbal IQ * 115(16) 104 (19)
84-139 60-138
Performance IQ ** 103 (12) 95 (14)
78-125 67-127
Full scale IQ ** 111 (15) 100 (16)
83-134 65-131
Head circumference .72 (1.07) 1.14(1.29)
(z-scores) -1.58-2.73 -1.78-4.35
*p<.05, ** j&c.Ol
ethnicity (x2(2)=.099; 5 ASD non-Caucasians, 2 control non-Caucasions), the ASD group 
had lower verbal t(^2)—2 A \ ,p —0S)\^) and performance IQs (7(82)=2.77,y>=0.007) and 
therefore lower full scale IQs (/(82)=2.96,y>=0.004). Despite these differences, it can be 
seen from the means in Table 2.3 that the ASD group are performing at average IQ  levels 
expected for the general population and therefore can be considered a high-functioning 
sample; rather, it is the controls who appear to be of above average intelligence, particularly 
in the verbal domain. However, it is quite possible that the WISC norms are out o f date, 
having been collected over 10 years ago and before the advent o f the literacy and numeracy 
hour initiative in UK schools in 1998; this is likely to have affected verbal more than 
performance IQ levels of even the oldest children in this sample given that both arithmetic 
and verbal subtests such as vocabulary load onto verbal IQ; this could explain why verbal 
IQ is so much higher than performance IQ in the controls and why they are performing on 
average one standard deviation above average. This would imply that the ASD group was 
instead performing below the level currendy expected for verbal IQ.
In addition, observation o f the ranges reveals that there are children in the ASD group 
spanning the same range o f IQs as the controls but with an additional low-scoring tail of 
individuals below the range o f the controls. Control children with lower IQs were actively 
sought for inclusion in the study; however, these were difficult to find as most children 
with below average IQs had some form of prior diagnosis. While it might therefore be 
valuable to exclude those children performing below the control range, it was considered 
vital to retain the large ASD group srze in order to study individual profiles and possible 
subgroups; all 57 children were therefore retained in the sample. Furthermore, all except 
two children in the ASD group had one of verbal or performance IQ  within the control 
range; as verbal and performance IQs are known to be more discrepant in ASD than 
control populations (Joseph, Tager-Flusberg & Lord, 2002), to exclude children with low 
scores on one o f these may have introduced a sampling bias. Indeed, the discrepancies 
between verbal and performance IQ ranged from verbal IQ that was 49 points lower than 
performance IQ to verbal IQ that was 46 points higher than performance IQ in the ASD 
group whereas the control discrepancies were 12 and 36 respectively. Still, verbal and 
performance IQ were correlated in both groups (ASD: r =.41,y>=.002; control: r =.57, 
p=.002).
Differences between the groups for head circumference were also examined and found to 
be non-significant (/(75)=1.42), although there was a trend for the ASD group to include 
individuals with larger head circumferences than any of the controls, up to more than 4 
standard deviations above the population mean. Twelve children with ASD, 
corresponding to 23% of this group, met clinical criteria for macrocephaly (more than 1.88 
standard deviations above the population mean), similar to previous prevalence estimates 
(Bailey et al., 1995; Lainhart et al., 1997; Stevenson, Schroer, Skinner, Fender & Simensen,
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2.3 Relating intelligence to  symptom profiles and head size
Although an IQ profile in which performance IQ is higher than verbal IQ has long been 
associated with ASD (Lincoln, Courchesne, Kilman, Elmasian & Allen, 1988; Rutter,
1978), it is now known that the opposite profile is more commonly seen in high- 
functioning individuals (Klin, Volkmar, Sparrow, Cicchetti & Rourke, 1995; Manjiviona & 
Prior, 1995; Ozonoff, South & Miller, 2000). This difference is possibly due to the less 
frequent occurrence o f language delay in high-functioning individuals. Indeed, when 
comparing those children in the ASD group with language delay (19) to those without (34), 
no differences were found in age (/(51)=.05) or performance IQ as might be
expected however, those children with language delay had lower verbal IQs (mean o f 97) 
compared to those without (mean of 109) (/(51)=2.25,/>=.029).
A number o f studies have looked at behavioural correlates of macrocephaly in ASD with 
little success (eg. Lainhart et al., 1997; Miles, Hadden, Takahashi & Hillman, 2000). 
However, two recent studies have suggested that verbal and performance IQ and the 
difference between them may be related to both symptom severity and brain size (Deutsch 
& Joseph, 2003; Joseph et al., 2002). Specifically in these studies, low verbal IQ  was found 
to be associated with greater social and communication problems, and relatively high 
performance IQ compared to verbal IQ (IQ discrepancy) was associated with greater social 
and communication problems and with larger head sizes (after correcting for absolute 
verbal IQ levels), whilst being otherwise unrelated to absolute verbal or performance IQ  or 
to a number o f aspects of language or executive function. In the present ASD sample, 
both verbal and performance IQ were correlated to all three symptom domains (r >.30, 
p<.006), with high IQ scores indicative of less severe symptoms. No correlations existed 
between IQ discrepancy and these symptoms (r < .l), or between head size and any IQ 
measure (r < .l) though.
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These findings partially replicate those o f Joseph et al. (2002) in that social and 
communication impairment were associated with low verbal IQ, as well as extending this 
relationship to repetitive behaviours. Low performance IQ was also related to impairment 
in all three domains, a finding that was also present in only the preschool subset o f children 
in Joseph et al.’s study. However, no associations were found between IQ discrepancy and 
symptom severity, or between head sfze and any IQ measure. Although these latter results 
differ from those of Joseph et al. and Deutsch and Joseph (2003), two notable differences 
in methodology should be considered. Firstly, Joseph et al. used a more direct measure of 
symptomatology than here, using the Autism Diagnostic Observational Schedule (ADOS: 
Lord et al., 2000) rather than a parental interview such as the 3Di. More likely than this to 
affect the correlations, however, is the use of a different intelligence measure; the WISC is 
used here rather than the Differential Ability Scales (DAS: Elliott, 1990). It is possible that 
the DAS non-verbal measure is less sensitive to individual differences than the WISC, 
accounting for the lack o f correlation between performance IQ and symptom severity in 
the older children in Joseph et al.’s study. Indeed, the DAS non-verbal measure is 
composed of only two subtests as opposed to five in the WISC. A final possibility is that, 
as the current sample of children with ASD did not contain many individuals with verbal 
IQ significantly lower than performance IQ, this subgroup may have been driving the 
results o f Joseph et al. and Deutsch and Joseph by co-occurrence rather than association.
2.4 Relating cognitive impairments to  intelligence and symptom profiles
The remainder o f this thesis studies the relationship between the three main cognitive 
domains suggested to be impaired in ASD and intelligence and symptom profiles.
Chapters 3, 4 & 5 detail the tests used to tap into each cognitive domain and examine 
group differences over a range of tasks, assessing each theory within this population. 
Chapter 6 considers the effect o f these cognitive impairments on intelligence tests, explores 
the relationship between these different cognitive domains, examines the patterns of
impaired abilities found in different children, and investigates the ability of each cognitive 
domain to predict group membership through discriminant function analysis. Chapter 7 
assesses whether different cognitive impairments can predict the presence of certain 
behavioural symptoms through comparison of children with ASD who did or did not show 
each cognitive impairment, regression analyses and structural equation modelling.
Chapter 3: Mentalising
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3 .1 Theory of mind battery
Since Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith’s (1985) paper, there has been an immense interest in 
the theory o f mind (ToM) theory of autism. In this first paper, individuals with autism 
were hypothesised to have specific problems in understanding other people’s mental states, 
an ability that has come to be known as mentalising. This hypothesis was tested by use o f a 
‘false belief paradigm, designed by Wimmer and Pemer (1983), in which a character (Sally) 
places an object (marble) in a location (basket) but a second character (Ann) moves the 
marble to a different location (box) while Sally is out o f the room. This sets up a situation 
in which Sally holds a false belief about the current location of the marble and the critical 
test comes when the child is asked to predict where Sally will look for the marble when she 
returns. Story understanding is controlled by posing memory (where was the marble in the 
beginning?) and reality (where is the marble really?) questions. In line with the novel 
prediction made by these researchers, children with autism were more likely to say that 
Sally would look for her marble in the box, where it actually was, hence being unable to 
correcdy predict Sally’s behaviour on the basis of her (lack of) knowledge.
In general, studies employing such paradigms have focussed on this one task, occasionally 
pairing it with other tasks, such as the ‘unexpected contents’ task (Pemer, Leekam & 
Wimmer, 1987), or using multiple trials of the same basic task. Since it is possible to pass 
these tasks 50% of the time by chance, using a single trial may give a false representation o f 
an individual’s ability (although this has been argued against by showing that children don't 
choose a third irrelevant location; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Theory of mind 
understanding develops over many years in normally developing children so that 
increasingly complex mental state representations can be understood (Wellman & Liu, 
2004); indeed, it has long been known that false belief task performance is dependent on
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verbal mental age (Happe, 1995), a strong correlate of chronological age in normally 
developing children, and that second-order false belief tasks are passed by normally 
developing children at a later age than first-order false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, 1989b). 
Use of a single trial or a few task repetitions therefore limits any information that could be 
available about more subtle individual differences in performance and provides only a 
narrow window on a particular developmental level (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001).
Wellman & Liu (2004) have therefore recently proposed a battery of seven scaled ToM 
tasks that undergo an ordered developmental progression in normal development (see 
Hughes et al., 2005; Steele, Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2003 for similar batteries). In the 
majority (75%) o f their young normally-developing children, they found a consistent 
pattern in the order o f tasks passed across different children, whereby a diverse desires task 
was easier than a diverse beliefs task, followed by knowledge access, contents false belief, 
explicit false belief, belief emotion and real-apparent emotion in that order (see Appendix 2 
for details o f the tasks). It is possible that a similar progression is present in children with 
ASD if ToM development is delayed, but this may be different if understanding o f others’ 
mental states progresses along a deviant compensatory pathway. In either case, the idea 
that such progression takes place may therefore go some way to explain why, even in the 
initial experiment (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), a minority of individuals with ASD (20%) 
was able to pass a false belief task.
Given that this thesis attempts to investigate individual differences in performance, these 
seven ToM tasks (Wellman & Liu, 2004) were collated with four additional tasks known to 
be sensitive measures o f theory of mind ability in ASD (see Appendix 2). This whole set of 
tasks therefore ranges from an extremely simple diverse desires task, requiring the child to 
predict the action of a character who holds a different desire to their own, to more 
complex second-order false belief tasks, involving the understanding o f what one person 
falsely thinks about another person’s thoughts. A simple penny-hiding task (Baron-Cohen,
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1992) was also added to this sets of tests, which requires the child to conceal a coin from 
the experimenter and is thought to be a more implicit on-line test of ToM abilities.
3 .1. 1 Method
The 12 ToM tasks were administered to each child in a randomised order during the first 
testing session (see Table 3.1). Seven of these tasks were taken from Wellman & Liu 
(2004) and five additional tasks were added, which were expected to be more challenging 
for the older age groups involved here and therefore increase variability in responses.
These additional tasks consisted of an implicit false belief task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), 
an interpretation false belief task modelled on the ‘Smarties’ contents false belief task 
(Luckett, Powell, Messer, Thornton & Schulz, 2002), two second-order false belief tasks 
requiring a higher level of meta-representational skill (icecream: Baron-Cohen, 1989b);
Table 3 .1 ToM tasks administered to all children ordered by expected task difficulty; 
the shaded tasks indicate those taken from Wellman & Liu (2004).
Task Task demands
diverse desires state another’s desire contrary to own
diverse beliefs state another’s belief contrary to own
knowledge access understand that seeing leads to knowing
contents false belief predict knowledge on basis of false belief
explicit false belief predict behaviour on basis of false belief
implicit false belief predict behaviour on basis of false belief
interpretation false belief predict behaviour on basis of knowledge
belief emotion predict emotion on basis of false belief
real-apparent emotion predict apparent false emotion
second-order false belief (puppy) predict behaviour on basis of false belief
second-order false belief (icecream) about another’s false belief
penny hiding actively conceal visual information
(puppy: Sullivan, Zaitchik & Tager-Flusberg, 1994) and a penny hiding task (Baron-Cohen, 
1992). It was expected that the second order false belief tasks would be harder than all 
other tasks as they involved a higher order of meta-representation, that the additional 
implicit false belief task would be harder than the explicit false belief task as the false belief 
would need to be inferred from the situation, and that the interpretation false belief task 
would be harder than the contents, explicit and implicit false belief tasks as it involved a 
conceptual false belief rather than a physical false belief. The penny hiding task, whilst 
quite simple, was also expected to be challenging as it required the child to not only reason 
about another person’s thoughts but also to actively perform in such a way as to take this 
reasoning into account.
The first 11 tasks consisted o f situations in which: a character and the child had diverse 
desires or diverse beliefs; where a character had a lack of knowledge, a false belief or a false 
belief about another character’s false belief; or where a character wanted to create a false 
belief in others. In all cases, the child was asked to predict the knowledge of, behaviour of 
or emotion felt by another character on the basis of their mental state; this answer was 
marked as a pass or fail (1 or 0). In all but the three simplest tasks, the child was also asked 
to justify why they had made that prediction; this was marked as a correct mental state 
justification (eg. ‘because she doesn’t know it’s in the box’), a correct non-mental state 
justification (eg. ‘because she left it in the basket’), or an incorrect justification (eg. ‘because 
no-one stole it apart from Anne’) (1, 0.5 or 0 respectively). This additional scoring aimed 
to check for false positive responses when the child was achieving the correct answer by 
guessing, and also was expected to increase the variation in responses with the aim of 
avoiding ceiling effects.
All o f these tasks were presented with accompanying props or pictures to help the child to 
comprehend and engage with the scenarios. Control questions were administered (and 
prompt questions during the more complex tasks) in order to check for comprehension of
the situation. If a child failed a prompt question, the story was repeated from the 
beginning until the child gave the correct answer; this situation was extremely rare and 
comprehension was generally good. It was also rare for control questions to be failed; on 
the few occasions it did occur, it was on memory control questions that required the child 
to acknowledge that they themselves had initially had a false belief and therefore required a 
degree o f mental state understanding; responses to mental state test questions were 
therefore not excluded on this basis.
The penny-hiding task involved 6 trials during which the experimenter modelled hiding the 
coin to the child, followed by 6 test trials during which the child was encouraged to hide 
the coin. The task was marked out of a total of 6, with one point for each trial performed 
by the child. One point was awarded for perfect performance, whereby the experimenter 
was unable to tell which hand the coin was hidden in. Half a point was given if the child 
made no obvious mistake but held their hands asymmetrically, in such a way to make it 
obvious which hand the coin was in. The child gained no points if they failed to deceive 
the experimenter, by either not hiding both hands behind their back whilst choosing which 
to hide it in, bringing only one hand out from behind their back, not closing the empty 
hand, or leaving the coin in sight of the experimenter during a critical part of the 
procedure. No points were deducted if the child played a trick on the experimenter, eg. by 
placing the coin on their chair and bringing out two empty hands, so long as the 
experimenter was unaware that a trick had been played until the end of the trial.
In total, the former 11 ‘reasoning’ tasks were scored together out o f 19 and the ‘on-line’ 
penny-hiding task was scored out o f 6, hence a combined maximum score o f 25 for the 
whole battery of tasks was possible. Given that the penny hiding task differed from the 
other tasks both in the nature of the task and in its task demands, it was o f interest to see 
how results from this test differed from the remaining tasks and so scores for this task will 
be reported separately as well as in the combined total.
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3 .1.2 Results
As can be seen from Table 3.2, performance on the reasoning tasks differed between the 
groups with the ASD group performing more poorly than the controls. After accounting 
for age, verbal and performance IQ  (in ASD group, total score x vIQ: p<.001; total score x 
pIQ: />=.18; total score x age:p>.81), this difference was found to be significant 
(F(1,79)=5.740,A=.019). There was a trend for the performance of the ASD group to be 
lower than that of the control group on the penny-hiding task, although this difference did 
not reach significance (F(l,79)=:3.263,^=.075); unfortunately there was a floor and ceiling 
effect on this task in both groups. However, this test still added variance to the total ToM 
battery score as the group difference was stronger than for the reasoning tasks on their 
own (F(l ,79)=8.195, />= .005).
Observation of the range of scores on the reasoning tasks and total ToM battery indicates 
that these differences arise due to the ASD group having a broader range o f scores, 
spanning that of the controls but extending lower with a tail of poor performers. This 
indicates that at least some children were performing at age and intelligence appropriate 
levels within the ASD group. Indeed, this is supported by the individual performances that 
can be seen in Figure 3.1; 32% of children in the ASD group could be categorised as
Table 3.2 Means (and standard deviations) with range for the ToM battery.
Control group ASD group
Reasoning tasks (19 max) * 15.1 (1.5) 12.5 (3.9)
11-17.5 2-17
On-line penny-hiding (6 max) 3.8 (1.7) 2.9 (1.7)
0-6 0-6
Total ToM battery (25 max) ** 19.0 (2.5) 15.3 (4.5)
13.5-23.5 3-21.5
*p<.05, **p <.01
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Figure 3 .1 Individual performance on the ToM battery after accounting for age and
IQ; the position o f the x-axis indicates the control mean and the dotted line 
illustrates the cut-off for the 5th percentile of control performance.
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having deviant performance below the 5th percentile of control performance (see section 
6.2 for further details of this methodology).
Given that the normally-developing children here were older than in Wellman & Liu 
(2004), they mostly answered the test questions correcdy, making it difficult to see a 
developmental pattern in the results. Despite this, two tasks were answered correcdy by 
less than 90% of the controls; real-apparent emotion (86%), and icecream second-order 
false belief (79%) and can therefore be considered the most challenging (see Table 3.3). 
Within the autism group, a higher proportion of incorrect answers was given to the test 
question, as expected. The tasks could therefore be ranked in order o f difficulty according 
to the percentage o f individuals who answered the test question correcdy (see Table 3.3). 
The two hardest tasks for the controls were also the hardest for the ASD group. The 
overall order can be seen to be similar to that o f the young normally-developing children in
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Table 3.3 Percentage o f correct responses to test question for the reasoning tasks, 
ordered by ASD group performance.
Control group ASD group
diverse desires 100 96
diverse beliefs 100 91
knowledge access 100 89
belief emotion 96 89
contents false belief 100 88
explicit false belief 96 84
implicit false belief 93 82
second-order false belief (puppy) 96 81
interpretation false belief * 96 77
real-apparent emotion 86 65
second-order false belief (icecream) * 79 58
*y><.05
Wellman & Liu (2004), with one notable exception: the children with ASD found the 
belief-emotion task to be as easy as the knowledge access task.
Comparisons between the numbers of correct responses for each test question in the two 
groups were calculated. tests indicated that only two of the more challenging tasks 
differentiated the groups from each other (interpretation false belief, x 2( 1)—4.814p —.O28; 
second-order false belief (icecream), X2(l)=4.509,y)=.034), although it should be noted that 
these did not take the IQ differences between the groups into account.
In order to investigate the number of children in the current sample who showed the 
expected developmental progression, only the seven tasks used by Wellman & Liu (2004) 
were studied. Only six of the 27 controls failed one of these tasks, o f whom four failed the 
hardest real-apparent emotion task, conforming to the developmental pattern reported by 
Wellman & Liu, whilst the remaining two controls failed either the second or third hardest
task. When looking at all 11 reasoning tasks ordered by percentage of correct responses in 
the control group, 11 o f the 27 children gave at least one incorrect answer with some 
children giving up to three incorrect answers, although only three of these children 
conformed to the task order (four children when optimally reordering tasks to give 
maximum number of children conforming). However, given that nine of these children 
failed only one task, this may simply be noise in the data or may indicate that the additional 
tasks were of similar difficulty making it hard to predict the order in which children would 
pass them.
Within the ASD group, 25 of the 57 children failed at least one o f the seven tasks taken 
from Wellman & Liu (2004), with one child failing five out o f seven tasks. Eight o f these 
25 children conformed to the pattern seen in Wellman & Liu, indicating that the normal 
developmental pattern is not seen in these children. However, even if the tasks are 
reordered so that the belief emotion task is given equal ranking to the knowledge access 
task as mentioned above, only 10 of the 25 children conform to this order and in fact this 
is the optimal order to which the highest number o f children conform. When looking at 
the full 11 reasoning tasks, 38 children failed at least one task, with one child failing nine o f 
the 11 tasks. 11 of these 38 children conformed to the task progression when ordered by 
difficulty (maximum of 13 children when optimally reordering tasks), indicating that the 
majority o f children with ASD do not all follow the same pattern of developmental 
progression as each other.
The answers to the justification questions provided more information from both groups, as 
they did not explicidy ask for a mental state answer and so there was greater variation in 
responses. From easiest to hardest in the ASD group, these can be seen in Table 3.4. It 
can be seen that the order of difficulty differs between responses to the test and 
justification questions. Some tasks were highly likely to elicit a mental state response, for 
example the explicit false belief task in which the appropriate mental state answer was
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Table 3.4 Percentage o f mental state justifications given for the ToM tasks, ordered 
by ASD group performance.
Control group ASD group
explicit false belief * 93 65
real-apparent emotion 30 28
second-order false belief (puppy) 22 18
belief emotion 19 16
implicit false belief 7 14
interpretation false belief 22 11
second-order false belief (icecream) ** 33 4
contents false belief 4 4
*p<.05, **p <.01
integrated into the story, whilst others tended to produce non-mental state responses, for 
example the contents false belief task which has an obvious physical-state answer. The 
groups only differed on two tasks however; the explicit false belief task (x2(l)=4.514, 
p —.034) and the second-order false belief (icecream) task (x2(l)=10.019,/)=.002). Again, it 
should be noted that these differences have not been corrected for intelligence levels.
When looking at all the data combined for each task, including the test and justification 
questions, the order o f difficulty is similar to that expected from the predicted task 
difficulty and is more similar to the order for the test than justification question (see Table 
3.5). The only exception is that the explicit false belief task was found relatively easy, 
mostly due to the high frequency of mental state terms used in the justification question. 
The control group consistently performed better than the ASD group across all tasks. 
Differences between the groups on this total score were found on three tasks: the explicit 
false belief task ((7=557.5,/>=.008), the interpretation false belief task (U= 566.5,/)=.025) 
and the second-order false belief (icecream) task ((7=427.5,/)=.001). Whilst these tests
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Table 3.5 Mean total scores for each ToM task including a justification question (2 
max).
Control group ASD group
explicit false belief ** 1.89 1.49
belief emotion 1.54 1.38
contents false belief 1.50 1.31
implicit false belief 1.43 1.27
second-order false belief (puppy) 1.50 1.22
interpretation false belief * 1.50 1.18
real-apparent emotion 1.41 1.06
second-order false belief (icecream) ** 1.30 0.80
*p<.05, **^<.01
appear to be most sensitive in this sample of children, the consistently low performance 
across tests in the ASD group justifies the use of a combined battery of such measures.
3.1.3 Discussion
The use of a battery of theory of mind tasks, comprising of a range o f more traditional 
tasks such as those involving false beliefs as well as a more naturalistic and on-line penny- 
hiding task, replicated the often reported finding of theory of mind difficulties in 
individuals with ASD. Whilst few individual tests in this battery produced group 
differences, the overall battery produced a strong effect, supporting its use. However, the 
distribution o f scores on the overall battery indicated that only a proportion o f children 
were performing outside the control range. This suggests that some children were 
performing at and above age- and intelligence-appropriate levels and therefore either had 
no mentalising problems or were compensating to such a degree that their performance 
was comparable to that of normally-developing control children.
Although few o f the individual tests produced group differences, the tasks that did tend to 
were those that were hardest for the controls, indicating that there may have been a ceiling 
effect on other tasks. Interestingly, one of the easier tasks, explicit false belief, did produce 
a group difference, most likely because the control performance was so consistently high 
across participants that any differences in the ASD group were amplified. Given that the 
reasoning tasks are two alternate forced choice tasks, they are vulnerable to guessing and 
therefore passing by chance and so a battery of many such tasks is crucial to retain 
sensitivity.
The stable developmental progression seen by Wellman & Liu (2004) in younger children 
was present in very few o f the children here with ASD who were not performing at ceiling, 
consistent with a more recent study by Peterson, Wellman & Liu (2005). After collecting 
the current data, Peterson et al. published a study in which they found that children with 
ASD did not conform to the order of task progression seen in normally-developing 
children. The convergence of this study with the current results is remarkable despite the 
broader age range, lower IQ levels, restriction to full autism diagnoses, and the use o f only 
5 of the tasks in Peterson et al.’s sample. Interestingly, exactly the same finding of 
relatively good performance on the belief emotion task was found by these authors as well. 
Furthermore, Peterson et al. found late-signing deaf children to progress through the same 
order of tasks as the normally developing children, despite being severely delayed in their 
ToM understanding, indicating that the abnormal progression seen in the ASD group is 
not just the result o f delay.
This supports the idea that the development o f the current ASD group’s understanding of 
other people’s behaviour in terms of mental states was unlikely to be only delayed, but also 
to follow a deviant developmental path. It is likely that other skills and abilities, as well as 
general knowledge and experience of how the social world works, can allow children to 
correctly solve some theory of mind scenarios, in the absence o f a true understanding of
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why this is the case. Indeed, few children with ASD who were able to give correct answers 
to the test questions were also able to spontaneously produce mental state justifications for 
these answers, although this was also the case to a lesser extent with the control children. 
Furthermore, examination o f the task demands for the belief emotion task help to reveal 
why this task may have been relatively easy for the AS group; indeed, the ToM component 
of this task is actually only as complex as the knowledge access task. This task may be 
difficult for younger children due to the additional need to understand how emotions relate 
to mental states. For the current older children with ASD, as the understanding o f basic 
emotions is thought to be intact in autism (Castelli, 2005), such understanding would have 
been acquired at the normal stage of development and this component o f the task would 
therefore have been relatively easy for them. Hence, any problems encountered are likely 
to have been purely with the ToM component of the task, making it no more difficult for 
them than the knowledge access task.
If the ability of some children with ASD to pass theory of mind tests relies on other skills 
and abilities and more importantly on experience of how people behave in certain 
situations, this would differ wildly between different children depending on their individual 
circumstances. Some children may therefore be able to pass seemingly ‘harder’ tasks whilst 
failing easier ones and the particular pattern of performance would differ between different 
children. This reinforces the need for batteries o f tests rather than single test scenarios in 
order to provide an accurate measure of individual performance.
Regardless o f the ability of some children with ASD to pass a proportion o f the tasks, it 
must still be acknowledged that a number of children were performing consistently well, 
indicative of a lack of mentalising problems. As already mentioned, it is possible that many 
of these tests produce ceiling effects and therefore are not sensitive enough to pick up 
more subtle problems in these children. More recently, new tests that tax such individuals’ 
capabilities have therefore been sought in an attempt to reveal any mentalising problems
that do exist (Abell, Happe & Frith, 2000; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 
1997b; Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones & Plaisted, 1999a; Channon, 2004; Heavey, 
Phillips, Baron-Cohen & Rutter, 2000; Kaland et al., 2002; Kleinman, Marciano & Ault, 
2001; Klin, 2000; Rutherford, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2002). One such advanced 
test o f mentalising, the Strange Stories (Happe, 1994), has revealed a deficit in the 
understanding o f more complex mental states by high-functioning individuals with ASD, 
even those passing second-order false belief tasks. A number o f studies have now 
replicated the finding that the Strange Stories reveal autism-specific impairments, even 
among high-functioning participants (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b; Gillott, Fumiss & Walter, 
2001; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999a; Kaland et al., 2005).
3.2 Strange Stories
The original set o f 24 Strange Stories required the participant to answer mental-state 
questions relating to stories involving pretence, jokes, lies, white lies, misunderstandings, 
false appearances, sarcasm, figures of speech, double bluffs, forgetfulness and contrary 
emotions (Happe, 1994). These were accompanied by a smaller set o f 6 control stories 
requiring understanding of physical states. However, all participants in Happe’s study 
performed at ceiling on these control stories, which were not equated for difficulty with the 
mental state stories. It is therefore possible that the poor performance of the autism group 
on the mental state questions could have been due to general comprehension problems or 
the need to integrate information and make inferences across the text, which were not 
revealed by the easier physical state stories. In fact, comprehension problems and 
problems with inference are a common feature of high-functioning children on the autism 
spectrum (Norbury & Bishop, 2002) and may possibly be explained by the central 
coherence theory. Problems in integrating information, one aspect o f so-called ‘weak 
central coherence’, are therefore an alternative explanation for failure on the mental state
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stories, a possibility discussed by both Happe and Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen (1999a) in 
considering their findings.
In subsequent development o f the Strange Stories for functional brain imaging (Fletcher et 
al., 1995), a subset o f the 8 most demanding mental state stories was selected, involving 
understanding o f double bluff, white lie, persuasion and misunderstanding. To test for the 
specificity o f any difficulty with these stories, 8 control stories were created that required 
reasoning about physical states only, and were of comparable difficulty in healthy young 
adults. An additional set of 8 passages of unlinked sentences was also created; here 
participants were required to recall a specific fact from one sentence. All sets therefore 
involved people and required attention to sentence meaning, memory and question 
answering, while the mental and physical state sets also required the integration of 
information between sentences and inference from implicit information, and only the 
mental state set required mentalising.
These well-controlled stimuli enabled a ‘mentalising network’ in the brain to be revealed 
(see section 1.1.2). Reduced activation in this network was also seen in adults with 
Asperger syndrome (Happe et al., 1996). Here five adults were chosen to be extremely 
high-functioning and to perform well at these tasks, to allow valid scan comparisons. 
Despite this, the behavioural results still showed a significant difference between the 
groups on the mental state stories but not on the physical or unlinked stories. However on 
closer observation o f the results, the adults with Asperger syndrome did perform non­
significant^ worse than controls on the physical state stories and better on the unlinked 
sentences. As participant numbers were small, these non-significant effects might have 
been more pronounced with a larger sample. In fact a recent study of 20 high-functioning 
children with autism spectrum disorders (Brent, Rios, Happe & Charman, 2004), found a 
similar pattern o f performance in these mental and physical state story sets, showing 
sigmficandy worse performance than age- and IQ-matched controls on the mental state set,
and non-significandy worse performance on the physical state set. Furthermore, an 
unpublished study with even larger group sizes has indicated that both children and adults 
with ASD have significant difficulties with both mental and physical state story types, 
although to a significantly greater extent with the mental state stories. Importantly, the 
groups performed equally well with the unlinked sentences (White, Hill, Happe & Frith, in 
prep).
Results from the use o f these stories supports the idea that individuals with ASD have a 
specific difficulty in understanding other people’s mental states, as evidenced by poor 
performance on the mental state stories. From the literature however, it is difficult to 
determine why individuals with ASD might also find the physical stories problematic. It is 
possible that, as already suggested, individuals with ASD have more general difficulties in 
integrating information and making inferences, possibly due to the role of weak central 
coherence in text comprehension (although there are also other possible reasons for a 
general comprehension deficit). This would affect performance on the physical state 
stories but also further affect mental state story performance. The unlinked sentences 
however, would be unaffected as these do not require information to be integrated 
between sentences or for inferences to be made.
A different interpretation could be that individuals with ASD find processing any 
information about animate beings (including animals) problematic; indeed, the recognition 
o f biological motion from random dot kinematograms has been shown to be impaired in 
children with ASD (Blake, Turner, Smoski, Pozdol & Stone, 2003). Moreover, the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS), the main brain area thought to process biological motion (Bonda, 
Petrides, Ostry & Evans, 1996), has been shown to be functionally and structurally 
abnormal in individuals with ASD (Boddaert et al., 2004; Pelphrey, Adolphs & Morris, 
2004; Waiter et al., 2004). Interestingly, the STS has been found to be activated in normal 
adults when reading both the mental and physical state Strange Stories (Fletcher et al.,
1995; Gallagher et al., 2000), even though these do not involve any direct visual biological 
motion. Furthermore, the same neural areas of medial prefrontal cortex are activated for 
both animals and humans when thinking about their mental as opposed to physical states 
(Mitchell, Banaji & Macrae, 2005), indicating that information about all animate agents may 
be processed in the same way. Indeed, one study looking at visual recognition memory in 
high-functioning adults with ASD found that impairments were present in this sample not 
just for human face stimuli but also for other potential agents including animals, and non­
living agents such as vehicles, whilst showing retained memory for stimuli such as buildings 
(Blair, Frith, Smith, Abell & Cipolotti, 2002).
One further possibility is that the presence of humans in the physical stories might make 
physical state inferences slightly more difficult for individuals with ASD; the general 
population might use mentalising to aid their understanding of situations involving people, 
even when mental state processing is not explicitly required. Indeed, there is evidence to 
show that the network o f brain areas thought to be involved in mentalising are also 
activated when making semantic judgements about people as opposed to objects (Mitchell, 
Heatherton & Macrae, 2002), although to a lesser extent than when performing an explicit 
mentalising task (Fletcher et al., 1995).
Table 3.6 Task requirements for the different story sets.
Mental Human Animal Natural Unlinked
Explicit mentalising X X X X
Thinking about humans X X X
Thinking about animate agents S X X
Integration of info across text ✓ V X
Sentence comprehension V
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Two new sets of physical stories involving either animals or natural events were therefore 
added to the original three sets o f stories. Like the human-physical stories, these sets 
require the integration o f information and inference but do not involve humans. They 
therefore allow us to investigate the level at which children with ASD have problems with 
these stories (see Table 3.6).
3.2.1 Method
The mental and human-physical story sets and the unlinked sentences (Fletcher et al.,
1995), as well as the new animal-physical and natural-physical story sets each consisted o f 8 
stories. Full texts o f all stories can be found in Appendix 3. A number of changes were 
made to the existing story sets in order to make them more appropriate for the age range 
and hypotheses. Firsdy, only 4 of the human-physical stories from Fletcher et al. (1995) 
were used; a previous experiment found the other 4 to be too difficult for this age group 
(White et al., in prep). The 4 easiest stories were therefore selected, based on an 
independent sample of normally-developing children (White et al., in prep) and combined 
with 4 new easier stories. This modified set of human-physical stories was matched to the 
mental state set for difficulty. Similarly, the novel animal- and natural-physical stories were 
designed to match the other sets in difficulty, as confirmed by pilot testing.
In addition, the unlinked sentences used in Fletcher et al. (1995) differed from the other 
stories in the type of question that was asked; these involved closed (requiring the answer 
‘yes’ or ‘no’) rather than open questions. This made it difficult to compare performance on 
these stories to the other story sets; if a child was guessing, they would perform at chance 
(half marks) on the unlinked sentences whilst if they were guessing on the other story sets, 
they would score at ‘floor’ level. The questions were therefore adapted from closed 
questions, such as ‘Is Mary’s birthday in February?’ to open questions, such as W hen is 
Mary’s birthday?’.
All stories were presented on a laptop computer using E-prime software, both as written 
and spoken text in order to aid concentration. Each story was pre-recorded by an adult 
male speaker and lasted approximately 30 seconds. The full text of each story was 
presented on the screen and the child was invited to follow the words whilst listening to 
the recording. 500 mecs after the spoken text had ended, a question about its content was 
presented on the screen and simultaneously spoken by the pre-recorded voice. As soon as 
the child began to give an answer, the experimenter pressed a button on the keyboard to 
record reaction time (the time from the end o f the spoken question until the child began 
their response). In cases where the child began to speak but stopped immediately to think 
again before answering, a different button was pressed when they began their answer a 
second time, in order to indicate that this was the true reaction time. The same procedure 
was also available one additional time, in case a child made up to two false starts. The 
experimenter recorded the child’s answer verbatim on paper. The child was then invited to 
press the spacebar to listen to the next story.
The stories were presented in blocks of 8 stories, one block for each story type. Other 
tasks were conducted between the blocks to aid concentration. The mental, human- 
physical and unlinked sentences were presented during the second testing session and the 
animal- and natural-physical stories during the third session. The order of the blocks 
within each session and the order o f the stories within each block were randomised.
The accuracy of each verbal response was rated on a 0-2 scale by two researchers, with 0 
given for incorrect answers or when the child did not know the answer, 1 for partially 
correct answers and 2 for correct answers (scoring schemes are given in Appendix 3).
Total scores for each story type were therefore marked out of 16. Good agreement 
(Cohen’s kappa=.65, indicating substantial agreement; 78% of responses in agreement; only 
3% of responses rated as 0 by one rater and 2 by other) was reached between the author 
and a co-rater blind to group based on a sample of answers to each question (20% of
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answers selected randomly for each question). Only the author’s scoring was used in the 
subsequent analysis.
3.2.2 Results
As can be seen from Table 3.7, accuracy across the different story sets was generally lower 
in the ASD group than the control group. Similarly to the false belief battery, the range of 
scores in the ASD group was wider, with an additional tail of lower scores compared to the 
controls. As before, on an individual level this indicates that only a proportion of the 
children had problems with these tasks. Interestingly, no such tail was seen for the 
jumbled stories but this may be due to floor effects. Figure 3.2 reveals the pattern of 
individual performance.
A 5x2 repeated measures ANCOVA, entering age, verbal and performance IQ as 
covariates (in ASD group, stories x vIQ: p<.002; stories x pIQ: p<-056; stories x age: 
p>.22), and comparing story type by group, revealed a main effect o f story type (F(3.9,
Table 3.7 Means (and standard deviations) with range for the Strange Stories results.
Accuracy (16 max) Reaction time (secs)
Control
group
ASD
group
Control
group
ASD
group
Mental 11.5 (2.8) 7.5 (4.2) 2.6 (2.3) 4.2 (4.4)
**Acc *RT 6-16 0-15 .6-12.5 .9-27.1
Human 11.3(3.1) 7.7 (4.1) 3.1 (2.4) 4.4 (3.4)
**Acc *RT 5-15 0-15 .7-10.8 .9-18.3
Animal 12.5 (2.8) 8.5 (4.7) 2.4 (1.1) 3.0 (1.8)
**Acc 7-16 0-16 .6-5.3 .5-8.3
Natural 11.4(3.6) 8.5 (4.9) 3.2 (1.9) 3.7 (1.9)
4-16 0-16 .8-8.3 .7-9.2
Unlinked 8.7 (3.4) 7.3 (2.7) 3.4 (3.0) 3.2 (2.0)
3-16 2-13 .6-13.4 .7-8.7
*^><.05, **p<.Q\
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Figure 3.2 Individual performance on the different sets o f Strange Stories after
accounting for age and IQ; the position o f the x-axis indicates the control 
mean and the dotted line illustrates the cut-off for the 5th percentile of 
control performance.
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311.2)=4.81,7>=.001), with the unconnected sentences being more difficult than the rest of 
the stories (£><.03). There was also a main effect of group (F(l, 79)=9.59,y>=.003), with the 
ASD group generally performing worse than the controls. Furthermore, a significant 
interaction was found between story type and group (F(3.9, 311.2)=2.41,p —.050), with the 
ASD group performing worse than the control group only on the mental (£>=.001), human- 
physical (£>=.004) and animal-physical (£>=.009) stories. Weak post hoc interactions (story 
type by group) were present between each of these three story sets and the two remaining 
story sets (.030</><.096). No other post hoc pairwise interactions were found (see Figure 
3.3).
As the reaction time data were not normally distributed, non-parametric tests were used to 
compare the groups (it should be noted that age and IQ  were therefore uncorrected in this 
analysis). As can be seen from Table 3.7 (p96), performance was similar to that seen in the 
accuracy data: slightly slower reaction times in general in the ASD group and a wider range 
of reaction times, including extremely slow performance. This slowness is indicative of
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Figure 3.3 Performance on story sets by control and ASD children, corrected for age, 
verbal and performance IQ; error bars are standard errors; * indicates a 
significant group difference.
■ Control
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requiring a longer thinking time to produce an answer. Again, only a proportion of the 
children showed extreme reaction times, however. Mann-Whitney U-tests revealed group 
differences for only the mental (17=526,^>=.044) and human-physical stories (17=494, 
p=.020).
In order to investigate further the problems that the ASD group had with the mental, 
human and animal stories, the ASD group was split into two subgroups on the basis of 
their performance on the ToM battery used in the first part o f this chapter. Any child 
performing more than 1.65 SD below the corrected control mean was defined as having 
impaired ToM (18 children) and the remaining children as having relatively good ToM (39 
children) (for further details of this methodology, see chapter 6). These groups did not 
differ from each other on age (/(55)=1.124), verbal IQ (/(55)=.146) or performance IQ 
(/(55)=.346). Individual performance split into these groups can be seen in Figure 3.4; 
while there is overlap between those children with ASD with poor or relatively good ToM,
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Figure 3.4 Individual performance on the mental state Strange Stories after accounting 
for age and IQ; the ASD group is split by performance on the ToM battery; 
the position o f the x-axis indicates the control mean and the dotted line 
illustrates the cut-off for the 5th percentile of control performance.
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it can clearly be seen that every child with poor ToM as defined by the ToM battery had 
performance below the control mean on the mental state Strange Stories, whilst the range 
of scores in the ASD group with relatively good ToM is similar to that in the control 
group. Indeed, the mental state Strange Stories were highly correlated with the ToM 
battery in the ASD group (partial correlations accounting for age & IQ: r  =:.50,y><.001).
A 5x3 repeated measures ANCOVA comparing story type by group was again performed. 
As before, this produced main effects of story type (F(4.0, 309.8)=5.02,/>::::.001) and group 
(F(2, 78)=11.96,/K.001), as well as an interaction (F(8.0, 309.8)=2.06,7?=.040). Tests of 
within-subjects contrasts indicated that the interaction produced a linear relationship 
between the groups across the different story types. Post hoc tests revealed that this 
interaction resulted mainly from the poor ToM subgroup performing worse than the 
controls on the mental (/K.001), human (p<.001) and animal (/>=.005) stories, although 
from Figure 3.5 their performance was also slightly lower on the natural stories. The ASD
43
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Figure 3.5 Performance on story sets by control and ASD children, corrected for age, 
verbal and performance IQ; scores are presented as z-scores relative to the 
control group; error bars are standard errors.
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subgroup with relatively good ToM did not differ significantly from the controls in their 
performance although, as can be seen from Figure 3.5, their performance was slightly lower 
on the mental, human and animal stories. The relatively good and poor ToM subgroups 
differed significantly in their performance on the mental (/)=.001) and human (/>=.006) 
stories, as well as the natural stories (/>=.036).
3.2.3 Discussion
Contrary to other studies using the Strange Stories, the current results do not provide 
support for the presence of a specific deficit on the mental state stories in ASD. Rather, 
the children with ASD were less likely to give accurate answers to the mental, human and 
animal stories, indicative of a more generalised impairment. An initial interpretation of 
these results might indicate that children with ASD have problems understanding stories 
which involve animate beings of any sort, as suggested in section 3.2.1 as one possible 
hypothesis. However, the second analysis, after dividing the ASD group into those with
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good and poor performance on the theory of mind battery from the first part of this 
chapter, as well as the reaction time data, indicates that there may be an alternative 
explanation of the results.
The results from the mental state and human-physical stories are fairly straightforward; 
children with poor ToM have significant problems with these tasks, both in comparison to 
normally developing children and children with ASD with good ToM. Given that the 
children with ASD were split on the basis of their performance on an independent measure 
of mentalising (the ToM battery) which involved checks for comprehension, their poor 
performance on both o f these measures indicates a lack of understanding of mental states 
rather than a problem comprehending text. The reaction time data were also consistent 
with this finding. Together, these support the idea that the human-physical stories may 
elicit mentalising despite no explicit need to do so.
Performance on the animal and natural stories is more difficult to interpret however, as the 
results produced a less consistent pattern. While the children with ASD and poor ToM 
appeared impaired relative to controls on the animal stories, their performance was not 
significantly worse than that of the children with ASD and good ToM. Despite this less 
clear cut result, the same pattern of performance can be seen on this set of stories as on the 
mental and human story sets. This indicates that any differences are likely to come from 
the same underlying deficit, a mentalising impairment, whilst possibly having a slighdy 
lesser effect on this task relative to the mental and humans sets. This would suggest that it 
is normal to anthropomorphise non-humans in order to understand their actions in terms 
of mental states. Indeed, previous work from two independent groups of researchers has 
found that individuals with ASD have difficulties attributing mental states to animated 
triangles whilst controls appear to do this instinctively and with ease (Abell et al., 2000; 
Castelli, Frith, Happe & Frith, 2002; Klin, 2000).
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Furthermore, the analysis o f the interaction between story type and group revealed a linear 
relationship in performance differences between the groups across the story types, which 
can clearly be seen in Figure 3.5. This suggests that each consecutive set of stories, which 
were designed to be one more conceptual step away from the mentalising stories (see Table 
3.6, p93), were less impaired in the poor ToM group than the previous set. Hence, the 
lower the likelihood that controls would use mentalising to aid their comprehension, the 
less impaired the poor ToM group were. Although not significant, this is reminiscent of 
the trend seen in previous studies for the mental state stories to be more difficult for 
individuals with ASD than the human-physical stories.
However, the fact that a similar pattern can be seen on the natural stories compared to the 
other stories is puzzling, this time with the children with poor ToM performing 
significantly worse than the remaining children with ASD and non-significantly worse than 
controls. Conversely, all the groups performed similarly on the unlinked sentences, 
revealing that sentence comprehension is intact in these children with ASD, regardless of 
ToM ability. This impairment on the natural stories is more difficult to explain as a 
mentalising deficit as no animate beings were involved in these stories; indeed, the children 
only needed to integrate information between sentences and make inferences from implicit 
information. One possible explanation could be that, despite similar verbal intelligence, the 
poor ToM group still had worse text comprehension in addition to their mentalising 
problems, possibly as a result of having poor ToM.
Overall, this experiment indicates that a mentalising impairment may have more 
widespread effects than previously thought. Indeed, mentalising ability appears to affect 
understanding of human and animal actions even when these do not explicitly require 
understanding of other people’s mental states.
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3.3 Conclusion
Both experiments together indicate the presence of a deficit in mentalising ability in some 
children with ASD. Two independent sets of ToM tasks were used and were found to 
discriminate the ASD from control group, as well as capturing the variance within these 
groups. While it was possible that ceiling effects may have been limiting performance in 
the ToM battery, it seems unlikely that this was the case with the Strange Stories as these 
stories were more complex and challenging and no ceiling effects were observed. The sets 
of Strange Stories also allowed for an extension and more detailed analysis of the 
impairments revealed by the ToM battery. Such a combined battery o f tasks, rather than 
individual tasks, appears to be necessary to capture ToM impairment at an individual level 
and development of this sort o f battery will be crucial for future clinical assessment.
The ToM deficit revealed by this battery of tasks appears to have a quantitative effect on 
mentalising ability as development is both delayed and deviant. A subgroup of children 
with ASD had distinct and severe ToM impairments, whilst other children appeared to 
have relatively preserved ToM task performance; those children with relatively good ToM 
performance, as measured by the false belief battery, were similarly unimpaired on the 
Strange Stories task and performance across the two sets of tasks was highly correlated. 
While this may indicate intact understanding of others’ mental states, it may alternatively 
point to some form o f compensatory learning in these children. Surprisingly however, 
those children with good ToM ability did not differ from the children with poor ToM on 
the basis o f age, verbal or performance IQ. Given that past results have suggested that 
verbal ability may be the basis on which compensation is possible (Happe, 1995) and the 
fact that verbal IQ and performance on ToM tasks are strongly correlated in this sample, 
this would support the idea o f a genuine lack of impairment in these children rather than 
compensation.
Chapter 4: Executive Function
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4 .1 Ecologically valid tes ts
Executive function (EF) encompasses a wide range of skills and abilities that have in 
common their involvement in the higher order control of behaviour in order to accomplish 
a goal. Whilst some researchers stress the componential nature of executive functions 
(Hughes, 1998; Ozonoff, 1997), others suggest that these are just different reflections of 
one system working towards a common goal. Specifically, the two main executive models 
involve a ‘central executive’ (Baddeley, 1986) or a ‘supervisory attentional system’ (Shallice, 
1988), which fulfil this role. However, even these authors suggest that these central 
systems control peripheral modules with specific functions (Baddeley, 1996; Shallice, 1994). 
Whether executive functions can be fractionated into subcomponents and whether these or 
some central mechanism is impaired in ASD is an unresolved issue.
Furthermore, whilst many traditional tests of EF have been grouped under certain 
executive subheadings, many are more complex and involve multiple executive functions, 
making it difficult to interpret exactly what aspect of the task is problematic. For example, 
the Tower of London test, whilst usually considered a test o f planning ability, also involves 
a significant degree of working memory and inhibition of prepotent responses. Moreover, 
the language used when describing such tests is ambiguous; for exampl^flexibility can be 
described in terms of an ability to flexibly switch to a new response, but also involves the 
inhibition o f the current response, and the planning and generation o f a novel response.
Additional problems with traditional tests are revealed when considering their efficacy in 
identifying executive dysfunction. These tests are frequently found to be insensitive to 
subtle impairments in patients with frontal lobe damage, whilst these patients have more 
obvious problems in everyday life, indicating that the tests do not provide an accurate and
reliable identification o f the core EF problems (Shallice & Burgess, 1991) (Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991). Wilson, Evans, Alderman, Burgess & Emslie (1997) suggested that a 
reason for this disparity between laboratory and real-life performance is that these tests 
often require the individual to perform a single task with short trials, few rules, clear goals 
to be achieved, external support and explicit prompting from the experimenter, 
circumstances which are rarely true of everyday life. Indeed, it is just this aspect of 
executive control that is thought to be problematic in the executive dysfunction seen in 
frontal patients (Burgess, 1997). Problems may occur when multiple task demands are 
concerned, either due to a general information processing problem causing a break down in 
response under high load, or due to more subtle problems only being revealed under 
situations where compensation is more costly (Burgess, 2000). Similar proposals have been 
put forward for individuals with ASD. Garcia-Villamisar & Della Sala (2002) found that 
high-functioning adults with ASD were impaired on EF tasks that involved dual task 
performance but not when the individual task components were administered separately. 
Minshew, Goldstein & Siegel (1997) and Goldstein, Johnson & Minshew (2001) likewise 
found that individuals with ASD showed impairments only on tasks in which the 
complexity o f the information processing demands was high, independent of the domain in 
which these were performed.
Further difficulties are encountered when attempting to test executive skill in children; as 
the majority o f tests available were designed for use in adult patient populations, they are 
typically not suitable for use with children as they are not developmentally appropriate 
(Anderson, 1998). Firstly, the administration procedures may not be suitable for child 
populations due to underdevelopment of other skills, such as ability to read and remember 
complex instructions. Likewise, the use of such tests in child populations may tap into 
abilities unrelated to frontal lobe dysfunction and executive control. For example, tests 
such as the Stroop, which rely on relatively automatic reading skill, may be invalidated in
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child populations when the child is still developing fluent reading and therefore identifies 
words laboriously.
These observations have led to the development of new tests that tap into more real-life 
scenarios, providing ecological validity of the tests; this allows the task to be both relevant 
to and representative o f everyday behaviour (Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie & Wilson, 
1998; Burgess et al., 2006). A comprehensive neuropsychological test battery o f six EF 
tasks suitable for children has recently been produced: the Behavioural Assessment of 
Dysexecutive Syndrome for Children (BADS-C: Emslie, Wilson, Burden, Nimmo-Smith & 
Wilson, 2003). The tasks in this battery were designed to be sensitive and suitable for high- 
functioning populations who may be compensating for any impairment. The requirement 
for reading, language skills and verbal short-term memory were also kept to a minimum by 
presenting the task instructions pictorially when possible. Furthermore, this test battery 
has been designed to assess everyday difficulties in more ecologically valid situations than 
traditional EF tests, such as finding a key in a field or planning a trip to the zoo.
Whilst the use of the BADS-C has not yet been reported in the literature, the adult version 
of the test has been utilised with a range of patient populations, including adults with 
Asperger Syndrome. The BADS therefore appears to be sensitive at detecting executive 
dysfunction in schizophrenic patients (Cools, Brouwer, de Jong & Slooff, 2000; Evans, 
Chua, McKenna & Wilson, 1997; Ihara, Berrios & McKenna, 2000, 2003; Krabbendam, de 
Vugt, Derix & Jolles, 1999), drug users (Zakzanis & Young, 2001), chronic alcoholics 
(Moriyama et al., 2002), patients with depression (Paelecke-Habermann, Pohl & Leplow, 
2005) and patients with traumatic brain injury (Bach, Happe, Fleminger & David, 2006; 
Bennett, Ong & Ponsford, 2005a, 2005b). Most o f the sub tests also appear to have good 
test-retest reliability (Jelicic, Henquet, Derix & Jolles, 2001). Furthermore, the study by 
Bach et al. (2006) supports the idea that the BADS may detect EF impairments that more 
traditional tests do not.
The one study using the BADS in adults with Asperger Sydrome has also successfully 
detected executive dysfunction in this population (Hill & Bird, 2006). These adults were 
found to have impairments on the Zoo Map test, the Action Program task (equivalent to 
the children’s Water task) and the Six Elements test (equivalent to the children’s Six Parts 
test) from the BADS, as well as on an additional novel test, the Hayling Sentence 
Completion Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) (see section 4.2.1 for details o f these tests). 
More traditional tests o f EF were also administered but these failed to discriminate the 
adults with Asperger Sydrome from the controls. Furthermore, these authors studied the 
individual profiles o f each of their participants and found all but one of their adults with 
Asperger Syndrome to be significantly impaired on at least one EF test. Relationships 
between performance on these tests and autistic symptomatology were also established, 
indicating that these tests are indeed ecologically valid.
Given that such a battery of tests now exists for children, it would be of interest to know 
whether high-functioning children on the autism spectrum show similar problems to adults 
with Asperger Syndrome across a range of ecologically valid tests of EF. One further study 
indicates that this may indeed be the case; a task similar to one of the tests from the adults 
version of the BADS (the 6 Elements test) has been developed to be suitable for children 
(Mackinlay, Charman & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006). This study compared a group o f high- 
functioning boys with ASD to age and IQ matched controls and found impaired 
performance on this task. Participants in the ASD group were less likely than controls to 
plan a strategy to complete the task, showed less switching between tasks and made more 
rule-breaks. There was also limited evidence that the level of performance on this task was 
related to everyday behaviours, again supporting the ecological validity o f the task.
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4.2 Method
All EF tests were carried out during test session 3. The full BADS-C was administered and 
scored according to the user manual (Emslie et al., 2003), which consists of six tests 
tapping different aspects o f executive functioning. In addition, a modified version of the 
Hayling Sentence Completion Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), adapted for children, was 
also administered.
4 .2 .1 Behavioural Assessm ent of Dysexecutive Syndrome for Children (BADS-C)
The Cards task taps into the ability to inhibit a prepotent response by flexibly shifting to a 
new rule and therefore avoiding perseveration. Here the participant responds twice to the 
same set of playing cards, firstly saying ‘yes’ to red cards and ‘no’ to black cards, and 
secondly saying ‘yes’ when the previous card was the same as the current one and ‘no’ 
when it was different. The second set of responses was critical as here the prepotent 
response set up by the previous rule must be put aside in order to answer according to the 
new rule. The number o f errors made during the second set of responses was therefore 
recorded.
The Water task requires the child to plan and carry out a response in order to solve a 
multistep problem involving the retrieval of a cork from a tall tube; this can only be 
achieved by using a special tool to remove a lid from a pot of water, screwing a base onto a 
tube to form a container, filling the container with water twice and pouring these into the 
tall tube in order to make the cork float to the top. In the majority of cases, this requires 
the child to investigate possible responses at each stage and evaluate whether they have 
helped them get any closer to the solution. Two points were awarded for each stage 
successfully completed without prompting, with a one point penalty subtracted if the child 
perseverated in their response or took longer than 200 seconds.
The Key Search task examines the ability to plan an efficient solution to a problem that is 
implementable in everyday life. The child is presented with a picture of a birds eye view of 
a field (a square box) and asked to draw a line to indicate where they would walk in order 
to search it for their lost keys. Points were awarded for strategies that took into account 
the information provided (eg. searching only within the field), that were systematic, 
planned and efficient (eg. walking from side to side across the field) and for 
implementability (eg. strategies that did not rely on knowing your precise positioning in the 
field at an earlier point in time).
The Zoo Map test is split into two parts. Part 1 requires the child to plan a solution to a 
problem that requires the consideration of a number of rules. Here the child must plan a 
walk around a zoo, keeping to the paths, visiting only certain places and walking along 
certain paths only once. Points were awarded for visiting the places in the optimal 
sequence and were subtracted for breaking any of the rules. Part 2 requires the child to 
follow a set of instructions whilst obeying some simple rules. Here the child is presented 
with an identical map and asked to repeat the task obeying the same rules; however, this 
time the order in which to visit the places is provided, removing much of the need for 
planning.
The Six Parts test requires the child to plan a strategy in order to complete an overall task, 
involving carrying out six activities, without breaking any of the rules. The child must also 
monitor their own progress on each activity in order to ensure they keep to their plan. The 
six tasks consist o f two picture naming tasks, two counting tasks and two sorting tasks.
The child is given 5 minutes on a timer placed in front of them and is required to complete 
something from each task without performing two tasks o f the same type consecutively. 
Here the child was awarded points for attempting all six parts, not breaking the order rule 
and for using specific strategies to achieve these two aims. Points were deducted if the 
child inefficiendy returned to a particular task three or more times.
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This battery o f tasks also produces a BADS-C total score by combining the standardised 
scores from all 6 tests together to give an overall measure of EF performance.
4.2.2 Shallice Switching Sentence Completion Task (SSSCT)
The Hayling Sentence Completion Test was first adapted for use with children by Shallice 
et al. (2002). Shallice (unpublished) further adapted the task to make it even more 
challenging and this version, referred to here as the Shallice Switching Sentence Completion Task 
(SSSCT), was used in the current study. This test requires the generation and inhibition of 
verbal responses as well as task switching. It establishes a prepotent situation by making 
use of over-leamt knowledge of sentence endings rather than creating the prepotent 
response during the test situation, thus making the prepotent response highly salient and so 
requiring a high degree o f inhibition to overcome it. During task administration, the 
experimenter reads a sentence to the child with the last word missing and the child must 
complete the sentence with a single word. In the first condition (formerly Part A), the 
child must give the correct or most appropriate word, whilst in a second condition 
(formerly Part B), the child must produce a word that is unrelated to the sentence, to the 
missing word or to a previous answer. These two conditions were alternated, with the 
experimenter indicating ‘correct’ trials by placing their right hand on their lap and ‘wrong’ 
trials by holding their right hand up. For the ‘correct’ trials, the number of inappropriate 
responses given was recorded. For ‘wrong’ trials, three penalty points were awarded when 
the correct response was given or one point when the response was semantically related to 
the sentence or the missing word. After the task had been administered, children were 
asked how they had generated the ‘wrong’ words; specifically, whether they had used a 
strategy such as naming objects around the room or naming objects in a category, and 
whether they had thought of these words before or after they heard the sentence read to 
them.
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4.3 Results
Raw scores rather than scaled scores were entered into all analyses for the BADS-C tests as 
these were felt to be more reliable and retained a higher degree of variation of responses.
In addition, this allowed absolute age and IQ to be taken into account on an individual 
basis rather than on the basis of broader age and IQ bands. Performance on the Key 
Search task (r=.48,/><.001) and Zoo Map 2 (r =.37,jf>=.004) was found to increase with 
age in the ASD group, no test was related to performance IQ and performance on all of 
the subtests and the SSSCT was found to increase with verbal IQ (r >.21,p<.05). In the 
control group, performance on the Water task (r ~.50,p=.008) and Zoo Map 1 (r = .48, 
p —.012) both increased with age; performance on the Cards, Water, Zoo Map 1 and Key 
Search tests increased with performance IQ (r >.44,/K.03); and the Cards test, Zoo map 2 
and the Six Parts test all increased with verbal IQ (r >.38,/><.05).
The ASD and control groups were therefore compared on each test using a multivariate 
ANCOVA, entering age, verbal IQ and performance IQ as covariates (see Table 4.1). 
Group differences were found on the Key Search task (F(l,79)=6.99,/>=.010), the Six Parts 
test (F(l,79)=5.24, j£>=.025) and the SSSCT (F(l,79)=4.85,y>=.031). In addition, a weak 
trend towards a significant group difference was observed for the Zoo Map 2 test 
(F(l,79)=2.79,y>=.099), which was found to be significant once the lack of equality 
between the variances in the two group had been accounted for (p=.04T). N o other 
comparisons on EF tests were significant. An overall difference on the BADS-C total 
score was also found (F(l,79)=7.16,^>=.009). Observation of the group means revealed 
that the ASD group were consistendy performing worse than the controls across all 
measures, even those on which significant group differences were not found.
Those tests that produced significant differences were studied in more detail. Differences 
between the groups on the Key Search task were found for the ability to produce a
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Table 4 .1 Means (and standard deviations) for performance across the EF tests; note 
that negative scores are possible on some tests.
Control group ASD group
Cards task (errors in set 2) .93 (1.44) 2.02 (2.99)
Water task (max 10) 7.81 (2.39) 6.42 (3.30)
Key Search task (max 14) **
- task understanding (max 5)
- efficient planning (max 8) *
9.11 (4.15) 
4.07 (.47) 
4.44 (3.65)
5.49 (4.51) 
3.72 (.90) 
1.47 (3.85)
Zoo Map 1 (max 8) 1.74 (4.45) -.21 (4.86)
Zoo Map 2 (max 8) *
- no. moves in correct sequence (max 8) +
- no. rule breaks
- time before making first move
7.56 (1.16) 
7.93 (.38) 
.37 (1.11) 
4.63 (5.62)
5.16 (4.56) 
7.30 (1.68) 
2.05 (3.29) 
5.93 (8.09)
Six Parts test (max 16) *
- max time on any subtask (secs) +
- no. subtasks attempted (max 6)
12.59 (2.79) 
75.89 (52.08) 
5.59 (1.12)
9.96 (3.43) 
126.52 (78.79) 
4.86 (1.84)
BADS-C total score (mean 60) ** 61.74 (10.61) 51.47 (11.76)
SSSCT (total errors) *
- ‘correct’ trial errors
- ‘wrong’ trial errors
- strategy use (% o f children) ***
- generating word before sentence (%) **
6.15 (2.92) 
1.22 (1.25) 
4.93 (2.84) 
63 
44
9.75 (6.14) 
2.33 (2.09) 
7.42 (5.78) 
23 
16
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***^><.001, + p <.06
systematic, planned and efficient search strategy (F(l,79)=6.21,y>=.015) with the ASD 
group performing worse than controls, whilst the ASD group was as good as the controls 
in understanding the task requirements (F(l,79)=.804). On the Zoo Map 2, the number of 
moves made by the child in the correct sequence neared significance after correcting for 
inequality of variances in the two groups (/(80.3)=1.92, p ~ .058) whilst no differences were 
found on the number of rule breaks made by the child (F(l,78)=1.70) or the time taken 
before the first move (F(l,78)=1.49). For the Six Parts test, the group difference arose 
from the ASD group having a slightly longer maximum time on any one subtask than the 
controls (F(l,78)=3.87,y)=.053), whilst not differing from them on the number o f subtasks 
attempted (F(l,79)=.724). Whilst the overall score on the SSSCT produced group
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differences, these were only seen as trends in the separate conditions (‘correct’ 
F(l,79)=3.45,^>=.067; ‘wrong’ F(1,79)=2.63,^>::I.109). However, the ASD group was 
significantly less likely than controls to use a strategy (eg. naming objects in the room) to 
help them think o f words in the ‘wrong’ trials (x2(l)—12.87,^<.001) and were more likely 
than controls to think o f these words after they had heard the sentence than before 
(X2(l)=8.02, />=.005).
From Figures 4.1 and 4.2, it can be seen that most of the tests produced a tail of outliers in 
the ASD group (Zoo Map 2, Six Parts, SSSCT) and this was the case even for some tests 
that did not produce significant group differences (Cards, Water, Zoo Map 1). The Key 
Search test, however, appeared to produce different distributions in the two groups despite 
similar ranges, skewed towards poor performance in the ASD group; this is likely to be 
produced from a floor effect in the marking scheme for this test. This latter pattern was 
also seen in the BADS-C total score, although here it is likely to be due to inconsistency in 
individual performance across the different tests. Despite this, it is notable that in both
Figure 4 .1 Performance o f each individual across the subtests of the BADS-C; scores
are shown as 2-scores based on control performance and the dotted line 
illustrates the cut-off for the 5th percentile o f control performance.
Cards W ater Key Search Zoo Map 1 Zoo Map 2 Six Parts
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Figure 4.2 Performance o f each individual on the BADS-C total score and the Shallice 
Switching Sentence Completion Task; scores are shown as z-scores based 
on control performance and the dotted line illustrates the cut-off for the 5th 
percentile of control performance.
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patterns, only a small proportion o f the children in the ASD group could be classified as 
showing deviant performance, performing below the 5th percentile of control performance 
(see section 6.2 for more details o f this methodology). This proportion ranged from 12% 
(Zoo Map 1) to 37% (Six Parts test). 10 children showed intact performance on all 7 tests, 
20 children showed impairment on 1 test, 17 on 2 tests, 4 on 3 tests, 5 on 4 tests and 1 on 
5 tests. Furthermore, performance in the ASD group spanned the full range of the control 
performance, with some children performing particularly well above the top of the control 
range.
A few specific cases in the ASD group are worth mentioning. CB performed extremely 
well across a number of tests, with performance above the control range on 4 of the 7 tasks 
(Cards, Water, Key Search and Six Parts). This particular child was one o f the youngest in 
the study (6 years 10 months at the first test session) and performed on the IQ  test in the 
low-average range (verbal IQ 87; performance IQ 69). Despite this, he performed all the 
EF tests intuitively and with ease and, after correcting the scores for age and IQ, his
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performance was therefore found to be exceptionally high. A similar case to this, albeit to 
a lesser extent, is AS who performed above the control range on 2 of the 7 tasks (Cards 
and Six Parts); she was only 7 years 4 months at the first test session with verbal and 
performance IQs o f 98 and 91 respectively and performed well on the EF tests. Two 
particularly interesting cases both showed extreme performance on two tasks, with 
performance on one task being exceptionally high and performance on the other being 
exceptionally low (RW Cards low, Zoo Map 2 high; YA Cards low, Six Parts high). Both 
children were again young (7y7m and 6y llm  respectively) although only RW had low IQ 
scores (verbal IQ  66, performance IQ 77; YA verbal IQ 98, performance IQ 108). It 
seems likely that both children had specific problems inhibiting the first rule and moving 
onto the second rule in the Cards test. Still, such variable performance across a single 
battery of tests warrants caution.
Relationships between the different EF tasks were examined in both of the groups 
separately. After accounting for age and IQ, only the Water task and Zoo Map 1 were 
correlated in the ASD group (r = .37,/)=.004). This same relationship was also seen in the 
controls (r=.57,/)=.002) and correlations in this group were also found between Zoo Map 
2 and the Cards test (r =.46,/>=.016), Zoo Map 2 and the Key Search task (r =.52,/)=.005), 
Zoo Map 2 the Six Parts test (r =.40,/>=.041) and Zoo Map 2 and the SSSCT (r=.40, 
/)=.040).
4.4 Discussion
Consistent with many previous studies assessing EF in ASD (Hill, 2004a), executive 
dysfunction was found in the ASD group across a number of tasks from a novel 
ecologically valid neuropsychological battery suitable for children (Emslie et al., 2003), as 
well as a sentence completion task. Those tests showing significant group differences were 
the Key Search test, Zoo Map 2 test and Six Parts test from the BADS-C, as well as the
SSSCT. These findings closely parallel those found on the adult version of the battery in 
adults with Asperger Syndrome, particularly on the Six Parts test and the SSSCT (Hill & 
Bird, 2006).
While significant group differences were observed on only on a few tests, the ASD group 
means were consistendy lower than those of the control group across all tasks. From 
examination o f individual performance, a fairly consistent pattern was seen across the tests: 
a tail o f children in the ASD group were performing below the control range but the 
majority of children with ASD performed similarly to the controls. Whilst it can be fairly 
certain that these deviant performers had problems with the tasks, it is possible that some 
other children with ASD, who were not classed as performing poorly, also had executive 
dysfunction but were compensating to an extent on these tasks. Remarkably, some 
children in the ASD group were performing well above the control range of scores, 
indicating that executive abilities were truly intact in at least some children. Furthermore,
18% of children showed intact performance across all 7 tests, again a remarkable 
achievement on their part suggestive of truly retained ability.
Those group differences that were found to be significant were those with the greatest 
number of deviant performers (with the exception of the Key Search task; this is likely to 
be due to a floor effect in the task), indicating that these children were driving the group 
differences and that some tests appeared to be more sensitive to executive dysfunction 
than others. There was little consistency, however, in the children performing poorly 
across tests, with different children finding different tasks difficult, supported by the lack 
o f significant correlations between the tasks. While this warranted caution when 
considering any hypothesis attempting to pinpoint a single cause of poor performance 
across these tasks, it is still advantageous to look for a common denominator that could 
then be used to direct and focus future tests.
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4.4.1 A comm on denom inator
A more detailed analysis o f those tasks showing significant group differences revealed that 
some children in the ASD group did not spontaneously produce an efficient strategy in the 
Key Search test, whilst they were relatively unimpaired in their understanding o f the task 
requirements and took these into account in their responses (see Table 4.1, p i 12). This 
indicates problems with planning or with impulsivity and lack o f inhibition; lacking an 
efficient strategy could result from either an inability to make such a plan or an inability to 
stop oneself from beginning the task immediately, thus not allowing time to plan. O n the 
SSSCT, some children in the ASD group were more likely both to give incorrect answers 
when they were meant to be finishing the sentence appropriately and to give correct or 
semantically related answers when they were asked to supply unrelated words. The first o f 
these appeared to occur as a form o f perseveration as the child became stuck in the ‘wrong’ 
condition, responding with unrelated words regardless; the latter can be interpreted as an 
inability to inhibit the correct sentence ending. In addition, some children with ASD 
showed a lack o f planning in their wrong answers, being less likely to produce a strategy to 
aid them in the ‘wrong’ condition and more likely to generate their answers after they heard 
the sentence.
For the Zoo Map 2 test, some children with ASD made fewer moves in the correct 
sequence. This is curious for two reasons: firsdy, because the groups did not differ 
significantly on this measure for the more difficult Zoo Map 1; secondly, because the 
sequence was actually provided for them in the Zoo Map 2 test, whilst it was not for Zoo 
Map 1. The control children found this additional information a great aid, performing Zoo 
Map 2 close to perfecdy, whilst finding Zoo Map 1 similarly challenging to the ASD group. 
The children in the ASD group could obviously follow the task instructions, as shown by a 
lack o f group difference on the number o f rule breaks and similar performance to the 
controls in Zoo Map 1. It was noted in a number o f cases, however, that some children
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repeated the route they have used in Zoo Map 1 when completing Zoo Map 2, making the 
same mistakes again rather than improving their performance (this could be obviously seen 
in 9 cases); this indicated that their poor performance on the easier Zoo Map 2 may be due 
to perseveration. This hypothesis would be easily testable by presenting the Zoo Map 2 
condition without Zoo Map 1; those children with ASD who had previously performed 
poorly on Zoo Map 2 should then perform as well as controls.
In the Six Parts test, the maximum time spent on any one subtask was longer in the ASD 
group than in the controls, although they attempted as many subtasks. Rather than 
spending longer across all subtasks and therefore not managing to complete as many 
subtasks, it therefore appears that some children in the ASD group were spending less time 
on some tasks in order to spend more time on others. Exactly this same pattern of 
performance was also reported in the previous study with adult with Asperger Syndrome 
using this test (Hill & Bird, 2006). Anecdotally, a few children in the ASD group verbalised 
this intention during the test session, stating that they were uninterested in spending time 
on tasks they didn’t enjoy, preferring to focus on one favourite task. Whilst this strategy is 
not maladaptive and complies with the task instructions, it is obviously a consistent 
difference between the two groups; it appeared that some children with ASD had a 
different understanding o f the appropriate behaviour during the test situation, with their 
own wishes predominating and the experimenter’s wishes not taken into account. While 
this may be indicative o f an executive failure to comply with the implicit purpose o f the test 
and to monitor one’s own progress, it may be exactly this implicit information that is not 
available to or less salient for some children with ASD; if  they were less likely to model 
another’s mental states, they would have less access to the experimenter’s expectations of 
them. In the same vein, these children may not have knowledge o f or the desire to 
conform to social scripts o f how to behave appropriately in certain social situations. Such 
behaviour could be described as egocentric.
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This hypothesis could also explain the mixture o f EF impairments seen in other tasks; 
while some tasks appeared to reveal planning impairments, others seemed to be better 
characterised by inhibition and perseveration problems. It may be that an explanation 
concerning a lack o f adherence to implicit task demands more successfully encompasses 
the poor performance seen in a proportion of the children with ASD across these tasks, 
with performance being driven by the child’s own desires rather than the experimenter’s 
expectations.
4.4.2 Implicit task demands
This hypothesis o f a lack o f understanding o f the implicit task demands could also be seen 
anecdotally in other tests, such as the Zoo Map test, in a few cases when children 
spontaneously remarked on their own performance. For example, after visiting the animals 
in the wrong order, one child commented that he would always go and see the lions first as 
he was a cat lover. The same child, when visiting only 5 o f the 8 specified locations, 
explained that he would save the others for another day, and didn’t need to visit the cafe as 
he’d been organised and brought a picnic with him. A different child similarly explained 
that he had visited the cafe last as he would be hungry then, after having walked all the way 
round the zoo visiting the animals. W hether these are post hoc justifications after having 
forgotten the rules is unclear, however.
This leads to a consideration o f the use o f ecologically valid tasks in populations with ASD. 
Why do such tests appear to be sensitive in picking up group differences between 
individuals with and without ASD when traditional tests are not sensitive? It appears that 
the ecologically valid, uncontrolled and open-ended nature o f such tasks allowed a minority 
o f the current children with ASD the freedom to impose their own task demands on the 
test situation. Indeed, the absence o f prompting in ecologically valid tasks, which is 
present in more traditional tasks (Wilson et al., 1997), may provide enough information for
120
certain children with ASD to comply with the task demands. Furthermore, as Russell 
suggests (Biro & Russell, 2001; Russell, 1997), EF tasks commonly impose arbitrary rules 
on individuals and it appears to be with these that some individuals with ASD struggle 
most. While this may be due to a lack o f verbal self-prompting as suggested by Russell, it 
is also possible that certain individuals with ASD are not aware o f the social expectation to 
comply with such arbitrary rules, instead imposing their own desires. In support o f this 
possibility, O zonoff (1995) found that individuals with autism performed as well as 
controls on an EF test when presented in a computerised format and therefore presumably 
seen as away from the experimenter’s intentions, than when presented by an experimenter 
in a normal testing situation.
This suggestion may even go some way towards explaining the associations seen between 
mentalising and EF tasks in ASD samples (Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Ozonoff, 
Pennington & Rogers, 1991a). Whether such a relationship is indeed present in the current 
sample o f children with ASD will be addressed in chapter 6 . It would also be possible to 
test this suggestion more directly by running an ‘ecologically valid’ test o f the sort used in 
the current study and closely matching a control condition with explicit prompting and 
instruction to it. It would be expected that certain children with ASD would find only the 
experimental condition hard relative to controls; furthermore, it would be expected that 
those with the greatest disparity between the control and experimental conditions would 
have the most severe mentalising problems.
4.5 Conclusion
The current findings support the idea that ecologically valid tests o f EF do indeed detect 
abnormalities in task performance by a proportion o f individuals with ASD. Indeed, it 
appears that it is the very nature o f these open-ended and unguided tasks that is a challenge 
to such individuals. These tasks require the child to respond to implicit demands laid down
by the experimenter and it has been proposed here that it is this implicit information that 
may be unavailable, less salient or less desirable to certain children with ASD. While this 
tendency not to conform to the implicit task demands may be due to an executive failure to 
prom pt oneself during unguided tasks in order to stay on task, it is also possible that 
implicit information is less available to these children due to their social communication 
problems, leading to a poor understanding o f the appropriate behaviour during the test 
situation. It is clear that such a problem does not affect all children with ASD however, as 
a proportion o f children displayed intact task performance, even with these more sensitive 
tasks and even across a whole battery o f tests.
C hapter 5: Central C oherence
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Weak central coherence is currently thought to result from a superiority in, a bias towards 
or a preference for local stimuli, rather than an impairment in global processing (Happe, 
1999; Happe & Frith, 2006). Hence, global processing is generally thought to be intact in 
individuals with ASD (Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert & Burack, 2006) although local 
processing may take precedence over global processing in tasks where the two are in 
competition. Those tasks thought to be most sensitive in detecting weak central coherence 
either pit global and local processing against each other or require fast online responses 
that are able to pick up this bias; the ability o f one such task to detect this bias will be 
investigated in the first part o f this chapter. Recent research has also begun to suggest a 
mechanism for this bias, in terms o f an inability to shift out o f local processing and 
therefore into global processing (Mann & Walker, 2003; Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, 
Brereton & Tonge, 2001). W hether this supposedly directional switching problem can be 
explained by a more general problem with switching between stimuli will be further 
explored in the second part o f this chapter. Lastly, the hypothesis that macrocephaly may 
be a biological marker o f weak central coherence will be examined.
5.1 Embedded Figures T est
The traditional test used to tap central coherence, and the first used in an autistic 
population, is a visuo-spatial test called the children’s Embedded Figures Test (EFT: 
Witkin, Ottman, Raskin & Karp, 1971). This test requires the child to find a figure, such as 
a triangle, hidden as a small element in a much larger image. The child must therefore 
disregard the whole image and the semantic information it carries with it and focus in on 
the detail o f the shapes and lines present in the picture, searching for the hidden element. 
This is a complex process requiring the child to ignore and inhibit Gestalt principles, such
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Figure 5 .1 Examples o f stimuli used in the Embedded Figures Test; the child is
required to find the shape (above) in the picture (below). © Consulting 
Psychologist Press, Inc., Palo Alto, CA.
as the continuity o f lines, foreground and background information, and texture and colour 
cues. Performance is known to increase with age (Witkin et al., 1971) and is also likely to 
depend on the individual child’s experience, intelligence and perceptual abilities, as well as 
their processing bias in terms of central coherence. Examples of some of the stimuli are 
given below in Figure 5.1.
Typically, children with ASD have been found to perform better than control children on 
this task and there is a reasonably pervasive sense not only that children with ASD are 
guaranteed to show superior performance on the EFT, but also that this test is a marker of 
weak central coherence. However, in reality, results are equivocal (see Table 5.1 for a 
summary of all studies). The initial study using this task found increased levels of accuracy 
in children with ASD compared to controls matched either on non-verbal mental age or on 
both non-verbal mental- and chronological age (Shah & Frith, 1983). Unfortunately, no 
control task was presented with this or any of the subsequent studies using the EFT. Since 
then, nine different papers using the task have been published, only two of which has 
replicated this accuracy difference (Ropar & Mitchell, 2001; van Lang, Bouma, Sytema,
Kraijer & Minderaa, 2006b). O f  the remaining seven studies, five found that the ASD 
group located the embedded figures more quickly than controls (Edgin & Pennington, 
2005; Jarrold, Gilchrist & Bender, 2005; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Morgan, Maybery & 
Durkin, 2003; Pellicano, Gibson, Maybery, Durkin & Badcock, 2005). O f the last two 
studies, one found no differences between groups on either accuracy or reaction times 
(Brian & Bryson, 1996), a finding also shown by the high-functioning group in the study by 
(Ropar & Mitchell, 2001), and the other found lower accuracy scores in their ASD group 
(Burnette et al., 2005).
These inconsistent results across studies are not straightforward to explain; there are a 
number o f different reasons why they might have occurred. These include the use of 
different ages, different levels o f general ability and different administration techniques.
Any o f these factors could reduce the likelihood o f identifying a true group difference 
through interference from variables other than central coherence and the presence o f floor 
or ceiling effects. For example, it is likely that Edgin & Pennington (2005) had a ceiling 
effect in accuracy due to a large age range spanning up to 16 years, when the children’s 
version o f the test is designed for 5-12 year olds. Similarly, Jarrold et al. (2005) had a 
ceiling effect in their accuracy data. It is also o f interest that both studies detecting group 
differences in accuracy used lower-functioning groups (Ropar & Mitchell, 2001; Shah & 
Frith, 1983); it is possible that these individuals had a more severe form o f ASD and so 
differences in central coherence were more enhanced.
A related issue, and one that pervades the literature on ASD, is how to match control 
groups to ASD groups when the latter are o f below average intelligence. In a paper 
discussing such methodological issues, Mervis & Klein-Tasman (2004) argue against the 
use o f younger mental age- or raw score-matched control groups as different abilities 
develop at different rates; it is therefore possible that the use o f younger controls might 
affect differences between the groups. As can be seen from Table 5.1, such comparison
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Table 5 .1 Studies using the Embedded Figures Test in individuals with ASD.
Comparison
group
Age (ASD) &  
task version
Ability
level
Average 
accuracy 
(ASD; ctrl)
Group diff 
(RT=reaction 
time)
Shah & Frith 
(1983)
CA,
performance IQ
8-18 years 
Children’s
Low 21/25;
14/25
Accuracy
Brian & Bryson 
(1996)
Verbal raw 
score; non­
verbal raw score
10-27 years 
Children’s
Low 8 / 8 ;
8 /8
N o acc or 
RT diff
Jolliffe & Baron- 
Cohen (1997)
CA, verbal & 
performance IQ
18-49 years 
Adult
High 11 / 12 ;
1 1 /1 2
RT
Ropar & Mitchell 
(2001 )
Verbal MA 9-18 years 
Adult
Low 7/12;
3/12
Accuracy & 
RT
CA 8-15 years 
Adult
High 8 / 12 ;
9/12
N o acc or 
RT diff
Morgan et al. 
(2003)
CA,
performance IQ
3-5 years 
Preschool
High 18/24;
19/24
RT
Jarrold et al. 
(2005)
Non-verbal raw 
score
8-15 years 
Children’s 
part A only
Low not given RT
Pellicano et al. 
(2005)
CA,
performance IQ
8-12  years 
Children’s
High not given RT
Edgin &
Pennington
(2005)
CA, verbal IQ  
& Block Design
7-16 years 
Children’s
High 20/24;
21/24
RT
Burnette et al. 
(2005)
CA, verbal & 
performance IQ
Mean l ly  
Children’s
High 25/32;
29/32
Accuracy; 
ASD worse!
van Lang et al. 
(2006b)
CA, verbal & 
performance IQ
10-20  years 
Children’s
Low 13/25;
11/25
Accuracy
groups were used in the studies by Jarrold et al.(2005) and by Ropar & Mitchell (2001), 
both of which did find significant group differences in reaction times, with the older 
children with autism performing perhaps unsurprisingly better than the younger control 
children. Furthermore, matching groups on the basis o f verbal ability, on which ASD 
populations may score below the expected level, may lead to respectively higher scores on
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non-verbal tasks and a false interpretation that this is an area o f superiority when it is in 
line with non-verbal abilities. This was certainly a possibility in Ropar & Mitchell (2001).
Furthermore, when analysing reaction time differences between groups, different authors 
have used different techniques, each o f which produce quite different results. Some 
authors have calculated the average reaction time for correct responses only (Morgan et al., 
2003; Pellicano et al., 2005), whilst others have calculated the reaction time to all stimuli, 
either substituting the maximum time allowed for incorrect trials (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1997) or using search time regardless o f whether the response was correct or not (Edgin & 
Pennington, 2005). Burnette et al. (2005) recently combined reaction time with accuracy by 
awarding an extra point for each trial in which reaction time was faster than a cut-off.
When accuracy is at ceiling, such as in Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1997), the method of 
reaction time analysis is o f little significance as there are few incorrect trials; however, when 
considering non-significant differences between groups in accuracy, this issue is of high 
importance. As the children’s EFT consists o f two parts, one easier and one more difficult, 
average reaction times may not be comparable between low and high accuracy scores. 
Children who have lower accuracy are likely to give correct answers to the easier test items; 
the target stimuli are therefore likely to be identified more quickly than children with higher 
accuracy who correctly identify more difficult targets. A group with a slightly lower 
accuracy may therefore have a faster reaction time when reaction times for only correct 
responses are included. This effect could be further amplified by the classic speed-accuracy 
trade-off seen in many psychological experiments. Studies using this method may 
therefore artificially produce group differences and, indeed, this exact pattern o f results is 
seen in Morgan et al. (2003).
Similarly, using time spent searching for the target, regardless o f trial accuracy, could lead 
to differences in reaction times between groups due to different search strategies on 
incorrect trials; it is possible that one group might give up searching for the target more
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quickly than others. The alternative method of substituting the maximum time limit for 
reaction time on incorrect trials also seems inappropriate; this would mask any group 
differences in the data, particularly for individuals with lower accuracy, as reaction time 
would basically reflect accuracy scores. One way o f dealing with all these problems would 
be to take accuracy into account in each individual’s average reaction time score for correct 
trials.
However, there is a second possible reason for inconsistent findings which is related to 
heterogeneity; specifically, only a subset of individuals with ASD may exhibit weak central 
coherence. For example, it has been stated that weak central coherence is applicable 
mainly to savants. Savant abilities may occur in rote memory, art, mathematics, calendrical 
calculations, music, perfect pitch and a variety o f more specialist areas (Hermelin, 2001). 
These abilities have been explained in terms o f central coherence as the style of 
information processing concerned with detail and specific exemplars rather than meaning 
or generalisations (Heaton, Hermelin & Pring, 1998; M ottron & Belleville, 1993). The 
occurrence o f savants in the autistic population is thought to be about 10% (whilst only 
about 1% in the normal population; Rimland & Hill, 1984) and this lends support to the 
idea o f heterogeneity, with central coherence only being present in a minority of 
individuals.
Individual data are rarely seen in the autism research literature but are vital to understand 
how prevalent weak central coherence is in ASD. Three authors o f papers using the 
Embedded Figures Test do provide such information. Edgin & Pennington (2005) reveal 
similar distributions o f performance in the ASD and control groups but with a slow tail in 
the controls and three extremely fast performers in the ASD group, indicating that the 
ASD group reaction time distribution may be shifted towards faster responses. O n the 
other hand, Jarrold et al. (2005) and Pellicano et al. (2005) both show an almost complete 
separation in the distributions o f the two groups, indicating that fast performance may be
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universal in ASD (although it should be noted that the method o f reaction time analysis 
will affect this). However, the means and standard deviations given in other papers 
support the idea that the distributions o f the two groups tend to overlap.
The first part o f this chapter will therefore examine group and individual differences in 
performance on the EFT by the current sample o f children with ASD, as well as assessing 
the different methods o f analysing reaction time data within the same participants.
5 .1 .1 Method
All items in the Children’s (test session 2) and Adult’s (test session 3) Embedded Figures 
Tests (W itkin et al., 1971) were administered to each child, thus providing a greater range 
o f possible scores and avoiding ceiling effects in the older or more able children. The tests 
were presented in a series o f three laminated picture books and the child was instructed to 
search for the target shape in each picture (either a triangle, a house shape or a mixture of 
designs) and to draw over the target with a pen when they had found it. This encouraged 
the child not to be ambiguous or vague in their response and so allowed for more accurate 
scoring and timing. Accuracy and reaction times for all stimuli were recorded. A 
maximum of 60 seconds was allowed for each picture, rather than the recommended 180 
seconds in the manual, as most children were found to give up looking within this period 
during piloting and the shorter time limit also helped to maintain their attention on the 
task.
5.1.2 Results
From the means in Table 5.2, it can be seen that the ASD group were in general 
performing slightly worse in terms o f accuracy than the control group, although this could 
be explained by differences between the groups in IQ. The relationship between task 
performance and age and IQ  was therefore investigated. In both groups, EFT total
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Table 5.2 Means (and standard deviations) o f Embedded Figures Test results.
Control group ASD group
Accuracy Child: Triangle 8.93 (1.90) 7.88 (2.49)
(11 max) 4-11 0-11
Child: House 8.11 (3.59) 6.28 (3.59)
(14 max) 1-12 0-13
Adult 3.81 (3.15) 3.00 (3.02)
(12 max) 0-9 0-10
Total 20.85 (7.68) 17.16 (7.88)
(37 max) 7-31 3-32
Reaction time 1: Child: Triangle 8.26 (2 .88) 7.99 (3.86)
correct responses 2.79-13.80 1.93-17.43
only (seconds) Child: House ** 16.92 (7.39) 
6.37-40.55
13.25 (7.39) 
1.50-30.47
Adult 19.58 (6.28) 
8.49-31.31
17.48 (8.97) 
2.56-44.71
Total 12.83 (3.66) 
4.88-20.65
11.25 (3.89) 
3.33-19.04
Reaction time 2: Child: Triangle 18.07 (8.82) 22.94 (11.37)
60s for incorrect 6.33-43.20 3.18-60.00
trials (seconds) Child: House 34.17 (12.80) 
14.03-58.61
39.13 (12.46) 
11.34-60.00
Adult 46.97 (11.22) 
25.05-60.00
49.31 (11.11) 
19.82-60.00
Total 33.53 (9.84) 
17.51-51.27
37.62 (9.84) 
16.78-56.55
Reaction time 3: Child: Triangle 0 .00  (1 .00) -0.12 (1.30)
correct responses 4.45-2.49 -2.00-3.86
accounting for Child: House ** 0 .00  (1 .00) -0.54 (0.82)
accuracy (z-scores; 4.40-3.17 -2.27-1.80
-ve numbers Adult 0.00  (1 .00) -0.36 (1.44)
indicate fast 4.75-1.78 -2.84-3.94
responses) Total 0 .00  (1 .00) 
4.68-2.14
-0.30 (1.03) 
-2.16-1.92
** p<. 01
accuracy increased with age (ASD: r =.48,/><.001; control: r verbal (ASD:
r =.37,/)=.005; control: r =.49,/>=.010) and performance IQ (ASD: r =.27, ^ >=.039; control: 
r —.65,/K.001), although the strength o f this relationship differed between the groups, 
particularly for performance IQ. An ANCOVA comparing group accuracy performances, 
after factoring out the variance in age, verbal and performance IQ, found no significant
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differences in any condition (F(l,79)<.5). Indeed, the corrected means indicated that the 
groups were performing extremely similarly in all conditions.
Reaction times were calculated in three ways; firstly reaction times to correct trials only, 
secondly reaction times with 60 seconds entered for incorrect trials, and lastly correct 
reaction times with accuracy scores covaried out o f them (shown in Table 5.2). It should 
be noted that for the first and last methods, not all children have reaction time data as this 
relies on them having correctly located at least one target shape. One child with ASD 
therefore has missing data from the tent condition, one child with ASD from the house, 
and 15 children with ASD and 6 controls on the adult version; this is a serious floor effect 
but can be taken into account in the Embedded Figures total.
From the table, the different patterns o f results produced by the two reaction time 
calculation methods can clearly be seen. For the first method, the ASD group performed 
more quickly than controls (although this was only significant for the house condition once 
age, verbal and performance IQ  had been accounted for: F (l,78)=8.06,7)=.006) whilst, for 
the second method, they performed more slowly (although these differences were not 
significant: F(1,79)<1). This illustrates the differential effect that group differences in 
accuracy have on reaction time and can be seen clearly in graphs A and B o f Figure 5.2 
below. This is especially striking for the second method, in which the majority o f variance 
in reaction time is eliminated as it is almost perfectly linearly related to accuracy (with a 
negative gradient), particularly at low accuracy levels. Both methods can therefore be seen 
to be consistently biased by the accuracy o f the individual.
Given this thesis addresses individual differences in performance, not just group 
differences, it is important to account for individual accuracy levels within the reaction time 
data; this will also eradicate the issue o f accuracy affecting reaction time data. This can be 
done by the third method o f calculation mentioned above. An ANCOVA was therefore 
performed on the mean reaction time for correct responses, with accuracy, age, verbal and
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Figure 5.2 Relationship between Embedded Figures Test accuracy and reaction time, 
using three different methods to calculate reaction time: A, reaction time for 
correct responses only; B, reaction time with 60 seconds assigned to 
incorrect trials; C, reaction times accounting for accuracy. Line of best fit 
shown for total sample.
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performance IQ entered as covariates. A significant group difference was found only for 
the house condition (F(l,77)=8.24,fl=.005), with the ASD group performing faster than 
the controls (estimated marginal means of 12.95 seconds and 17.53 seconds respectively). 
From graph C in Figure 5.2, it can be seen that accuracy is of course no longer reflected at 
all in the reaction time data.
As so many children performed at floor levels on the adult version of the test, a composite 
of scores from the two child subtests was also produced. This also allowed for comparison
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with previous findings using only the child version o f the test. Neither accuracy 
(F(l,79)=.38) nor reaction time (method 3; F(l,78)=2.64) produced significant differences 
between the groups.
Figure 5.3 shows individual differences in EFT accuracy and reaction time (method 3) after 
accounting for age and IQ. Performance in the ASD group spanned the range o f control 
performance; however, it can also be seen that a number o f individuals in this group fell 
outside the control range, with 4 above and 4 below for accuracy and 6 below for reaction 
time. O n the basis o f the accuracy data, eight children were classified as showing weak 
central coherence, defined as falling below the 5th percentile o f control performance (see 
chapter 6 for further details). For the reaction time data, nine children were classified as 
showing weak central coherence. However, only one child was classified as showing weak 
central coherence under both performance measures.
Figure 5.3 Individual performance on the Embedded Figures Test after accounting for 
age and IQ; low scores indicate high accuracy or fast reaction times and 
therefore weak central coherence; the position o f the x-axis indicates the 
control mean and the dotted line illustrates the cut-off for the 5th percentile 
o f control performance.
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5.1.3 Discussion
Contrary to received wisdom that individuals with ASD are bound to show superior 
performance on the Em bedded Figures Test in comparison to controls, past studies have 
produced varying results for different research groups. It is the case that there has been a 
trend towards finding group differences in reaction time but not accuracy though. Due to 
problems with group matching and data analysis techniques, some o f these results may be 
spurious however. From the information available in the various papers, three studies 
definitely address these problems (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 1983; van 
Lang et al., 2006b), two showing group differences in accuracy with low-functioning 
children, the other in reaction time with high-functioning adults. Indeed, in Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen (1997), accuracy differences may have been observed if the test had not 
produced a ceiling effect.
It is therefore surprising that the current experiment finds little support for these results, 
revealing no differences between the groups in accuracy or reaction time on the total 
measures. A difference was seen however in the reaction times to the house condition of 
the children’s version o f the test, with the children with ASD performing on average faster 
than the control children. This difference was not strong enough to produce group 
differences on the combined children’s measure used in previous studies though.
The most notable differences between the present experiment and the three mentioned 
above is in the use o f higher-functioning children compared to Shah & Frith (1983) and 
van Lang et al. (2006b) and in using children rather than adults compared to Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen (1997). From these three studies, neither level o f functioning nor age appear 
to affect the presence o f group differences and it seems unlikely that the particular 
combination o f being high-functioning and being a child would cause the present results to 
differ from previous findings.
However, the fact that the ASD children did perform faster as a group than the controls on 
the house subtest indicates that they were performing in line with previous studies, albeit to 
a lesser extent (see van Lang et al., 2006b for similar results in accuracy). The house 
subtest is designed to be more challenging than the triangle subtest and it is possible that 
the triangle condition produced a slight ceiling effect in the ASD group, allowing the 
control group to perform very similarly to them. Indeed, the ASD group was non- 
significantly faster on this subtest. A very similar performance can be seen on the adult 
version o f the test, this time possibly being limited by a floor effect as the test was too hard 
for many children. The performance displayed by the ASD group on the triangle subtest is 
therefore rather reminiscent o f Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen’s (1997) results, given that they 
used only the 12-item adult version, most appropriate for their population.
Another reason why the results may not have been as clear cut as expected is based on the 
heterogeneity within the particular sample o f individuals used. It can be seen from Figure 
5.3 that both the accuracy and reaction time measures in the ASD group spanned the range 
of control performance, with only a few children performing outside the control range. If 
only a proportion o f the ASD population display weak central coherence or if the 
distributions for the ASD and control populations are overlapping but displaced from one 
another, it is possible that a different sample o f the ASD population would by chance 
contain more children with performance outside the control range, producing a stronger 
group difference. It should be noted that the children falling outside the control range do 
so in both directions for the accuracy data; this may indicate that both extreme weak and 
strong central coherence exists in this sample o f children. However, it is important to 
consider here that weak central coherence is shown by extremely good accuracy on this 
test, making it a very conservative test o f the theory; those children showing good 
performance are likely to really possess a locally biased processing style. Consequendy, 
strong central coherence would be defined as poor accuracy on this test. There are of 
course a number o f different reasons why a child might perform poorly on any test but the
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lack o f control task here makes it difficult to discount factors which are not specific to the 
task.
It would therefore be advantageous to further investigate the nature of this processing style 
using a separate central coherence task in the same population in order to control more 
tighdy for general rather than specific poor performance through task design, and to 
explore the nature o f the mechanism that underlies the purported difference in information 
processing style in ASD. In addition, this will allow the pattern o f individual differences in 
performance to be further investigated.
5.2 Local-Global Switching task
The other main visuo-spatial task designed to tap central coherence that has been used with 
individuals with ASD involves Navon figures. In 1977, Navon investigated local and 
global processing within the normal population using what he termed ‘hierarchical stimuli’; 
large letters made up o f smaller letters. These were used to tap into the processing of 
global and local visual information as both were contained in these stimuli, the large letter 
being the global element and the small letters being the local elements. Navon created 
both congruent stimuli, in which the global letter was the same as the local letter and 
incongruent stimuli, in which the global letter was different from the local letter. These 
stimuli are therefore referred to as Navon figures (Figure 5.4). Within the normal
Figure 5.4 An example o f some Navon figures. A congruent figure is shown on the 
left, in which the global and local letters are both H; on the right, an 
incongruent figure is shown, in which the global figure is H whilst the local 
figure is A.
HH HH AA AA
HH HH AA AA
HH HH AA AA
HHHHHHH AAAAAAA
HH HH AA AA
HH HH AA AA
HH HH AA AA
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population, Navon found that global information was processed faster and often at the 
expense o f local information, a phenomenon he termed ‘global precedence’. Specifically, 
participants were both slower to report the local than the global elements o f incongruent 
stimuli, indicating a global advantage, and were slower to report the local elements of 
incongruent than congruent stimuli, indicating global interference.
Navon figures therefore lend themselves ideally to studying different hypotheses about the 
nature o f local and global processing in ASD, such as whether global processing is intact or 
not, and whether processing biases are present despite intact abilities. A number of 
authors have utilised these stimuli through a variety o f different methods and with varying 
results (see Table 5.3). Typically, an individual is shown a Navon figure for a short period 
o f time (200-4000 msecs) and is asked to identify which o f two target letters was displayed 
(or sometimes whether or not a particular target letter was displayed). Congruent stimuli 
only involve a single letter at both levels, whereas incongruent stimuli involve two target 
letters, only one o f which the participant must respond to (see Figure 5.4). As two 
different letters are present within incongruent stimuli, these are thought to compete and 
hence increase processing time. Neutral stimuli consist o f a target letter paired with a non­
target letter, which may be perceptually similar or not to the target letter; these are likely to 
cause less interference when they are similar to the target stimulus. Both accuracy and 
reaction times are used as measures o f information processing.
The main difference between methods used in different studies concerns whether the 
participant is informed beforehand which level o f processing (local or global) to attend to. 
Selective attention paradigms provide this information for the participant whereas divided 
attention paradigms do not; in the latter, individuals may therefore have to quickly switch 
their attention between levels o f processing if the target stimulus is not present in the first 
level they attend to. In selective attention tasks, the normal global precedence effects are 
generally seen in everybody, including individuals with ASD (Mottron, Burack, Stauder &
137
Robaey, 1999b; Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon & Filloux, 1994; Plaisted, Swettenham &
Rees, 1999; Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton & Tonge, 2000), whereas they are either 
absent in individuals with ASD or replaced by local precedence effects in divided attention 
tasks, particularly for interference effects (Behrmann et al., 2006; Plaisted et al., 1999; 
Rinehart et al., 2001). These results indicate that global and local information are
Table 5.3 Studies using a Navon paradigm in individuals with ASD
Comparison
group
ASD age & 
ability level
Task version ASD results 
(G=global, L=local)
O zonoff et al. CA, verbal, 8-16 years Selective attention G advantage &
(1994) non-verbal & 
full-scale IQ
High (was it H or S?) interference
Mottron et al. CA, non-verbal 7-19 years Selective attention G advantage &
(1999b) IQ High (was it H or S?) interference (but 
not in controls!)
Plaisted et al. CA, non-verbal 6-16 years Selective attention G advantage &
(1999) IQ High (was it H or S?)
Divided attention 
(was A present?)
interference
L advantage & 
interference
Rinehart et al. CA, full-scale 6-20  years Selective attention G advantage &
(2000 ) IQ High (was it 1 or 2 ?) interference, also 
L interference
Rinehart et al. CA, full-scale 6-20  years Divided attention Slower for G
(2001 ) IQ High (neutral stimuli only) 
(was it 1 or 2 ?)
targets after a L 
target
M ottron, Burack, CA, full-scale 10-21 years Divided attention N o group diff
Iarocci, Belleville 
& Enns (2003)
IQ High (neutral stimuli only) 
(was it H or S?)
Fragmented letters 
(global level only) 
(was it H or S?)
Disembedded letters 
(local level only)
(was it H or S?)
N o group diff
ASD group 
relatively fast
Behrmann et al. Age, education 19-53 years Divided attention N o advantage, L
(2006) level High (was it H or S?) interference 
(neither found in 
controls)
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processed normally when the participant is explicidy directed towards a particular 
processing level, but that a natural bias towards or inability to inhibit local processing is 
observed when attention is undirected.
At first glance, M ottron et al.’s (2003) results appear to contradict the results from other 
authors using divided attention paradigms as they found no evidence for a local bias using 
the same technique. A closer scrutiny o f their stimuli is necessary to interpret this 
difference. M ottron et al. required their participants to indicate whether an H or an S was 
present in the Navon figure; figures were constructed in rectangular configurations similar 
to those shown in Figure 5.5 (page 140). They used neutral congruent stimuli in which the 
second letter present was perceptually similar to the target. As these letters were 
consistendy paired together (an A always with the target H and an E  with the target S), the 
non-target letters can be seen as representing the target that is present, and processing at 
both levels is therefore not necessary. Consequendy, the participant does not need to 
attend to both levels o f the stimuli and so this task should not be considered a divided 
attention task.
An alternative interpretation o f the divided attention results is that children with autism are 
poor at switching between levels o f processing (Plaisted et al., 1999), producing no 
precedence effects in either level. This could be seen as a problem with executive 
functioning (see Chapter 4). For example, if an individual has a bias towards global 
processing and always attends first to the global level, they would be faster on trials in 
which the target was present at the global than local level. This pattern o f performance is 
certainly the case with normally developing participants. However, if an individual more 
generally has problems switching and gets ‘stuck’ within a level, they will always attend first 
to the level they are currently in, that o f the target in the previous trial; this would predict 
that they would be o f similar speeds in both local and global incongruent conditions and 
slower at both o f these than congruent conditions. This is indeed the pattern o f results
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shown in the reaction time results for the ASD group when performing the divided 
attention condition in Plaisted et al.’s study.
More recendy, Rinehart et al. (2001) have employed a Navon task in which they compared 
performance across consecutive pairs o f trials in order to analyse the ability to stay within a 
processing level or switch between levels, thus pitting an executive switching problem 
against a local or global processing bias. They found that individuals with autism, but not 
Asperger Syndrome, were non-significandy slower to identify a global target stimulus that 
came after a local target stimulus than vice versa. This borderline result is o f interest as it 
supports the idea o f intact global and local processing with a natural bias towards local 
processing, but also implicates a mechanism for this problem, specifically in the switching 
from global to local levels.
It would be o f interest to pursue Rinehart et al.’s (2001) finding for a number o f reasons: to 
clarify their borderline result and to refine their methodology. Two issues are included in 
this latter point: there was no control over the inter-stimulus interval and it is unclear how 
data from incorrect responses were analysed. Furthermore, divided attention paradigms 
have their own caveats as it is difficult to know how the task is being performed and what 
strategies are being used. Therefore, rather than group differences retiecting any 
underlying processing differences, it is possible that differences may reflect differences in 
strategy use, unrelated to central coherence.
Indeed, Rinehart et al.’s (2001) results prompted Mitchell Valdes, a researcher at the Cuban 
Neuroscience Centre in Havana, to design a novel task based around the same principles, 
which will be investigated here (personal communication). His Local-Global (LG) 
Switching task employs Navon figures composed o f only global or local components in an 
attentional blink paradigm (Raymond, Shapiro & Amell, 1992). This is the phenomenon 
whereby participants often have trouble reporting a second stimulus that appears shortly 
(300-400 msecs) after a first, as they have few attentional resources available to direct
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towards it. Moreover, if the participant is required to switch between two different modes 
of processing for the two stimuli, an additional attentional cost is required, further reducing 
the probability o f correctly reporting the second stimulus (Ward, 1982).
This LG Switching task is well suited to testing individual differences in global and local 
processing and has been developed and piloted in control adults and individuals with ASD 
in an as yet unpublished study (Torres, Valdes, Lopez, Garcia & Manzano, 2004). Firsdy, it 
would be expected that a switch from local to global processing or vice versa would be 
more cosdy than staying within a mode o f processing. Secondly, it would be expected that 
switching into a less preferable processing mode would be more cosdy than switching into 
a favoured mode; if the cost o f switching processing mode is low, the participant will 
therefore be able to process the second stimulus whilst, if the cost o f switching processing 
mode is high, the second stimulus may fall within the attentional blink and so will not be 
processed. Individuals with ASD would therefore be expected to find it easier to switch 
from global to local processing and normally developing children would be expected to 
find it easier to switch from local to global processing.
Furthermore, this paradigm avoids one o f the problems o f divided attention paradigms; 
namely that both global and local information are presented at the same time, making it is 
difficult to know what strategy a participant is using on any one trial. For example, one 
reason why people with ASD may not show the usual global precedence effects is that they 
may inefficiently attend to both levels o f processing before responding. In the current 
study, global and local information were presented separately and therefore the only 
competition is temporal, in terms o f the cost o f switching and the demands on attention.
Lastly, this paradigm enabled issues relating to the crossover between the executive 
function and central coherence theories to be addressed. An executive theory would 
predict that individuals with ASD would show impairments on all switching conditions
whereas the central coherence theory would predict problems in ASD specifically when 
switching from local into global but not in the opposite direction.
5.2.1 Method
This experiment was run during test session 3 on a laptop computer using E-prime 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). Blank stimuli were constructed from a 5 by 3 
grid o f elements each consisting o f two rectangles, one above the other, similar to a square 
number 8 . Global stimuli were letters constructed from different combinations o f these 
blank elements. Local stimuli were a grid o f 15 small letters, each constructed from the 
relevant subcomponents o f a blank element. The letters involved in the task were E, H, P, 
S and U. Examples o f both local and global stimuli can be seen in Figure 5.5.
The participant was first introduced to the same global and local stimuli that they would 
see during the task. Once they had correctly identified each o f the letters, the participant 
completed 4 blocked conditions in a set order; global-global (GG), local-local (LL), global- 
local (GL) then local-global (LG). Each block consisted o f 5 slow practice trials followed 
by 25 test trials with corrective feedback after each trial. Each trial consisted o f two 
consecutive letters with an inter stimulus interval o f 400 ms between their onsets. Global 
stimuli had a duration o f 50 ms whilst local stimuli had a longer duration o f 200 ms; the
Figure 5.5 Time line for a single trial o f the global-local condition in the LG Switching 
task.
blank global H blank local S blank
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latter were much harder to identify during piloting (the normal global advantage) and these 
durations were designed to produce similar levels o f accuracy across the stimulus types. 
Accuracy data for the two letters in each trial were recorded and the proportion of 
responses on which the response to the second letter was correct was calculated for only 
those trials on which the first response was correct. This was necessary in order to ensure 
that the first stimulus had been processed and there had been a chance for the attentional 
blink to occur. Chance performance would therefore result in correct responses 20% of 
the time. As reaction time data was not o f interest, it was also stressed that the participant 
was under no time constraints.
Figure 5.5 gives the time-line for each trial; in this example, a switch from global to local 
processing is required. The child must respond to each trial by saying which two letters 
they saw (here, H and S). This paradigm has been trialed with small samples of low- 
functioning adolescents and adults with autism (Torres et al., 2004), revealing that those 
with autism were indeed worse at switching from local to global stimuli while controls 
(normally developing adolescents and adults) were worse at the condition which required a 
switch from global to local processing.
5.2.2 Results
Data were not available for three children in the ASD group as they were unable to 
complete the task; all three thought the task was impossible and therefore became 
frustrated and upset that they had been asked to do something that they thought they could 
only fail at. Two o f these children were young with intelligence in the normal range, one 
boy and one girl; the third child was an older girl with particularly low performance IQ. All 
three children completed all other tasks.
As mentioned in section 5.2.1, only those trials on which a child responded correcdy to the 
first letter were suitable for analysis o f the attentional blink paradigm, resulting in different
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children having different numbers o f trials analysed. However, in order to ensure that the 
children in both groups found the task o f equal difficulty and any further analyses involved 
the same mean number o f trials in both groups, responses to the first letter were also 
analysed. While there was a slight trend for the children with ASD to respond correctly to 
fewer first letters than the controls, group differences were not significant after accounting 
for the effects o f age and IQ  (F(4,73)=1.36).
In order to calculate each individual’s ability to switch into a level, the difference between 
the relevant non-switching and switching condition was calculated; for switching into 
global, each participants score was calculated as GG-LG, whilst for switching into local, 
LL-GL was used. This gave a measure for each child o f the cost o f switching into a level 
in comparison to that child’s own ability o f processing within that same level.
As can be seen from Table 5.4, group means indicate that both groups found the switching 
conditions (GL and LG) harder than the non-switching conditions (GG and LL). The
Table 5.4 Means (and standard deviations) with range o f LG Switching task results;
scores reflect the proportion o f correct responses to the second stimulus 
for trials on which the first stimulus was correcdy identified.
Control group ASD group
Global-Global (GG) 0.70 (0.22) 
.00-1.00
0.63 (0.26) 
.00-1.00
Local-Local (LL) 0.81 (0.18) 
.43-1.00
0.78 (0.24) 
.00-1.00
Global-Local (GL) 0.51 (0.17) 
.20—91
0.55 (0.23) 
.00-1.00
Local-Global (LG) 0.55 (0.31) 
.05-1.00
0.51 (0.27) 
.1 0 -9 6
Global switching cost (GG-LG) 0.15 (0.26) 
-.2 5-. 5 6
0.12 (0.25) 
-.67-.68
Local switching cost (LL-GL) 0.30 (0.14) 
.07—65
0.23 (0.24) 
-.50-71
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ASD group were performing slightly worse across all conditions except the GL condition, 
on which they performed slightly better than controls, as predicted. In general, their 
switching costs were also lower in both conditions (GG-LG and LL-GL), although as 
expected this was more pronounced in the local condition. However, a 2x2 repeated 
measures ANCOVA, entering age, verbal and performance IQ  as covariates, revealed that 
there was no main effect o f condition (F(l,76)=.58) or group (F(l,76)=.63) and no 
interaction between the two (F(l,76)=.55).
Individual differences in performance on both switching conditions were examined. Five 
children were found to have particular difficulty (below the 5th percentile o f control 
performance) switching into the global level o f processing and 14 children were particularly 
good at switching into the local level o f processing (see Figure 5.6).
Figure 5.6 Individual performance on the local and global switching conditions of the 
LG Switching task after accounting for age and IQ; high scores indicate 
high cost o f switching (high GG-LG scores and low LL-GL scores 
therefore indicate weak central coherence); the position o f the x-axis 
indicates the control mean and the dotted line illustrates the cut-off for the 
5th percentile o f control performance.
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5.2.3 Discussion
The results from the LG Switching task reflect those from the Embedded Figures Task in 
terms o f a lack o f results. Children with ASD did not differ significandy from normally 
developing children despite a trend towards a relatively lower switching cost in the ASD 
group on the local condition. While the failure to replicate the borderline result of 
Rinehart et al. (2001) and the Cuban pilot study (Torres et al., 2004) was disappointing, this 
again reveals the inconsistency o f results in the central coherence literature on local and 
global processing. The fact that similar results were found here, across two quite different 
tests tapping into local and global processing, indicates that this may indeed be a result 
dependent on the particular sample due to heterogeneity within the ASD population.
How is the subgroup o f children with ASD to be identified, who are responsible for the 
marginal group differences in experimental studies o f local processing bias? One hint is 
given by the hypothesis o f under-connectivity due to pruning failure (see section 1.3.2): is 
there therefore a relationship between head size and weak central coherence? The 
suggestion is that the increased head or brain size seen in a small proportion of individuals 
with ASD may result from a lack o f early neuronal pruning leading to diffuse and 
inefficient feedback connections. A lack o f top down modulation might then result in 
good exemplar-based or local processing and poor generalisation or global processing, as is 
currently assumed to be characteristic o f weak central coherence. To this end, the effect o f 
head size on performance on tests o f central coherence was therefore examined.
5.3 Head size and central coherence
Head z-scores were available only for those children who were Caucasian, which reduced 
the size o f the ASD and control groups to 52 and 25 respectively for the Embedded 
Figures Test and 49 and 25 for the LG Switching Task.
146
5.3.1 Results
Partial correlations between these variables, accounting for age, verbal and performance 
IQ, were calculated and revealed that no relationship existed between performance on the 
Embedded Figures Test and head size in either group (ASD: r <.26; control: r< .28). 
However, within the ASD group only, head size was correlated to the cost of switching 
into the global mode of processing in the LG Switching task (r =.36,y>=.014). As Figure 
5.7 shows, children with larger heads had a greater cost of switching into a global mode of 
processing than children with smaller heads. Head size was unrelated to the cost of 
switching into a global mode of processing in the control group (r =-.22). Furthermore, it
I
was unrelated to the cost o f switching into local processing in either group (ASD r =.02; 
control r =-.06).
Group differences between those children in the ASD group who could be classed as 
having macroencephaly (head circumference z-score greater than 1.88 , equivalent to the
Figure 5.7 Relationship between head circumference and cost of switching into global 
processing in both groups; line of best fit is represented for ASD group 
only.
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Table 5.5 Means (and standard deviations) with range for LG Switching task results, 
with the ASD group split into those with or without macrocephaly.
Control group (25)
ASD group (49)
Normal head size (37) Macrocephalic (12)
Global switching 0.15 (0.26) 0.08 (0 .22) 0.26 (0.29)
cost (GG-LG) -.25-.56 -.67-.60 -.18:68
Local switching 0.30 (0.14) 0.24 (0.23) 0.18(0.30)
cost (LL-GL) .07-.65 -.30:71 -.50-.66
top 3% o f the normal population, here 12 children or 24% of the ASD group), those with 
head sizes in the normal range, and the controls (2 children or 7% of whom could be 
classed as macrocephalic) were therefore analysed. Table 5.5 shows the means and 
standard deviations for the three groups and indicates that the macroencepahlic ASD 
group did indeed show a greater cost when switching into global processing than the 
remaining children with ASD and the controls.
A 2x2 repeated measures ANCOVA comparing all three groups revealed no main effect o f 
either condition (F(l,68)=1.06) or group (F(2,68)=1.48) but a borderline significant 
interaction between the two (F(2,68)=3.05,/>=.054). Post hoc tests indicated that this 
interaction was present between the two ASD groups (F(l,44)=5.19, j£>=.028), and a weak 
trend towards the same pattern was also seen between the macrocephalic ASD group and 
the control group (F(l,32)=3.05,/>=.090). Conversely, no sign o f an interaction was 
present between the control group and the ASD children with normal head sizes 
(F(l,57)=.13). For the two ASD groups, this interaction arose from a difference between 
the groups in the cost o f switching into global processing (F(l,44)=8.93,/?=.005), with the 
macrocephalic group having a greater switching cost. For the control & macrocephalic 
groups, the interaction was a complete cross over and none o f the post hoc tests within or 
between groups were significant. This pattern o f results is shown in Figure 5.8. It should 
be noted that the tasks were not necessarily equated for difficulty so no claims can be made
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Figure 5.8 Interaction between the cost of switching into global versus local 
processing in the macroencephalic ASD group versus the remaining 
children with ASD and the controls. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean.
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about the absolute cost of switching across the two conditions within a group; for example, 
it may be that the local conditions were generally harder and therefore that the control and 
normal head size ASD groups found both types of switching to be of equal difficulty.
Given this LG Switching task has not been used previously in populations with ASD, 
partial correlations between performance on this task and the Embedded Figures Test were 
examined. In the ASD group, the cost o f switching into either the global or local level was 
unrelated to Embedded Figures performance (accuracy and reaction time, r <0.15). 
Additionally, when comparing those children with extremely good and extremely poor 
EFT accuracy, the children with good performance had slighdy but non-significandy bigger 
head z-scores than those with poor performance (/(l 2)=.83). Furthermore, differences 
between those children in the ASD group with and without macrocephaly on the different 
tests in the ToM and EF domains were also explored but revealed no significant 
differences (F(9,39)=l.ll).
149
5.3.2 Discussion
While such a novel result needs replicating, the results from the interaction between head 
size and the LG Switching task suggest that a bias towards local processing may be 
characteristic o f a subgroup o f individuals with ASD. Specifically, children with atypically 
large heads appear to show this style o f processing. This creates the possibility that the 
increased head size, and therefore presumably brain size, seen in a proportion of 
individuals with ASD is a biological marker for a lack o f preference for global processing, 
or a lack o f global precedence. This was predicted from the idea that macrocephaly may 
result from a lack o f neuronal pruning early in development and lead to numerous and 
inefficient feedback connections in the brain, resulting in good exemplar-based processing 
but poor generalisation and integration o f information (Frith, 2003a).
The high level o f control o f  the LG  Switching task conditions allows a careful examination 
o f exacdy where the difference in this processing style lies. Individuals with macrocephaly 
appear to have difficulties switching into global processing mode; they show a greater cost 
and presumably have to use more resources to overcome this attentional barrier. There 
was no evidence however that individuals with macrocephaly have difficulty processing 
global stimuli per se; rather they have difficulty when having to switch out o f local 
processing and into global processing. This would predict that individuals with 
macrocephaly would have problems on any task in which they have to switch into global 
processing under pressured conditions; this may indeed be the problem in divided attention 
Navon tasks whilst selective attention tasks require processing only within the current level. 
This could be described as a local bias or preference for local over global processing, in the 
same way that Happe & Frith (2006) use the term (see section 1.3.6), and is consistent with 
suggestions made by Plaisted (Plaisted, Dobler, Bell & Davis, 2006). These results could 
also be considered consistent with M ottron’s (Mottron et al., 2006) Enhanced Perceptual 
Function theory if a local enhancement can be conceptualised as a local bias, although the
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fact that the significant result was in an inability to switch into global processing departs 
from this theory (see section 1.3.7). The important difference to these theories being made 
here, however, is that this processing style is not characteristic o f ASD but rather o f ASD 
plus macrocephaly.
These results have implications for the executive function theory o f autism. Whilst this 
theory would have predicted impaired performance across both switching conditions, the 
results find little support for this idea. As already mentioned, those individuals with 
macrocephaly had difficulties specifically with switching in a particular direction, from local 
into global processing, but not vice versa. Furthermore, those individuals with ASD but 
normal head size were performing similarly to controls across all conditions, if anything 
performing slightly more efficiently on the switching conditions. This would indicate that 
any problems seen with switching set are likely to occur at a conscious level as this task was 
assessing the capacity o f the brain to switch quickly between levels. Indeed, the problem in 
executive tasks may be more to do with prompting oneself to switch levels or choosing 
when to do so, whilst possessing an intact ability to perform the switch when prompted 
externally as in the LG  Switching task.
It appears from these results however that the LG  Switching task is tapping into a slightly 
different ability to the Em bedded Figures Test; correlations were not seen between these 
two tasks or between the Em bedded Figures Test and head size. This might be because o f 
the complex, uncontrolled and open-ended nature o f the Em bedded Figures Test. In this 
task, participants are instructed to ignore the global image and search for the local image 
within it, hence a switch between local and global processing is not necessary. The 
advantage that individuals with ASD sometimes show in this task may come from the 
controls finding it hard to ignore the global image and slipping out o f local processing 
rather than from individuals with ASD finding it hard to switch into global processing. 
Furthermore, there is a high degree o f conscious control over processing in this task,
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making it difficult to assess the strategies used by different participants to achieve good 
performance. The LG  Switching task, on the other hand, is a more implicit task, putting 
the attentional system under maximum stress or pressure whilst measuring its efficiency.
5.4 Conclusion
Both the Em bedded Figures Test and the LG Switching task results together indicate that 
findings supporting the presence o f weak central coherence in autism are not unequivocal. 
In this population o f high-functioning children with ASD, there was little evidence of this 
processing style in the whole group. However, when the presence o f macrocephaly was 
used to split the group, a clear pattern o f results emerged; those children with ASD and 
macrocephaly showed a bias towards local processing on the LG Switching task, portrayed 
in a greater processing cost when switching from local into global processing. If these 
results are replicated, this would imply that weak central coherence is restricted to a 
subgroup o f individuals with ASD and should therefore not be considered as a universal 
property o f ASD. The tentative hypothesis can therefore be proposed that head si2e may 
be a biological marker o f weak central coherence and may provide a useful endophenotype 
for investigating the genetic basis o f a subgroup o f individuals with ASD.
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C hapter 6: Cognitive impairments
Whilst intended to assess general cognitive ability, by design intelligence tests also rely on a 
number o f different cognitive skills. It has been suggested that some of these skills may be 
similar to those cognitive abilities proposed to be causal in ASD (Frith, 1989). The first 
part o f this chapter therefore assesses the relationships between the three cognitive 
impairments involved in this thesis and performance on the various subtests o f the 
measure o f intelligence used here. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the underlying 
cognitive impairments in autism may be related in a variety o f ways (eg. Pemer & Lang, 
1999; Russell, 1997). The second part o f this chapter will therefore clarify the relationships 
between theory o f mind, central coherence and executive function through the various 
tests used here, designed to tap into each o f these domains.
6.1 The relationship betw een cognitive im pairm ents and intelligence 
te s t  perform ance
Although intelligence tests are designed to tap into general cognitive ability, intelligence test 
performance in ASD is typically characterised by an uneven profile, particularly on the 
Wechsler IQ  tests. This profile contains distinctive peaks and troughs, most notably with a 
peak on the Block Design subtest and a dip on the Comprehension subtest (Lockyer & 
Rutter, 1970). This pattern has been observed both in individuals and across whole groups 
o f individuals with ASD (Flappe, 1994). It has also been shown to be independent of: 
overall IQ  level, being present in both high- and low-functioning populations (Shah & 
Frith, 1993); the discrepancy between verbal and performance IQ, being present even 
when verbal IQ  is higher than performance IQ  (Lincoln, Allen & Kilman, 1995); the 
specific diagnosis o f the individual within the spectrum, being present for both autism
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(Shah & Frith, 1993) and Asperger Syndrome (Bowler, 1992); and of age, being present in 
children (Siegel, Minshew & Goldstein, 1996) and adults (Dennis et al., 1999).
It has been suggested that different cognitive impairments may explain this typical pattern 
of IQ test performance (Frith, 1989). The peak of performance seen in the Block Design 
sub test is thought to result from weak central coherence (CC). This test requires the child 
to recreate a given geometric pattern using blocks which have two coloured sides, two 
white sides and two sides diagonally split between colour and white (see Figure 6.1). In 
order to succeed at this task, the child must focus in on the local detail of the pattern, 
mentally dividing the pattern into components the size of an individual block, and not be 
swayed by cohesiveness o f the overall pattern. The presence of a bias towards local 
processing would therefore be an asset in such a test.
This suggestion has been supported by a study using the Block Design Task and a modified 
novel ‘segmented’ version (Shah & Frith, 1993). By presenting the geometric pattern to be
Figure 6 .1 The Block Design subtest from the Wechsler Intelligence Scales.
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Figure 6.2 The novel segmented (left) and the original un-segmented (right) version of 
the Block Design test (taken from Caron, Mottron, Berthiaume & Dawson, 
2006).
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constructed in a segmented display, with each block shown separately, the child no longer 
needs to mentally divide the pattern and so is not affected by the global design (see Figure 
6.2). Indeed, in this study the control children were just as fast as the age and ability 
matched children with autism in this segmented version, but when presented with the 
original un-segmented version, the control children fell behind the children with autism. 
This result has now been replicated (Caron et al., 2006).
Similarly to Block Design, the trough on the Comprehension subtest is thought to arise 
from the cognitive impairment in Theory of Mind (ToM) present in ASD (Frith, 1989). 
This subtest consists of questions about how to behave in certain life situations and why 
certain aspects of our society function in the manner they do, which the child must answer. 
For example, one question asks the child, “W hat should you do if you see thick smoke 
coming from the window of your neighbour’s house?”. A correct answer to this question 
would require the child to consider why the experimenter asked the question and the kind 
of answer they might be expecting, as well as to think about the question in terms of other 
people in addition to himself. So in this example the child must infer that the experimenter 
is really asking for a response to a house fire rather than to smoke, and that the appropriate 
response would involve consideration of the neighbour’s safety (calling the fire brigade) 
whilst maintaining his own safety (not going into the house to investigate). In this manner 
this task is likely to load heavily on an understanding of other people’s (the experimenter’s 
and the neighbour’s) mental states.
Evidence to support the idea that a ToM impairment may be causal o f the Comprehension 
trough comes from a study by Happe (1994). Individuals with autism were divided into 
those who failed at least one o f two standard first-order false belief tasks and those who 
passed both tasks. The results indicated that those individuals who failed the false belief 
tasks had poorer performance on the Comprehension subtest and were more likely to have 
a personal Comprehension trough relative to their overall verbal level. This indicates that 
the inability to pass false belief tasks has a detrimental effect on Comprehension subtest 
performance.
Although the classic uneven profile on IQ  subtests can possibly be explained by the two 
cognitive theories o f weak CC and ToM, it is less clear how the third candidate theory of 
executive function (EF) would affect intelligence test performance in ASD; this has not 
been investigated and no specific predictions have previously been made. One possibility 
is that executive dysfunction might adversely affect accomplishment o f the performance 
IQ  subtests. It is well documented that patients with acquired frontal lesions are poor both 
on tests o f EF and fluid intelligence but show retained performance on tests o f crystallised 
intelligence (Duncan, Burgess & Emslie, 1995). Fluid intelligence tests are thought to 
involve novel ‘online’ problem solving and reasoning, as do many tests o f executive 
function, whereas crystallised intelligence tests require reiteration o f previously learnt 
information. In the Wechsler Intelligence Scales, fluid intelligence therefore seems to be 
most reflected in the performance rather than verbal subtests and therefore leads to the 
hypothesis that performance IQ  will be lower in individuals with autism displaying 
executive dysfunction.
The analysis presented in the first part o f this chapter therefore aims to investigate how 
WISC subtest performance is affected by the cognitive skill o f children with ASD in the 
three cognitive domains under consideration in this thesis, by comparing performance on 
the WISC to performance in these three cognitive domains. In addition it will examine
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whether the distinctive IQ  test profile that has been previously documented is present in all 
children with ASD.
6 .1. 1 Method
In order to investigate the presence o f the characteristic WISC IQ  profile, the following 
method was used to define the presence of subtest peaks and troughs in each individual in 
the current sample. Verbal and performance IQ sub tests were treated independendy as the 
discrepancy between them is known to vary widely in either direction in ASD (Lincoln et 
al., 1995; Manjiviona & Prior, 1995). Within both verbal and performance IQ  therefore, 
the mean subtest scaled score and standard deviation were computed and one standard 
deviation above and below the mean was calculated. Subtest scores outside this range were 
then considered to be peaks or troughs.
It is important to note here that it is possible to do well on a subtest without it being a 
personal peak and, similarly, that it is possible to perform poorly on a subtest without it 
being a personal trough. Peaks and troughs are therefore relative to the overall ability level 
o f an individual. Another important observation to make is that this method is more 
conservative than that used previously (see Happe, 1994) in which all tests can be seen as 
peaks and troughs away from verbal or performance mean.
6 .1.2 Results
In order to compare the overall group profile in the ASD group to that in the control 
group, the IQ differences between the groups first needed correcting; this is important 
given that the control group had higher verbal and performance IQs than the ASD group 
so any subde differences in profile would be masked by overall IQ  differences. In order to 
do this, the discrepancy between the two groups in terms o f the mean subtest scaled score 
for verbal IQ  and performance IQ  separately was calculated and subtracted from each
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control participant’s score for each subtest. This retained the relative pattern of 
performance across subtests whilst lowering the absolute level of subtest performance in 
the control group in a consistent manner. Each verbal IQ sub test was lowered by 1.54 
scaled score points and each performance IQ subtest was lowered by 1.22 points in the 
control group. Group differences on each subtest were then examined and a trend towards 
a significant difference was found only for the Comprehension subtest (/(82)=1.95, 
7>=.054). However, as Figure 6.3 indicates, the ASD group were performing relatively well 
on the Block Design, Similarities, Information and Object Assembly subtests and poorly 
on the Coding and Picture arrangement subtests.
The relationship between individual differences on the Block Design (BD) subtest and 
weak CC was first explored. Fifteen children with ASD were located with personal BD 
peaks and were compared to the remaining children with ASD. These groups were 
matched on age (/(55)=.57), verbal IQ (7(55)=.17) and performance IQ (/(55)=.08) but, as
Figure 6.3 WISC subtest profile; ‘corrected’ relative performance levels shown for 
control group (with absolute performance levels superimposed as paler 
bars).
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Figure 6.4 Performance on the Block Design subtest and Embedded Figures Test in 
the ASD and control groups; ASD group divided by presence of personal 
Block Design peak (BD+).
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would be expected, the group with personal BD peaks showed higher Block Design scaled 
scores than the remaining children (/(55)=3.97,y><.001). No group differences were found 
between these groups on any ToM or EF test (/(55)<1.8) but a group difference was found 
on the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) (accuracy t(55)=2.91,/>=.005) (no difference on 
remaining CC measures). Indeed, when the relationship between absolute Block Design 
performance and the EFT was examined, a strong correlation was found in the whole ASD 
group (r =.55,^K.001), as well as more weakly in the controls (r=.45,p —.020; only 5 of the 
27 control children showed a personal BD peak and these numbers were considered too 
small to perform between group comparisons) (see Figure 6.4). In contrast, no correlations 
were found between the BD subtest and either ToM or EF tests (r <.17).
Two children, one with ASD and one control, particularly stand out in Figure 6.4 on the 
right-hand side as having particularly high BD scores whilst performing moderately on the 
EFT. Both children were young in the sample (7 years 1 month and 6 years 7 months
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respectively at the first test session). Whilst the BD scaled score accounts for age, the EFT 
does not; consequently, whilst performing outstandingly well for their age on BD, these 
two children were unsurprisingly not performing as well as other older children on the 
EFT. In fact both can be seen to be performing at approximately the mean o f the sample, 
which is remarkable in itself given they were some of the youngest children in the sample.
Moving on to the hypothesised relationship between individual differences in 
Comprehension sub test performance and ToM, approximately half of the children in the 
ASD group were identified as having personal Comprehension subtest troughs (27 
children). These children were matched to the remaining children with ASD for age 
(/(55)=.22), verbal IQ  (/(55)=.01) and performance IQ  (/(55)=.001). As expected, the 
children with Comprehension troughs had lower Comprehension scores than those 
without (/(55)=4.71,/)<.001), and also displayed lower scores on the penny hiding task 
(/(55)=2.54,/)=.014) but not on the false belief tasks (/(55)=.32) or mental state Strange 
Stories (/(55)=1.13). N o group differences were found on the CC or EF tests, except the 
Navon task where the group with Comprehension troughs appeared to find it easier to 
switch into global processing (/(52)=2.12,/)=.039) and harder to switch into local 
processing (/(52)=2.33,/)=.024) than the remaining children (indicative o f a preference for 
global processing or strong CC); this finding was unexpected. Correlations were found 
between Comprehension subtest scores and performance on all ToM tests (r >.36,/)<.006; 
see Figure 6.5) but also with the tests o f EF (r >.34,/)<.009). In the controls, correlations 
were found only for the mental state Strange Stories (r =.50,/)=.009).
Given that a specific hypothesis concerning a particular subtest had not been made for the 
EF domain, personal peaks or troughs in performance could not be evaluated. In order to 
investigate the effect o f EF on IQ  test performance therefore, correlations between the IQ 
subtests and the BADS (total score) were examined. As expected, correlations were found 
mainly between the performance IQ  subtests and the BADS in the control group
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Figure 6.5 Performance on the Comprehension subtest and the ToM tests in the ASD 
and control groups; ASD group divided by presence of personal 
Comprehension trough (Comp-).
25
20
5 15
1<u■a
Z
O 10
• .  i : i i  ! ' !  • • • •
•  •  •  
.  * • ;
• .
•  ASD
•  ASD Comp-
•  Control
16
14
12MV
o  10
to
V
« 8
to
t 65
Z
4
•  •  •  •  •  •
•  •  •
•  •
•  •  •  •  •  •
•  •  •  •  •
•  • •  •  •  •  • •
•  •
•  •  •  •  •
•  •  •  •
•  •
•  •  •
•  •
•  ASD
•  ASD Comp-
•  Control
0  5 10  15
C om prehension  sca led  sc o re
20 5 10  15
C om p rehension  sca led  sco re
20
(performance IQ x BADS total: r =.69,/><.001), particularly for the Object Assembly 
subtest (r=.59,^>=.001) but also for Picture Arrangement ( r =.47, ^ >=.013), Block Design 
{r — .44,p — .02\) and Information (r=.39,p=.045). Contrary to this finding and to 
expectations, no correlations were seen between the performance IQ subtests and the 
BADS in the ASD group (performance IQ x BADS total: r =.14). Instead, strong 
correlations were found between all the verbal IQ subtests and the BADS (r >.46,p<.00\) 
with the exception of digit span (r -  .21, p - .040) (verbal IQ x BADS total: r - .4 \ ,p - .0 0 2 )  
(see Figure 6 .6). A similar pattern of results was seen for the Shallice Switching Sentence 
Completion Task (SSSCT), with significant correlations with all verbal IQ subtests (r >.26, 
p<.05) except arithmetic and digit span but not with performance IQ subtests.
Given that executive function appears to be related to verbal IQ as a whole in the ASD 
group, those children with relatively low verbal IQ in comparison to their performance IQ 
were compared to the remaining children with ASD. As it was reasonably rare for children 
in this sample to show verbal IQ lower than performance IQ (see section 2.2.3 for a
161
Figure 6.6 Correlations between IQ subtests and the BADS total score in each group;
correlations given as r 2 values, signifying proportion of shared variance; 
each bar represents a different subtest ([^information, S=similarities,
A= arithmetic, V=vocabulary, C=comprehension, DS=digit span,
PC= picture completion, Cd=coding, PA=picture arrangement, BD=block 
design, OA=object assembly).
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discussion of why this might be), all 16 of the children whose verbal IQ was lower than 
their performance IQ were compared to the 41 children with verbal IQ greater than 
performance IQ. These groups were matched for age (/(55)=.09) and performance IQ 
(t(55)=.97) but the group with verbal lower than performance IQ had lower verbal IQs 
(/(55)=5.97,^K.001). These groups differed on the BADS overall score (/(55)=5.63, 
7><.001), but also more specifically on the Cards test, Water test, Key Search test, Zoo Map 
1 and the Six Parts test (7(55)>2.23, p< .029) with the relatively low verbal IQ group 
performing worse (but not on the Zoo Map 2 or SSSCT). While these groups did not 
differ on the CC tests (/(55)<1.54), they differed both on the ToM battery (/(17.6)=3.69, 
p - .002) and the mental state Strange Stories (/(21.6)=3.59,/>=.002), again with the low 
verbal IQ group performing worse. Verbal IQ was found to be correlated to ToM
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Figure 6.7 Venn diagram to show the number of children with ASD who displayed 
Block Design (BD) peaks, Comprehension (Comp) troughs or verbal IQ 
lower than their performance IQ (v<pIQ); the 17 children outside the 
diagram represent those with none of these profiles.
CompBD
v<plQ
performance within both the ASD and control groups (ASD: ToM battery r =.54,^<.001, 
mental state Strange Stories r =.64,^<.001; Control: ToM battery r =.40,^=.042; mental 
state Strange Stories r =.58,^>=.002).
The proportion o f individuals in the ASD group to show each o f the IQ  profiles studied 
was calculated. 26% of the children showed a Block Design peak, 47% showed a 
Comprehension subtest trough, and 28% showed lower verbal than performance IQ. In 
combination with Figure 6.7, this indicates that any o f these profiles can exist in any 
combination. Furthermore, 30% of children did not show any o f these profiles.
6.1.3 Discussion
With respect to IQ profiles in ASD, these results suggest that children on the autism 
spectrum show an uneven profile in the majority o f cases. Exactly where this unevenness 
was found in any one individual was more variable however; approximately a quarter 
showed a Block Design peak, half showed a Comprehension trough and a quarter showed 
relatively low verbal IQ. These different profiles were also found to overlap, occurring in 
all possible combinations. However, approximately a third of children with ASD showed 
no evidence o f any o f these profiles.
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The second aim was to investigate the relationship between the three cognitive 
impairments studied in this thesis and IQ subtest performance. The cognitive impairments 
suggested to be core to ASD do relate to the IQ profile even in high-functioning children; 
in fact all three appear to be independently necessary to interpret the profile. Specifically, 
both group differences and correlations indicated that the ToM deficit was revealed in the 
Comprehension subtest trough, weak CC through the Block Design peak and EF through 
a broader effect across verbal IQ. In terms of assessment therefore, Block Design can be 
considered a possible indicator o f weak CC and so children with a personal Block Design 
peak may have weak CC; children with this profile should therefore be followed up. 
Similarly, children with a personal Comprehension subtest trough are likely to have a ToM 
impairment and should be followed up. Furthermore, children with ASD with relatively 
low verbal IQ in comparison to their performance IQ  may show EF deficits. These 
subtests can be seen in some sense to have a screening function for certain cognitive 
impairments.
The finding that children with ASD who had Comprehension troughs had a bias towards 
global processing indicative o f strong CC was unexpected. While it is difficult to interpret 
these weak group differences, at very least it indicates that poor ToM and weak CC are 
likely to be independent cognitive impairments in ASD.
The presence of some null results in the ToM domain (see page 158) in relation to the 
Comprehension subtest may indicate that more than one factor is contributing towards 
performance. The fact that correlations between each ToM test and Comprehension were 
strong but group differences were not significant for the false belief tasks and the mental 
state Strange Stories suggests that the range o f ToM scores in the two groups were large 
and overlapping. Indeed, Figure 6.5 (p i60) indicates that there are some children with 
poor Comprehension scores but relatively good ToM performance, but not vice versa. It is 
possible that a child might be able to reason about another’s mental state when explicitly
asked to do so but, when given a more real-life scenario, would not think to consider 
another’s point o f view. This was shown in one such child’s answer to the Comprehension 
question about thick smoke given in the introduction to this chapter; he simply stated that 
he would close his own windows to keep the smoke out. Such a tendency to overlook 
another’s point o f view despite being capable of mental state reasoning in a simpler and 
more explicit scenario indicates that ToM is fragile and that performance is dependent on 
other cues. A further reason for the absence of significant differences within the ASD 
group on some o f the ToM tests despite correlations with the Comprehension subtest is 
due to ceiling effects, particularly in the false belief tasks. This would also explain the lack 
o f correlation in the controls for the false belief tasks but not the mental state Strange 
Stories. Despite these criticisms, these tests were still powerful discriminators between the 
control and ASD groups (see chapter 3).
Low ToM task performance in the presence o f relatively low verbal IQ  may be the result of 
particularly low Comprehension subtest scores pulling overall verbal IQ  down. However, 
this relationship has been seen many times before, using simpler vocabulary based 
measures o f verbal IQ  (eg. Happe, 1995). It has frequendy been argued {Baron-Cohen, 
1997 #12a; Bloom, 2000 #13} that an impairment in ToM would affect verbal IQ  more 
generally, as well as specifically having a more pronounced effect on the Comprehension 
subtest. One explanation for this relationship might be that children with higher verbal 
IQs use this ability to compensate for their ToM impairments (Tager-Flusberg, 2000), at 
least in the test situation. Alternatively, language learning may be restricted by a lack of 
understanding o f the intentions behind a speaker’s vocalisation (Bloom, 2000). Then again 
language may provide the environment in which to learn about mental states and therefore 
be a necessary precursor (Astington & Jenkins, 1999). The latter two suggestions seem less 
likely as unitary explanations given the presence o f ToM impairments in individuals with 
ASD compared to controls matched for verbal IQ; however, it is possible that these 
different explanations may interact together over time.
It is interesting to note single cases when this relationship between verbal IQ and ToM task 
performance is not so obviously related. One child in the current sample stands out in this 
respect. CH was 11 years 8 months at the first test session and was capable only of 
understanding diverse desires, diverse beliefs and that seeing leads to knowing from the 
false belief battery, scoring 3/25, lower than every other child in the sample. Similarly, he 
had a scaled score o f 1 on the Comprehension sub test and scored 0/16 on the mental state 
Strange Stories. Despite this profound impairment in ToM and the effect it had on his 
Comprehension subtest score, CH had a verbal IQ  o f 90, within the average range 
(performance IQ 86). This case illustrates the far from straightforward relationship 
between verbal ability and ToM understanding.
The relationships between Block Design and the EFT, and Comprehension and the ToM 
tasks were found in the control group as well as the ASD group, although to a lesser 
extent. It has been suggested that CC may exist as a continuum in the general population 
from weak to strong, with children with ASD clustered at the weak end (Happe, 1999).
The results from the current study support this idea o f a continuum for CC, with a larger 
proportion o f individuals clustering at the weak extreme in the ASD than the control 
group. Whether the similar results in the ToM domain are also indicative o f a separate 
continuum or whether this is an artefact o f the nature o f the tasks is a matter for future 
research.
More striking than these results, however, was the stark difference in the relationship o f EF 
performance to the IQ subtests between the two groups. While the directionality o f the 
cause and effect in this relationship is unclear, the difference between the two groups was 
striking. The control children showed the expected relationship between EF and 
performance IQ, particularly for the Object Assembly subtest which involves novel 
problem solving and a high degree o f flexible thinking to generate and try out new ideas, 
abilities that are commonly associated with EF. In contrast, the children in the ASD group
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showed no relationship between these tasks but instead between EF and all of the verbal 
IQ tasks.
Why might EF be related to verbal IQ  in ASD? Although unexpected, this result is 
consistent with one study by Liss et al. (2001) showing correlations between verbal IQ  and 
EF performance. The authors refer to a theory put forward by Russell, Jarrold & Hood {, 
1999 #42a}, which suggests that the nature of the EF deficit in ASD may be in verbally 
encoding rules. Specifically, Russell et al. stated that children with ASD have problems 
verbally encoding arbitrary rules in tasks that do not have any verbal output. Verbal 
encoding allows the child to rehearse the rules as internal speech and therefore to self­
monitor their own task performance; these rules must be arbitrary as logical rules would 
not need to be rehearsed; the task must not have a verbal response otherwise interference 
between the internal and vocalised speech will occur and the internal speech will be lost. 
Presumably Liss et al. were extending this idea to state that having a lower verbal IQ  would 
make a child less proficient at using such internal speech. In this sense, lower verbal IQ 
could be thought to be causing the poor performance seen by some children on executive 
tasks. Zelazo, Jacques, Burack & Frye (2002) make an alternative but similar hypothesis 
that executive tasks are best solved by complex verbal hierarchical (if-if-then) rules and 
therefore that low verbal IQ may prevent use o f such rules.
One problem with either o f these hypotheses is that there seems little reason to expect a 
lack o f relationship between the performance IQ  tests and the BADS test in the ASD 
group, given their similarities in terms o f novel problem-solving. It is likely however that 
the performance IQ  subtests put less demand on this verbal self-monitoring system as the 
tasks may involve fewer arbitrary rules. Even if this is the case, Joseph, McGrath & Tager- 
Flusberg (2005) have recently suggested that Russell et al.’s {, 1999 #42a} theory would 
predict poor use o f verbal self-monitoring in individuals with ASD despite intact verbal 
skills and therefore a lack o f relationship between the executive deficits seen and verbal
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ability, the opposite o f what was found in the current study. Indeed, when considering the 
verbal skills involved in verbal IQ  tests, these seem a long way from the skills that would 
be required for verbal self-monitoring; the skills involved in self-monitoring are likely to 
relate most strongly to verbal working memory and this ability, reflected most strongly in 
the digit span subtest o f the WISC, was only weakly correlated with EF.
Rather than verbal ability limiting executive skill, is it possible that the executive 
component o f the verbal IQ  tasks is relatively high and therefore that executive ability is 
limiting verbal ability? The similarities subtest certainly requires a high degree o f flexible 
thought but it is less clear how the other tests might relate to executive abilities. A further 
possibility is therefore that executive dysfunction causes poor language learning; in order to 
understand and learn the meaning o f words, it may be necessary to have a fairly flexible 
understanding o f their usage in order to understand them in different situations and use 
them appropriately. However, it really seems that there is a completely different 
relationship between executive skills and IQ  in the control and ASD groups, which 
indicates that the children with ASD are performing the BADS in a totally different 
manner to the controls.
On further observation o f the ASD IQ profile, one thing becomes evident: children with 
ASD may, if anything, be performing relatively well on some verbal tasks, particularly 
information and similarities. An alternative idea therefore is that children with exceptional 
verbal skills but with executive dysfunction might use their verbal skills to help them in EF 
tasks, possibly through internal verbal self-prompting or other verbal strategies; indeed, this 
suggestion fits with the pattern o f results found here. In contrast, normally developing 
children would not need to use such strategies as they could use their executive skills to 
succeed on such tasks. Verbal skills can thus be seen not as causal to the executive 
problems in ASD but as a compensatory mechanism for overcoming the executive
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problems. This may therefore explain why different relationships are seen between EF and 
IQ  in the two groups.
To bring another component into the discussion, the similarity o f the relationship between 
ToM with verbal IQ  and EF with verbal IQ should be noted. It is therefore possible that a 
more complex relationship exists between EF and verbal IQ, as ToM and EF may also be 
related. This possibility will be explored further by examining the relationships between 
the three cognitive domains in section 6.2 and chapter 7.
Regardless of the exact causal pathway linking each o f the cognitive impairments to IQ 
subtests, the fact that they are linked is o f importance when considering group matching. 
Particularly for ToM and EF, their correlations with verbal IQ  indicate that matching 
groups for verbal IQ may actually reduce group differences on ToM and EF tests, and 
possibly mask ASD specific variation. O n the other hand, when group differences are 
found under such strict matching conditions, they can be considered strong effects. 
Similarly, the link between weak CC and Block Design performance may result in an 
overestimate o f ability when such IQ tests are used in isolation. This is particularly relevant 
therefore for short forms o f the WISC and WAIS that estimate performance IQ  on the 
basis o f two subtests, one being Block Design. Block Design may have less effect however 
in a larger battery o f tests, such as the full WISC performance IQ  scale.
6.2 Relationships betw een cognitive domains
One proposed approach to tackling the problem of heterogeneity in the search for the 
underlying biological and genetic basis o f autism has been to look for subgroups of 
individuals showing traits associated with autism (Bailey, Phillips & Rutter, 1996). These 
are known as endophenotypes and tend to focus on the defining behavioural symptoms.
As yet, however, cognitive endophenotypes have not been used in the search for the 
genetic basis of ASD, mainly due to the lack o f consensus about the universality o f these
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Figure 6.8 Venn diagram showing hypothetical results.
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impairments and their relationships to each other. One of the major aims of this thesis was 
therefore to assess the relationships between the three different cognitive explanations of 
ASD examined here through tests specifically designed to tap into these domains. O f 
particular interest is the relationship between ToM and EF, given that both domains seem 
to correlate with verbal IQ  whilst CC does not. For example, in the hypothetical situation 
given in Figure 6 .8 , it is proposed that all cases o f ASD with ToM impairment also have 
executive dysfunction, whilst the converse is not the case. This figure illustrates the 
possibility that EF is primary to ToM, whilst CC is separate and unrelated to these two 
domains (see sections 1.2.4 and 1.3.4 for a theoretical discussion o f the relationships 
between these domains and o f evidence supporting different claims). Is the pattern present 
in the current sample similar to this idealised case or different?
6.2.1 Method
In order to investigate the relationship between ToM, EF and CC, composite measures 
were produced for each of these domains, calculated by averaging 2-scores (calculated in 
relation to control performance) for each participant across all tasks in that domain, giving 
equal weighting to each task. In the ToM domain, the tasks entered were the ToM battery 
and the mental state Strange Stories; in the CC domain, EFT reaction time (method 3) and 
a measure combining the two switching conditions in the attentional switching task (the
average o f LL-GL and o f G G -LG  inverted) were used; and in the EF domain, all 7 tests 
were used (inverted for the Cards test and SSSCT as these were error scores). Each task 
entered into the composite measure had already had age, verbal and performance IQ taken 
into account by entering the task into a regression analysis as the dependent variable with 
age and IQ  as the independent variables and collecting the residuals. Positive scores 
therefore always represent good performance and negative scores indicate poor 
performance.
Correlations were examined between the different domains, as well as examining the 
pattern o f impairments across the different individuals. O f particular interest here were 
individual differences in performance and individuals with abnormally low performance 
were therefore identified. Deviant performance was defined as below the 5th percentile of 
control performance. To detect individuals with deviant performance on each task or 
composite, any control outliers performing more than 1.65 standard deviations (SDs) 
below the control mean were removed in order to obtain a better estimate o f normal 
performance, regardless o f controls who might have performed abnormally on any one 
task. The control mean and SD were then recalculated and outliers were defined as those 
lying more than 1.65 new SDs below this new control mean (procedure as in White et al., 
2006).
6.2.2 Results
Individual performance across the three cognitive domains can be seen in Figure 6.9. The 
groups differed significantly only on the ToM (/(80.3)z::4.35,y)<.001) and EF composites 
(/(82)=3.30,^>=.001). The overall distributions are quite striking, however. In the ToM 
domain, scores can be seen to span the whole range o f the control performance but with 
an elongated tail o f individuals performing particularly badly outside o f the control range; 
indeed, 46% of children in the ASD group fell below the 5th percentile cut-off.
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Figure 6.9 Individual performance on the composites for each of the three cognitive 
domains; the x-axis represents the control means and the dotted line 
represents the 5th percentile cut-off; impairment and therefore poor task 
performance is generally reflected by low 2-scores, except for the CC 
domain in which weak CC and therefore good performance on the EFT 
would be represented by low z-scores.
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Performance was similar in the EF domain with few children performing above the control 
mean, although slighdy fewer children (33%) fell below the 5th percentile cut-off; instead 
the majority o f the remaining children (47%) fell between the control mean and this cut­
off. In the CC domain, only 20% of the children in the ASD group showed a profile 
indicative of weak central coherence, falling below the 5th percentile cut-off; however, the 
opposite extreme o f performance was more noticeable than in the other cognitive domains, 
with four children performing above the control range. As noted in section 5.1.3, poor 
performance on the EFT is reflected by high CC z-scores here and so poor performance 
by some children on this task may have resulted from difficulty with non-specific task 
factors; this may explain the extreme outliers with positive z-scores.
Correlations between the three domains were examined for the whole sample and found to 
hold only between the ToM and EF domains (r =.56,^><.001), but once the groups were 
examined separately, this relationship was only found within the ASD group (ASD: r =.52,
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Figure 6 .10 The relationship between Theory of Mind and Executive Function
performance in both groups. The regression line is for the ASD group 
only, whilst the broken lines represent the -1.65 SD cut-off for deviant 
performance based on the control distributions.
• ASD 
5 Control
ToM
• 1 )
— I
EF -1.65 SD
ToM
-1.65
SD EF
^><.001; control: r =.31). However, as can be seen from Figure 6.10, there seemed to be a 
trend towards individuals with ASD and low ToM to be less affected in the EF than ToM 
domain. Indeed, there were a number of children who had performance below the 
deviance cut-off on the ToM composite whilst performing above the cut-off on the EF 
composite. No other correlations were significant. Given that the different executive tests 
were found to be poorly related to each other (see section 4.3), this correlation between 
ToM and EF in the ASD group was further investigated by looking at relationships 
between each of the tests in the two domains. Both the ToM battery and the mental state 
Strange Stories were found to be related to the SSSCT (r >.41,/><.001), whilst only the 
ToM battery was related to the Cards test (r =.43,j£=.001). No further correlations were 
significant.
Patterns of impairment in each individual were studied and can be seen in Figure 6.11. 
While the majority of children either had a ToM impairment only, weak CC only or a
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Figure 6 .1 I Venn diagram to show the number of children with ASD who displayed 
significant ToM, CC or EF impairments; the 22 children outside the 
diagram represent those in which none o f these impairments were 
detectable.
ToM
EF
combination o f a ToM impairment and executive dysfunction, Figure 6.11 shows that 
individuals exist with all possible combinations o f impairment. Figure 6.12 shows some 
specific examples o f such combinations, portraying individual profiles across these three 
domains. This reveals that, although rare, the less frequent combinations o f impairment 
are not an artefact o f the cut-off methodology used; children exist with significant 
impairment in each possible combination of domains whilst having retained performance 
in the remaining domains. Figure 6.11 further reveals a high proportion o f individuals with 
ASD who appear to have no significant cognitive impairments on the tests used here; 39% 
of children fell into this category.
Those children who did not display any cognitive impairment were compared to the 
remaining children with ASD on age and IQ measures. Whilst no significant differences 
were found (age: /(55)=1.06; verbal IQ: /(55)=1.23; performance IQ: /(55)=1.73,/>=.090), a 
trend was found for the group without cognitive impairment to have lower performance 
IQs; in fact both verbal and performance IQ  scores were 6 points below the remaining 
children with ASD (verbal IQ: 100.5 and 106.9; performance IQ: 90.8 and 97.1). In 
addition, only one o f these 22  children had positive z-scores across all three cognitive 
domains whilst six o f the 27 control children did (x2(l)=3.09,^>=.079).
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Figure 6.12 Profiles for six children with ASD showing the presence of all possible
combinations of impairment and double dissociations between these three 
cognitive domains.
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Finally, Wilks’ step-wise discriminant function analysis was used to investigate which 
cognitive factors (from ToM, CC or EF) were best able to discriminate the groups and 
predict group membership (ASD or control). Variables were entered and removed in a
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Table 6 .1 Classification matrix for the discriminant function analysis, showing the
percentage o f correct classifications according to EF composite scores.
Predicted group
Control group ASD group
Control group 70.4 29.6
Actual G roup
ASD group 33.3 66.7
step-wise manner. EF was entered first as the best discriminator ()(2(1)—14.44, Wilks’ 
lambda=.84,/><.001) and no other variable was found to significantly increase this 
discrimination. Table 6.1 shows the classification matrix. The EF measure alone therefore 
significantly discriminated between the groups with 68% of children being correctly 
classified on the basis o f these scores. The majority of misclassification occurred within 
the autism group, indicative o f false negatives. In order to investigate the ability o f the 
other cognitive factors to discriminate the groups, the analysis was repeated after removing 
the EF measure. ToM was then the best discriminator (x2( l)= 11.78, Wilks’ lambda=.87, 
y>=.001), correctly classifying 62% of the children. It therefore appears that the EF and 
ToM composites were accounting for much o f the same variance within the data. CC was 
not found to significantly discriminate between the groups at all.
6.2.3 Discussion
When assessing the proportion o f children showing significant impairment in each o f the 
three cognitive domains o f theory o f mind, executive function and central coherence, these 
results bear a striking similarity to the results from the Wechsler IQ  profiles (see Figure 6.7, 
p i 62). They suggest that approximately half o f children showed mentalising impairment, a 
third o f children showed executive dysfunction and a fifth showed a detail focussed 
processing style; furthermore, these impairments can occur in any combination. The 
similarity between Figures 6.7 and 6.11 (pl62 & 173) are remarkable given the differences 
in tests used and the more strict cut-off here of 1.65 SD (as opposed to 1 SD). This
supports the idea that the Block Design and Comprehension subtests as well as the 
presence of low verbal IQ  map closely onto these three cognitive domains. Furthermore, 
the large proportion o f children with mentalising impairment indicates that this may be the 
most consistent and sensitive deficit present in ASD; this may be an artefact o f the lower 
internal consistency o f the EF and CC domains, however. By no means all children have 
mentalising problems though; the individual results clearly show that a proportion of 
individuals have superior skills in all three domains.
These proportions are also similar to those from the only previous investigation o f all three 
domains (Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin & Maley, 2006), although the proportions were 
slighdy higher there due to a more lenient cut-off of 1 SD (ToM 68%; EF 42%, CC 74%). 
The most notable difference was in the CC domain, with the present study producing 
many fewer deviant performers; this may in part be due to the tests used but also the 
method o f data analysis.
A primary aim o f the present analysis was to assess the relationships between the three 
cognitive domains. The correlations seen between the ToM and EF domains support 
previous findings in ASD populations that these domains are related (Joseph & Tager- 
Flusberg, 2004; Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991; Zelazo et al., 2002). The 
discriminant analysis further supports this relationship, indicating that EF and ToM have 
similar power in terms o f discriminating between the groups. Furthermore, the specific 
correlations with individual EF tests indicate that the tests most closely related to ToM 
performance were those involving prepotent inhibition and set-shifting, which also parallel 
previous findings (Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Zelazo et al., 2002).
Correlations provide litde information about the direction o f the causal relationship 
between these domains, however; one may be primary to the other or they may both be 
related through a third factor. Pemer & Lang (1999) argue that one way o f informing this 
issue is to look at dissociations between domains. How then do the results here compare
to the theoretical position shown in Figure 6.8 (p i69)? Whilst some authors would argue 
that the greater number o f outliers in the ToM domain would indicate primacy of ToM 
over EF {Ozonoff, 1991 #39a}, others would argue that the pattern of impairments seen 
here, with most cases o f executive dysfunction also having impaired ToM, would indicate 
that EF is primary to ToM. The reasoning behind this latter stance suggests that, if 
executive dysfunction is primary, it will always result in impaired ToM, whilst ToM 
impairment may result from alternative causes in other cases (Pemer & Lang, 1999). 
However, despite their scarcity there are three children with ASD in the current study who 
showed the opposite pattern o f intact ToM despite executive dysfunction. Indeed, the 
individual profiles shown in Figure 6.12 (pl74) reveal double dissociations between all 
three cognitive domains. While this is difficult to reconcile with the correlation seen in 
Figure 6.10 (p i72), this hints that the relationship between ToM and EF is unlikely to be 
causal. Instead it seems more likely that a third factor, such as verbal ability, may be 
associated with them both, or that one is involved in the process o f compensation o f the 
other.
Indeed, it is possible that the relationships between verbal IQ  and both ToM and EF task 
performance seen in section 6.1 could partially explain the relationship between ToM and 
EF in terms of compensation. Verbal ability may act as one compensatory method of 
solving otherwise difficult ToM and EF tasks for children with ASD; it is unlikely to be the 
sole compensational method however, given that age and IQ were factored out of the 
correlational analyses. The trend seen in Figure 6.10 for children with ASD and low ToM 
task performance to be less affected in the EF than ToM domain may imply that this 
compensation is more successful for EF tasks. It is interesting that EF was the best 
discriminator between the groups, however, indicating that many o f the ASD children not 
classed as showing deviant performance below the cut-off still had mildly impaired 
performance in comparison to the controls. This supports the idea that compensation may 
have a differential effect in these two cognitive domains, or possibly indicate a lower
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sensitivity for the EF measure, particularly given that internal consistency between the 
different EF tests was low.
A further idea relating to findings in chapter 4 is that children with ToM impairments have 
problems with ecologically valid EF tasks, such as the ones used here, which require an 
understanding o f implicit task demands, rather than with EF itself. This would explain 
both why ToM impairments appear to be more severe than EF impairments and why the 
relationship between these domains as shown in Figure 6.10 appears to be strongest in the 
children with severe impairments below the 5th percentile cut-off and non-significant in 
controls.
Remarkably, using the cut-off criteria defined in section 6.2.1, 39% of the children 
diagnosed with ASD tested here showed no signs o f impairment in any of the three 
cognitive domains and 33% were classified as controls in the discriminant function analysis. 
An important phenomenon to mention here is regression towards the mean; any factor 
that is used as the basis on which to select groups is likely to be a better discriminator than 
any further factor tested; cognitive tests will therefore naturally produce some wrongly 
classified cases. Another factor to mention again is the relationship between verbal IQ  and 
some o f these variables; by accounting for verbal IQ  levels in the composite scores, some 
of the ASD-specific variation may have been lost as the IQ  tests are likely to reflect some 
aspects of these cognitive domains (see section 6.1). Furthermore, the slightly lower IQs of 
these children without detectable cognitive impairment may have led to their impairments 
being masked, particularly if these lower IQs resulted from an underestimation o f true 
ability.
While these suggestions may go part way towards explaining these diagnosed children with 
intact cognitive performance, the large number of children involved here is still somewhat 
unexpected and puzzling. There are three possible reasons for this: the tests used here 
were not sensitive to the impairments tested; even in combination, these three cognitive
deficits are not sufficient to explain autistic behaviour and therefore these children had 
other causal impairments untested for here; or these children had been misdiagnosed.
While these three possibilities are difficult to differentiate without additional investigation, 
a number o f findings begin to inform these issues. The distribution of EF scores in the 
ASD group reveals that, whilst only a minority o f individuals performed below the 
deviance cut-off, the majority were performing below the control mean. This may indicate 
that the tests were not sensitive enough to discriminate the groups, possibly due to floor 
and ceiling effects. Indeed, there were fewer children with ASD and intact performance 
than controls who showed performance above the control mean across all three domains. 
Moving to the issue o f misdiagnosis, it is possible that these children either have other 
disorders and have received the wrong diagnostic label, or that the problems they displayed 
at diagnosis were transient and have since recovered. The possibility that these ‘cognitively 
intact’ cases may in fact be mild or misdiagnosed cases will be assessed in the following 
chapter when comparing behavioural with cognitive data.
Considering the possibility that these children with intact cognitive performance may have 
other undetected impairments, what might these be? Given that many o f the children in 
this sample did not fulfil full criteria in all three behavioural domains for ASD, it is possible 
that some of them may have primary communication problems rather than those that are 
secondary to social difficulties. The idea that some o f these children may have had 
pragmatic language impairments without social impairment will also be assessed in the next 
chapter. Other possible cognitive impairments that have been suggested in autism are, for 
example, attentional problems (Allen & Courchesne, 2001) and memory problems (Ben 
Shalom, 2003), but these have not been assessed in the current test battery.
6.3 Conclusion
An analysis o f task performance in the 3 main cognitive domains implicated in ASD has 
revealed that all three are related to IQ subscale scores in different ways, whilst mentalising 
and executive skill also appear to be related to one another. Both mentalising and 
executive skill are related to verbal ability whilst central coherence appears to be 
independent of both verbal ability and these two cognitive domains, rather being related to 
a specific aspect o f performance IQ  revealed in the Block Design subtest of the WISC. 
This indicates that at least two distinct cognitive subtypes exist within the autism spectrum. 
Whilst firm conclusions about the nature of the relationship between ToM and EF cannot 
be made at this stage, observation o f individual profiles across these domains indicates that 
neither impairment may be primary to the other and therefore that they may be related 
through a currently unspecified factor or that one may be involved in the compensation 
process for the other. A further unresolved observation is the high number o f children 
with ASD who showed no cognitive impairment by the definition applied here. Both of 
these issues are further investigated in chapter 7.
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Chapter 7: Relating cognition to  behaviour
7 .1 H eterogeneity at th ree  levels
It is already clear from the previous chapter that there is considerable heterogeneity at the 
cognitive level in the group o f children with ASD in the current study; some children were 
distincdy impaired while others were not and some of these latter children were performing 
well above average, indicating intact cognitive function. That behavioural heterogeneity also 
exists within the autism spectrum has long been acknowledged, even with the use of 
standardised diagnostic tests (Folstein, Bisson, Santangelo & Piven, 1998). Indeed, Chapter 
2 shows different children in the current sample to have problems in different areas of the 
behavioural triad. Furthermore, it is possible for two children with the same degree of 
impairment in a particular area o f the triad to show variability in their behavioural 
presentation of that aspect o f the triad as they may display behaviour characteristic of 
different items composing that area.
In addition to cognitive and behavioural heterogeneity, there is also genetic and biological 
heterogeneity in ASD, which became obvious when the genetic basis could not be 
identified in the same way as for simple genetic disorders (Spence, 2001). There is 
therefore a need for genetically predictive phenotypic markers or endophenotypes on 
which to subgroup individuals, allowing more uniform populations within ASD to be 
studied when searching for genetic risk factors for ASD. Examples o f dimensions of 
phenotypes previously suggested and used include IQ (Spiker, Lotspeich, Dimiceli, Myers 
& Risch, 2002), the behavioural symptoms (Ronald, Happe & Plomin, 2005; Shao et al., 
2003; Silverman et al., 2002), language (Pickles et al., 2000; Shao et al., 2002) and savant 
skills (Nurmi et al., 2003). However, none of these have proved especially fruitful, and 
researchers continually search for new subgroups o f children within the spectrum with 
similar characteristics to each other.
Probably the first attempt to locate behavioural subtypes in the autism spectrum was 
presented by Wing & Gould (1979). These authors noted different types of social 
impairment in different subgroups o f individuals; some being described as aloof, others as 
passive and still others as odd. However, children were observed to shift between these 
behaviours over time and these subgroups were typical of different levels o f functioning; 
thus, the subtypes were considered different behavioural manifestations of the same 
underlying problem, expressed in different ways by children at different ages and levels of 
abilities. This sort o f grouping is therefore less useful at a biological level, whilst it may be 
of use at a more applied level when considering the child’s needs.
Prior et al. (1998) also looked for subgroups in the spectrum on the basis o f diagnostic 
behaviours using a cluster analysis technique. The subgroups they located differed in terms 
o f the severity of behaviours, rather than showing qualitatively different patterns of 
impairment in the different clusters. The authors also found the most severely affected 
group to have lower verbal IQs and worse mentalising ability. However, as the clusters 
differed only in severity, this is likely to have created artificial groups that do not really exist 
from a continuous spectrum of impairment.
Given that the current behavioural triad has only limited use for ASD genetics, a number 
of studies have attempted to reclassify the behavioural symptoms empirically rather than 
theoretically, grouping behaviours in different ways from the traditional triad (Robertson, 
Tanguay, L'Ecuyer, Sims & Waltrip, 1999; Szatmari et al., 2002; Tadevosyan-Leyfer et al., 
2003; Tanguay, Robertson & Derrick, 1998). One recent study found that a model 
involving three new symptom categories (make believe and play skills, social 
communication skills, and stereotyped language and behaviours) fitted the behavioural data 
from a large sample of children better than the DSM diagnostic triad (van Lang et al., 
2006a). This study used the sub-items within each area of the DSM behavioural triad to 
produce these new categories, combining these sub-items in a different way. As the
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current conceptualisation o f the triad appears not to be optimal, this may explain why the 
different areas o f the DSM triad are commonly found to overlap so heavily, particularly the 
social and communication areas (Volkmar et al., 1994). The novel behavioural groupings 
in the study by van Lang et al. were suggested as one possible marker to further genetic 
research. It will therefore be important in the present analyses to not be restricted to the 
triad of behaviours but to look at the sub-items that the triad is composed from.
If  the cognitive domains thought to be causal in ASD are to be useful as potential 
endophenotypes on which to subgroup individuals for genetic studies, it is of interest how 
the cognitive heterogeneity relates to the behavioural heterogeneity; this is the main aim of 
this chapter. In addition, given that autism is currently defined behaviourally, it is 
important to be able to relate any factor thought to be causal in its aetiology back to the 
diagnostic symptoms. As reviewed in Chapter 1, previous findings seem to indicate that 
theory of mind (ToM) impairment is related to the social (Frith, Happe & Siddons, 1994) 
and communication (Capps, Kehres & Sigman, 1998) impairments but not to the presence 
o f repetitive behaviours (Turner, 1996). Weak central coherence (CC) does not seem to be 
related to any of the triad of symptoms (Teunisse, Cools, van Spaendonck, Aerts & Berger, 
2001), instead being related to other features not currently part o f the diagnostic criteria 
(Mottron & Belleville, 1993). Poor executive function (EF) seems to be related to all 
symptom areas (Happe, Booth, Charlton & Hughes, 2006; Lopez, Lincoln, O zonoff & Lai, 
2005) although results are more mixed in this domain (Ozonoff et al., 2004). One aim of 
this chapter is therefore to systematically assess the relationship of each of these cognitive 
domains to everyday behavioural symptoms as assessed through parental report.
A major question that arose from the analysis o f cognitive impairments is whether there are 
any behavioural differences between those children who appear to have no cognitive 
impairments in the domains studied here and those who have at least one. Are those 
children with more clearly identifiable cognitive deficits also more clearly identifiable in
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Figure 7 .1 Illustration o f convergence from the cognitive to the behavioural level; 
here, ToM and EF both affect social interaction skills.
ToM
Cognitive
Behavioural
Social
abilities
ToM tasks EF tasks
parental reports as showing autism-specific features? How does IQ  interact between the 
cognitive and behavioural factors? D o we see convergence from any of the cognitive 
impairments onto the same behavioural symptoms, do the different cognitive impairments 
affect different aspects o f the symptom triad, or might they affect different aspects within 
one o f the behavioural groups o f symptoms? The illustrations here depict some o f the 
possible outcomes.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the idea that there could be more than one cause of, for example, the 
social problems in autism, modelled according to the notation o f Morton & Frith (1995).
In this example, both ToM and EF are shown to independently affect social abilities, with a 
ToM impairment being the primary impairment for some children whilst the EF deficit is 
the primary deficit for others.
Figure 7.2 Illustration o f independence o f cognitive impairments in terms o f their 
effect on behaviour; here, ToM and EF are shown to produce different 
aspects o f the diagnostic triad.
ToM
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Behavioural
^  Social & ^  
communication 
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Figure 7.3 Illustration o f different cognitive impairments affecting different aspects of 
the same symptom category; here ToM and EF both affect different aspects 
of social interaction.
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Another possibility is that different cognitive impairments could result in different aspects 
of symptomatology which together make up the typical pattern o f behaviours seen in ASD. 
The cognitive impairments would therefore have independent effects on the behavioural 
level and different children might have different combinations o f those impairments. This 
is modelled in Figure 7.2.
A further possibility that encompasses both of the previous ideas is that convergence of 
two cognitive impairments may occur onto one set o f behaviours but that those two 
cognitive impairments have independent effects on different aspects o f that set of 
behaviours. In the example below in which both ToM and EF impairments result in 
problems with social interaction, children with a ToM impairment could still be 
distinguished from children with an EF impairment on the basis o f the particular social 
problems they were displaying. This idea is modelled in Figure 7.3.
Furthermore, the results from chapter 6 already illustrate that ToM and EF are related to 
each other. It is possible that one o f these impairments relates to all aspects of the triad, 
some directly and some indirectly through the mediation of the other cognitive 
impairment. This idea is illustrated in Figure 7.4, with an EF impairment resulting in both 
the presence of repetitive behaviours and a ToM impairment, which in turn results in social 
and communication difficulties. This particular illustration would also imply that it would
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Figure 7.4 Illustration o f different cognitive impairments affecting each other as well 
as different aspects o f the diagnostic triad; here EF affects ToM, and EF 
and ToM both affect behaviour in different ways.
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be possible to have a ToM impairment alone (through some other cause) and that only 
social and communication difficulties would then be seen in this case.
The main aim of this chapter was therefore to assess how the cognitive domains related to 
each other in terms o f their effect on behaviour.
7.2 Method
Behavioural measures were defined as those detecting everyday behaviours thought to be 
typical of individuals with ASD (3Di triad of behaviours, ToM, CC and EF novel 
questionnaires, and DEX-C), while cognitive measures were defined as tests specifically 
designed to tap into a particular cognitive domain (ToM, CC & EF composites plus IQ 
measures); the latter were therefore theoretically motivated while the former tended to 
have been derived from clinical observation of symptoms that commonly co-occurred 
across different individuals with ASD.
A break down o f the components o f the 3Di can be found in Table 7.1. Each area o f the 
triad was composed o f 4 categories, each of which was made up o f a number of items. 
Although the number o f questions within each item varied (see number in parentheses in
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Table 7 .1 Structure o f the 3Di in terms of areas o f the triad, categories within each 
area and items within each category.
Area of triad Category Items (no. questions)
Social Using non­
verbal social 
cues
Eye contact (3) 
Smiling (4)
Facial expression (9)
Peer & sibling 
relationships
Imaginative play with others (8) 
Playing together (3)
Others’ perception (3)
Social interest (8)
Shared
enjoyment
Sharing own enjoyment (1) 
Sharing material things (5) 
Sharing others’ enjoyment (2)
Emotional
reciprocity
Picking up on and responding to others with comfort (4) 
Using others as tools (1)
Responsiveness to others (2)
Laughing inappropriately (2)
Picking up on facial expression and tone o f voice (5)
Communication Use of
conventional
gestures
Pointing (3)
Gestures (6)
Positive head nodding (2) 
Negative head shaking (1)
Conversational
interchange
Purposeful conversation (4) 
Social conversation (3)
Stereotyped, 
repetitive or 
idiosyncratic 
speech
Stereotyped, egocentric and repetitive speech (9) 
Faux pas (2)
Pronominal reversal (3)
Neologisms (1)
Imaginative
play
Imitating (2)
Pretend play on own (5) 
Imitative social play (2)
Repetitive
behaviours
Circumscribed
interests
‘Normal’ intense interests (4) 
‘Odd’ intense interests (2)
Ritualistic
behaviour
Word repetitions (1) 
Ordered routine (1)
Mannerisms Simple mannerisms (1) 
Complex mannerisms (1)
Non-functional 
object use
Repetitive object use (3) 
Unusual sensory interests (2)
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table), these were averaged so that each item was scored out o f a total o f two points. Each 
question therefore has equal weighting within each item and each item has equal weighting 
within each area o f the triad. When analysing the relationships between the cognitive 
measures and behaviour on the 3Di, the three areas of the triad were explored. In order to 
guard against false positive results due to multiple comparisons, only the categories within 
those areas of the triad that produced significant effects were further explored and 
similarly, only those items within categories which produced significant effects were further 
explored.
Within the ASD group, group differences on measures of everyday behaviour between 
those with and without deviant performance on tests tapping into each cognitive domain 
were examined, as well as between those children showing no cognitive impairment and 
those with deviant performance in at least one domain (see section 6 .2.1 for a definition of 
deviant performance). Correlations between the cognitive and behavioural measures were 
also calculated. Finally, a model was fitted to the data using a structural equation modelling 
programme (AMOS 6.0, © Arbuckel 1983-2005).
7.3 Results
7 .3 .1 Relationship between IQ & age and behavioural measures
Whilst IQ was correlated to some o f the behavioural measures in the control group (vIQ & 
social: r —~A6,p—.017; vIQ & EF questionnaire: r =-.61,y>=.001; pIQ  & EF questionnaire: 
r =-.47,^=.013; vIQ  & DEX-C: r =-.51,y>=.001), with high IQs being associated with 
fewer deviant behaviours, this was only the case in the ASD group for the EF 
questionnaire (vIQ: r =-.30,y>=.030) and a trend towards an association for the 
communication behaviours was also seen (vIQ: r =-.27,y>=.051). This relationship was 
explored further in the ASD group by looking at the categories constituting the 
communication scale. A strong association was found between verbal IQ  and the
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‘conversational interchange’ category (r =-.48,/><.001). Both items making up this category 
also produced similar relationships (purposeful conversation: r =-.35,^=.010; social 
conversation: r =-.46,/><.001). These items cover the ability not to talk about topics that 
are well-known to the conversational partner, not to ask questions when the answer is 
already known, not to talk repetitively about one’s own interests, to take turns at making 
sounds as an infant prior to acquiring speech, to make ‘small talk’ rather than just talking in 
order to meet one’s own needs, to engage in conversation that is interesting and enjoyable 
for the conversational partner, and to respond to other people’s conversational cues. Age, 
on the other hand, was not related to any of the behavioural measures in the control group 
and only associated with the EF questionnaire in the ASD group (r —.27,^>=.048), with 
older children showing fewer deviant behaviours.
Given that associations between the behavioural and cognitive measures were to be studied 
further only in the ASD group, there was no need to enter age or IQ as covariates o f the 
behavioural measures (the results remained the same when these were covariates). For the 
cognitive measures however, both the composites from chapter 6 (with age and IQ as 
covariates) and composites with only age entered as a covariate were used; this allowed the 
influence o f each cognitive domain on behaviour, both independent o f IQ and through the 
mediating effect of IQ, to be assessed. These will now be referred to as composite (age & 
IQ) or composite (age).
7.3.2 Relationship between ToM and behavioural measures
Individuals with ASD classified in chapter 6 as having significantly deviant performance on 
the ToM composite (age & IQ) were compared to the remaining children with ASD; the 
former children had more severe problems on the 3Di social scale (/(51)=2.02,y)=.048), 
whilst no differences were found in the communication (/(51)=1.19) or repetitive 
behaviour (/(51)=1.33) scales. Interestingly, despite being reported as less severe, the mean
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Table 7.2 Means (and standard deviations) for performance across the behavioural 
measures in the ASD group, divided by performance on the ToM 
composite; high scores indicate deviant performance.
ASD group
Deviant ToM (31) Remaining 
children (26)
3Di social scale (30 max; 10 cut-off) *
- peer & sibling relationships (8 max) **
- imaginative play with others (2 max) **
- playing together (2 max) *
14.5 (4.4)
4.4 (1.4)
1.4 (0.5) 
1.2 (0 .6)
12.1 (4.3) 
3.1 (1.6) 
0.9 (0.6) 
0.8 (0.7)
3Di communication scale (26 max; 8 cut-off) 15.4 (3.9) 14.3 (3.0)
3Di repetitive behaviour scale (12 max; 3 cut-off) 5.6 (2.5) 4.7 (2.5)
ToM questionnaire (%) 58 (20) 56 (18)
CC questionnaire (%) * 73 (18) 63 (18)
EF questionnaire (%) 42 (21) 46 (18)
DEX-C (80 max) 9.75 (6.14) 6.15 (2.92)
* p<. os, ** p<m
score on the social scale of the children with non-deviant ToM task performance was still 
above the recommended 3Di cut-off of 10 (see Table 7.2). In order to explore further the 
difference between the groups on the social scale, the four categories making up the social 
measure were examined. This revealed that the difference stemmed from the category 
regarding peer and sibling relationships (/(51)=3.00,^>=.004). Again, the four items within 
this relationships category were examined and two produced significant group differences: 
imaginative play with others (/(53)=3.37,/>=.001) and playing together (/(53)=2.67,/>=.010) 
The first o f these measures consisted o f questions concerning whether the child ever 
played imaginative games with siblings and other children and, if so, what their level of 
understanding o f the game was, whether they contributed ideas to the game and whether 
the game tended to follow the same story line every time. The second measure was 
concerned with the child’s ability to play with, as opposed to alongside, another child and
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whether they tended to wander off and leave the other child alone. This indicates that the 
ToM measures were able to capture the severity of certain social impairments.
The novel questionnaire tapping into behaviours thought to stem from ToM, EF and CC 
produced surprising results. Children with deviant ToM task performance were rated as 
showing more behaviours thought to be characteristic of weak CC than the remaining 
children with ASD (/(51)=2.02,/>=.048). No group differences were found for the ToM 
(/(51)=.34) or EF (/(51)=.77) questionnaires however, or on the DEX-C (/(51)=.83).
The pattern of correlations across the whole of the ASD group supported the group 
comparison results, with a trend towards a relationship between the 3Di social behaviours 
and ToM composite (age & IQ) (r =-.25,/>=.068) and a significant relationship between the 
CC questionnaire and ToM composite (age & IQ) (r =-.31,7>=.026), whilst no other 
relationships were significant. The correlation between the 3Di social scale and ToM task 
performance was further examined and a relationship was found for the ‘peer and sibling 
relationships’ category (r =-.34,/)=.013) and within this for both the ‘imaginative play with 
others’ (r =-.36,/>=.007) and ‘playing together’ (r =-.32./>=.019) items as before. These 
two relationships are shown in Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.5 The relationship of ToM test performance to two of the items in the 3DI 
social scale in the ASD group: ‘imaginative play with others’ and ‘playing 
together’; high scores on the 3DI items indicate impairment.
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Correlations were also examined between the ToM composite (age) and the behavioural 
measures. All three areas o f the 3Di triad of behaviours were found to be significantly 
related to ToM task performance (social: r  =-.33,/>=.017; communication: r =.27,y)=.049; 
repetitive behaviour r —.27,p=.049), with poor ToM performance indicative of greater 
severity o f abnormal behaviour, as well as a trend again towards a relationship between the 
CC questionnaire (r —~.26,p—.057) with ToM task performance. These previously unseen 
relationships between the ToM composite (age) and the 3Di communication and repetitive 
behaviour scales indicated that IQ, most likely verbal IQ for the communication area, was 
having a mediating effect between ToM task performance and these behaviours. 
Specifically, the effect that ToM ability had on communicative skill could be explained 
through the effect o f ToM on verbal IQ. As with the relationship between verbal IQ  and 
the 3Di communication scale, the relationship between ToM (age) and this scale was only 
present within the ‘conversational interchange’ category (r =-.48,/><.001), as well as the 
‘purposeful conversation’ (r =-.36,y>=.006) and ‘social conversation’ (r =-.43,y>=.001) 
items. The relationship between the ToM composite (age) and the 3Di repetitive 
behaviour scale was present in both the ‘ritualistic behaviour’ (r--.?>A,p~.0\A) and ‘non­
functional object use’ (r =-.30,y>=.025) categories and within these in the ‘word repetitions’ 
(r —.39,^=.004) and ‘repetitive object use’ (r =-.30,p= .025) items respectively.
A step-wise linear regression analysis, entering the ToM composite (age) and verbal IQ  as 
predictors of the 3Di ‘conversational interchange’ category, supported the interpretation 
that ToM was transmitting its effect on communication through verbal ability. Verbal IQ 
was found to be the only predictor of conversational skill, accounting for 23% of the 
variance. When the ToM composite (age) was entered as the only predictor, an almost 
identical picture was found: this variable could account for 23% of the variance in 
conversational skill. Similar results were found for the 3Di communication scale, although 
verbal ability and ToM were each able to account for only 7% of the variance. Conversely, 
verbal IQ was unable to significantly predict any variance in the 3Di social scale, whilst the
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ToM composite (age) predicted 11% of the variance. For the ‘peer and sibling 
relationships’ category, only the ToM composite (age) was found to predict 19% of the 
variance; when verbal IQ  was entered alone, it could predict only 7% of the variance.
It was less clear why repetitive behaviour should be related to the ToM composite only 
when IQ was not accounted for, however; a regression analysis revealed that the ToM 
composite (age) was the only significant predictor of repetitive behaviour, accounting for 
7% of the variance (11% of variance for ritualistic behaviour and 9% for non-functional 
object use), whilst verbal or performance IQ were unable to significantly predict any 
variance in these measures. These inconsistent results may be the product o f the 
correlation being close to the significance threshold, as it would not remain after correction 
for multiple comparisons.
7.3.3 Relationship between EF & CC and behavioural measures
Children classified as having weak CC through deviant test performance were found to 
have no behavioural differences from the remaining children with ASD on the 3Di 
diagnostic triad (/(51)< 1.58); this was expected given that CC does not attempt to explain 
behaviours included in the triad. More surprisingly, similar results were found in the EF 
domain, with no group differences on the 3Di diagnostic triad between those identified 
with or without deviant performance on the EF composite (/(51) <. 1.2). Similarly, no 
differences were found between the groups on the ToM, CC or EF novel questionnaires 
either in the CC (/(51)<.77) or EF cognitive domains (/(51)<. 15), except for a trend 
towards a difference between those with and without EF impairment on the CC 
questionnaire (/(51)=1.95,/>=.057) and group differences were also absent on the DEX-C 
in either cognitive domain (/(51)< 1.65). Furthermore, no correlations between the CC and 
EF composites (age & IQ, or age only) and the behavioural measures were found.
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7.3.4 Comparison of children with and without cognitive impairment
Those children classified as displaying no cognitive impairment in any domain were 
compared to the remaining children with ASD. Those children with no detectable 
impairment in any o f the three cognitive domains were reported to display fewer 
behaviours characteristic of weak CC (CC questionnaire) than the children classified as 
showing one or more cognitive impairment (/t(51)=2.55,/>=.014). Otherwise, none of the 
behavioural measures distinguished these groups. The proportion of children with or 
without any detectable cognitive impairment were compared across the different 3Di 
diagnostic groups (autism, Asperger Syndrome, PDD-NOS). Whilst no significant 
differences were found (x2(l)=2.37,/>=.124), there was a slight trend towards children with 
autism and Asperger Syndrome (impairment in all three areas o f the triad) to be more likely 
to show a cognitive impairment than those with PDD-NOS (69% vs 48%). Similarly, there 
was no difference in the proportion of children with or without a secondary diagnosis on 
the 3DI (ADD, ADHD, ODD , CD) to display a cognitive impairment (56% vs 63%; 
r(l)= -2 7 ).
7.3.5 Modelling the relationship between cognitive measures and the behavioural 
triad
In order to assess the relationships between and within the cognitive and behavioural levels 
simultaneously, structural equation modelling was employed. Maximum likelihood 
estimation procedures were used to analyse the variance/covariance matrix of the observed 
variables; latent variables were not used due to the relatively low number o f participants 
involved here and so this was an observed variable model. As the relationship between IQ 
and the cognitive measures was also o f interest, verbal and performance IQ were entered 
into the path analysis as predictors of the autistic triad of behaviour (3Di scales), along with 
the ToM, CC and EF composites (age). All possible correlations between the five
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predictor factors were initially present in the model, as were all possible correlations 
between the three outcome behavioural measures and all possible paths between the 
predictors and outcome measures. Non-significant correlations and paths were then 
dropped to produce a much simplified model (one marginally significant path was not 
dropped from the model as this greatly reduced the final model’s fit; ToM & repetitive 
behaviour: ^ =.071).
The final path model is shown in Figure 7.6. CC was dropped from the model as it was 
found to be unrelated to any other variable and was therefore not contributing to the 
model. Only ToM was a predictor of both social skill and the presence o f repetitive 
behaviours, whilst verbal IQ was a predictor o f communication ability. EF did not predict 
any of the outcome measures however. While the model was a good fit to the data 
(X2(ll)=10.72,/>=.467, RM SEA = .00, CI=.00-.138, CFI=1.00), only a small proportion of
Figure 7.6 Path model representing relationship between cognitive and behavioural
measures resulting from structural equation modelling; error terms (err) for 
each o f the predicted variables are necessary to account for noise in the 
predictive paths; the numbers on arrows denote path weights (r ) and the 
numbers on boxes denote the proportion o f unique variance accounted for
(O -
-.27 .07
soc.68
err
.65
.06
-.23
com.57 .41err-.24
.05
.30 err
EF
ToM
Performance IQ
Repetitive
behaviour
Verbal IQ
Communication
Social
196
the variance for each o f the observed behavioural variables was explained by the cognitive 
measures ( r2=.053 to .070).
The path analysis was repeated substituting the ‘peer and sibling relationships’ category for 
the social scale from the 3Di, the ‘conversational interchange’ category for the 
communication scale from the 3Di and the ‘ritualistic behaviour’ category for the repetitive 
behaviour scale from the 3Di. Almost identical results were found (x2(13)=13.91,y>=.381, 
R M S E A -.035, 67=.00-. 14, CFI—.992), although ritualistic behaviour was unrelated to the 
other two measures o f everyday behaviour. The most noticeable difference was the greater 
proportion of variance in the behavioural measures that was explained by the cognitive 
measures, this time between 11 % and 2 2%.
7.4 Discussion
In support of the cognitive results from the previous chapter, the structural equation model 
indicated that ToM, EF and verbal ability, as assessed by the present range o f tests, are all 
related to each other and further, that they are all independendy related to each other, each 
accounting for unique variation in the other two domains. Similarly in support o f the 
findings in section 2.1.3, behavioural symptoms as assessed by the three scales on the 3Di 
were all intricately related, each accounting for unique variation in the others. While the 
relation between the cognitive and behavioural data was much weaker producing very few 
associations, a few notable relationships were revealed.
7 .4 .1 Relating cognition to  behaviour
There were indications that ToM ability predicted parental reports of skill in social 
interaction, specifically in the way the children related to other children in play situations, 
including those involving imaginative games. This fits with previous findings (Frith et al., 
1994; Hughes, Soares-Boucaud, Hochmann & Frith, 1997b) and makes intuitive sense
since the ability to decouple representations is thought to be necessary in order to 
understand and therefore to participate normally in pretend play (Leslie, 1987); also, the 
inability to understand another’s point of view is likely to be most obvious in unstructured 
social interactions with other children who may not compensate for the autistic child’s 
difficulties in the way adults might. These situations are therefore likely to be the most 
markedly impaired in a child with a ToM impairment. Additionally, ToM ability also 
weakly predicted the presence o f repetitive behaviours. While this association has not been 
found in previous studies (Turner, 1996), it may be that such behaviours are more 
noticeable in the absence o f normal social and symbolic activities, acting as a replacement 
activity; this is similar to the original conceptualisation o f the third member o f the triad by 
Wing & Gould (1979). This would also explain why a specific aspect o f repetitive 
behaviour associated with ToM ability (ritualistic behaviour) was not directly related in 
terms o f severity to the aspects o f social and communicative impairment also associated 
with ToM ability (relationships & conversation).
Parental reports o f communication abilities appeared to be related both to ToM and verbal 
ability, consistent with previous findings (Capps et al., 1998; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2005). 
Both verbal IQ and ToM task performance explained almost identical variance in the 
communication scale, both affecting conversational abilities in particular. This category of 
behaviour particularly covered the ability to respond in socially appropriate ways in a 
conversational exchange, a skill likely to depend on an understanding o f a conversational 
partner’s mental processes. Conversational ability also logically depends on verbal ability, 
requiring a high degree o f fast online verbal production, a large vocabulary and knowledge 
of appropriate verbal responses in order to flexibly respond to the conversational partner. 
Furthermore, the path analysis suggested that ToM affects conversational abilities 
indirectly, mediated through its effect on verbal IQ. As previously mentioned, one o f a 
number of different theories has proposed this relationship to be causal in this direction,
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with ToM development as a necessary precursor for normal language development to 
occur (Baron-Cohen, Baldwin & Crowson, 1997a; Bloom, 2000).
Behaviours thought to be characteristic of weak CC do not play a role in current diagnostic 
schemes; here, CC did not appear to have any affect on the triad o f autistic behaviours. In 
addition, the finding from section 6.2.2 that only a minority of individuals with ASD show 
an extreme tendency towards weak CC may indicate that it is not a causal factor in the 
currendy defined autistic behavioural profile but an additional feature which accompanies 
ASD in some cases. The association o f weak CC to ASD may result from genetic or 
biological factors that are far back in the causal chain and therefore difficult to identify at 
the cognitive or behavioural levels. Such factors will warrant careful study in the future.
Surprisingly, the EF composite was unrelated to any o f the behavioural measures and 
therefore did not play a causal role in terms of explaining the behaviours in the structural 
equation model. However, both from chapter 6 and the path analysis, EF task 
performance was seen to be related to both verbal ability and ToM task performance in the 
children with ASD involved in this study. In this way, it appears that ToM and verbal 
ability are related to EF independendy of their relationship with autistic symptomatology 
and therefore that EF cannot be causal to the relationship between these cognitive and 
behavioural variables. It seems most likely therefore that the relationships between ToM 
and verbal ability with EF are in this direction, with ToM and verbal ability both affecting 
EF task performance independendy.
Figure 7.7 illustrates a hypothesis o f a new causal model involving all o f these cognitive and 
behavioural factors, as well as the biological measure of head size from section 5.3. Here, a 
ToM impairment is shown to result in social problems and repetitive behaviour, as well as 
lowering verbal ability (although this does not rule out the possibility that absolute verbal 
ability could still be high in a particular child). In addition, a ToM impairment results in 
communication problems through this effect on verbal ability and is also shown to lead to
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Figure 7.7 Hypothesis for a new causal model o f ASD; the dashed pathway indicates 
that executive dysfunction may not be the cause o f poor EF task 
performance in ASD. STS=superior temporal sulcus; mPFC=medial 
prefrontal cortex.
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poor performance on certain executive tasks. Verbal ability is characterised as having a 
compensatory effect on EF task performance, although this effect will be smaller for those 
children with more severe ToM impairments and generally lower verbal IQs. Executive 
dysfunction is illustrated as possibly not being a causal factor in poor EF task performance 
in children with ASD; it could be the cause of poor performance in other children, 
however. In addition, weak central coherence may result from an increase in neurones 
producing macrocephaly, and this is shown to result in a local processing bias; it would be 
expected that certain behaviours not currently included in an ASD diagnosis would also 
result in this case. This latter area o f impairment is shown to be independent o f the former 
one.
7.4.2 Children with no detectable cognitive impairment
An important aim of this chapter was to determine whether behavioural measures could 
differentiate those individuals with a prior diagnosis o f ASD who were classified as not
showing impaired performance in any cognitive domain in the previous chapter. These 
children were reported as showing fewer behaviours indicative o f weak CC, and there was a 
slight trend towards these children not being rated above the 3Di cut-off on at least one 
domain; these may both indicate slightly milder impairments. Nonetheless, these children’s 
difficulties were severe enough to warrant a diagnosis on the autism spectrum so their 
problems must be taken seriously. Their lack o f impairment may be related to the use of 
the 5th percentile cut-off for deviant performance imposing a categorical approach to 
impairment on these children rather than a continuous one. The correlational analyses 
between cognitive and behavioural measures seems to support this view, with degree of 
impairment at least in the ToM domain relating to severity o f autistic symptoms as 
measured by the 3Di.
It may be that this group o f children with no detectable cognitive impairments may not be 
a homogeneous group and so different explanations may be appropriate for different 
children. Whilst some may have milder impairments that were not detected by the 5th 
percentile cut-off, others may have been misdiagnosed (particularly given the high 
proportion o f other non-ASD diagnoses present in this sample), others may have been 
compensating for and masking their difficulties, and still others may really have been 
unimpaired on these measures with impairments in other untested domains (see section 
6.2.3).
7.4.3 Limitations of cognitive and behavioural measures
Does the general paucity of relationship between the cognitive and behavioural levels mean 
that the cognitive measures used here were irrelevant to the way in which ASD manifests 
itself? This seems unlikely given that significant group differenced were present in both 
the cognitive and behavioural data. It seems likely that the poor correlations were due to 
noise in the data instead, making it difficult to pick up valid information about true ability.
201
A number o f factors may have contributed to this within both the cognitive and 
behavioural levels.
Concerning the behavioural level, it is possible that the current diagnostic triad may not be 
the best way to categorise the behavioural symptoms present in ASD or that certain 
behaviours may not be causally related to ASD. This was supported by the finding that 
ToM was related only to certain categories within each of the 3Di scales and is consistent 
with previous findings that the behavioural symptoms of ASD are better classified in 
alternative ways (van Lang et al., 2006a).
Furthermore, it may be that parental rating scales and interviews are not the best way to 
collect accurate individual data on behaviour that is comparable across individuals. As each 
parent rates only one child, it may be extremely difficult to acquire good inter-rater 
reliability. It seems unlikely that each parent rated their child at a severity consistent with 
all the other children in the study; rather, parental ratings are likely to be dependent on 
what the parent was rating their child against and what they used as a comparison, and this 
is likely to depend on the other children that they see their child with. The parents, of 
course, were also not blind to the child’s prior diagnosis; both this knowledge and the 
parent’s opinion of the diagnosis may have affected ratings. Indeed, it has previously been 
found that parents o f normally developing children tend to overestimate their abilities 
(Miller & Davis, 1992), and that parents of children with severe autism were likely to 
overestimate their child’s abilities whilst parents of children with milder PDD-NOS did not 
(Hughes et al., 1997b), possibly due to the need to maintain a positive outlook on a difficult 
situation. Moreover, Hughes et al. also found that parents of children with ASD were 
unable to identify subde social differences that teachers and therapists could, indicating that 
parents may be insensitive to detecting certain behaviours. Teacher and therapist ratings 
may be more objective measures but would also be systematically biased by prior 
knowledge of diagnoses.
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Direct behavioural observation is an alternative that could be used in a future follow-up of 
the present cases. This eliminates the problem of poor inter-rater reliability but is carried 
out at a single time point so can only provide a snap shot o f behaviour which may not be 
very representative. The essence o f developmental disorders is perhaps grasped best by the 
dynamics of repeated testing over time; this may also be true for the cognitive measures. 
Indeed, it has previously been found that a standard parental report and behavioural 
observation measure have poor agreeability (Norbury & Bishop, 2002), indicating that both 
are limited in their representation o f the child’s behaviour.
In relation to the cognitive measures adopted in this study, any group differences may have 
been less pronounced and therefore not detected on some of the EF and CC tests as there 
were fewer deviant performers in these domains; this was less the case in the ToM domain 
however. Additionally, within the EF and CC composites, the tests were poorly correlated, 
indicating that they might have represented more than one concept. Conversely, the poor 
relationship between the cognitive and behavioural measures may actually reflect the true 
state of this relationship; it has previously been shown that intervention, compensation and 
training at either that cognitive and behavioural level do not transfer to improved 
performance outside o f the specific area of training (Frith et al., 1994; Ozonoff & Miller, 
1995; Swettenham, 1996). Particularly, cognitive tasks performed within a controlled 
environment may prove less difficult for highly intelligent individuals whilst, outside the 
laboratory, such problems may be more pronounced.
Similar results were reported in the one previous study to look at all three cognitive 
domains and relate them to behaviour; no significant relationships between the cognitive 
measures and behavioural parental ratings were found (Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin & 
Maley, 2006). One other study looking at ToM and EF, as well as verbal ability, and 
comparing these to behaviour as measured through behavioural observation (Joseph & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2004) did find some similar relationships, with verbal ability relating to
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communication skills, and ToM task performance relating to all three areas of the triad 
(only to communication skill after accounting for verbal ability though). However, 
differing from the present findings, they also found verbal ability to relate to social skills 
and repetitive behaviour, and EF task performance to relate to communication skills (but 
not after accounting for verbal ability). These discrepant findings may in part be the result 
of using different measures to assess verbal ability, the cognitive domains and behaviour, as 
well as a consequence of recruiting a more variable sample in terms o f age and ability.
7.5 Conclusion
The extensive battery o f cognitive and behavioural measures applied to a large sample of 
children with ASD allowed a large number of detailed comparisons to be made in order to 
address the issue of causality from the cognitive to the behavioural level in ASD. This is a 
complex endeavour given the extensive heterogeneity in any ASD sample. Through a 
series of analyses culminating in structural equation modelling, a number of complex 
relationships were identified. It appears that ToM, EF and verbal IQ  are all intricately 
related and further that ToM affects communication skills, social interaction and repetitive 
behaviours, the former indirectly through its effect on verbal ability. EF appears to have 
no effect on autistic symptomatology in this sample however, implying that it is not 
involved in the same causal pathway as ToM and verbal ability. A model was proposed in 
which poor performance on EF tasks may result from poor ToM abilities, whilst verbal 
ability may be a compensatory factor in EF task performance. Weak CC was found to be 
independent of the other cognitive factors and o f the measures of autistic symptomatology 
used here, supporting the idea that this processing style represents a distinct subtype in the 
autism spectrum. Using both ToM test performance, and CC test performance or 
macrocephaly as endophenotypic markers of ASD may provide a way forward in the search 
for the genetic basis of autism.
Chapter 8: Conclusions
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This thesis has focussed on three of the main theories that have attempted to characterise 
autism at the cognitive level: theory of mind, executive function and central coherence. 
These theories all share a common goal in attempting to find a unitary cause by which a 
range of autistic behaviours can be drawn together. Relationships between behavioural 
tests thought to tap into these cognitive abilities and reports of everyday behaviours were 
therefore explored, along with relationships between these cognitive domains, in a group of 
high-functioning junior-aged children with ASD in comparison to a similar group o f 
children with no such diagnosis.
8 .1 Summary of main findings
The first aim of this thesis was to assess each o f the three main cognitive theories o f autism 
and their relationship to each other with selected tests. Support for the relevance o f all 
three theories to ASD was found and in general, results were consistent with previous 
findings. Thus, tests that were designed to tap into the cognitive processes that each 
theory considers a primary abnormality differentiated the present samples of children 
diagnosed with ASD and typically developing children. Furthermore, at the level of 
individual differences, subgroups were found characterised by extreme scores (less than the 
corrected 5th percentile of control performance) on tests tapping each of these theories.
Within the theory of mind (ToM) domain, a battery of tasks was selected, tapping mainly 
into understanding o f false beliefs, as well as a range o f other mental states. These tasks 
produced consistent and highly significant differences between the control and ASD 
groups. A closer analysis o f the tasks revealed that the development in the understanding 
of others’ minds is both delayed and follows a deviant course in many children with ASD
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in the present sample, and that this ToM impairment may have wider effects on the 
understanding o f biological agents in general.
In the domain o f executive function (EF) too, significant group differences were found. A 
common denominator in the impaired performance seemed to be in the child’s 
understanding of the task demands when specific prompts were absent. An implicit 
understanding of the experimenter’s expectations did not appear to be available to at least 
some children with ASD, resulting in performance that appeared idiosyncratic or 
egocentric. Such behaviour may result from an executive failure in self-monitoring or may 
be the consequence o f a failure in perspective taking.
Group differences were less clear-cut in the central coherence (CC) domain; whilst trends 
towards a bias for local processing could be demonstrated in both a well known and a 
novel test, evidence for significant group differences was scant. Observation of the 
individual profiles revealed a small number of children in the present sample to be 
particularly good at the more difficult component o f the Children’s Embedded Figures 
Test, indicative o f weak CC. More importantly, it was predicted that the processing style of 
weak CC would be found in those children with macrocephaly and the results from a novel 
Local-Global Switching Task supported this hypothesis. As this is a novel finding, it has to 
be treated with caution before it has been replicated. Speculatively, this finding might 
provide a starting point for a neurobiologically-based endophenotype. This test also 
allowed the nature o f the locally-biased processing style to be further examined; the results 
indicated that those children with macrocephaly could be described as finding it difficult to 
switch from local level and into global level processing, whilst performing as well as 
controls when switching in the opposite direction. This can be visualised as a gradient 
between local and global processing: the slope for individuals with macrocephaly would be 
higher at the global end, making it more of an uphill struggle to switch from local to global
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than the converse, whilst the gradient would slope in the opposite direction for the 
majority o f the population.
When assessing the relationships between the three cognitive domains in the children with 
ASD, CC emerged as an independent factor from the other domains, whilst ToM and EF 
were closely related, indicating that at least two independent cognitive subtypes can be 
found in the autism spectrum as represented by the present sample. This finding also 
supports the hypothesis that ToM impairments may adversely affect performance in 
unstructured EF tasks through a lack of understanding of the implicit task demands. 
Furthermore, ToM and EF task performance were both independently related to verbal 
ability, although only the relationship between EF and verbal ability appeared to be 
qualitatively different to that seen in the normally developing children. The emerging 
hypothesis was therefore that the present ASD group were performing the EF tasks in a 
qualitatively different way to the control group. This finding led to the proposal that a 
compensatory mechanism may be involved to overcome problems with EF tasks, possibly 
through internal verbal self-prompting.
Another aim o f the thesis was to examine the pattern of these three types o f cognitive 
impairment in different children with ASD. Using a strict technique to detect deviant 
performance in each domain (less than the corrected 5th percentile of control performance), 
between 20% and 50% of children with ASD were identified in each case; these children 
can be assumed to be impaired in the relevant domain with certainty. Within different 
children, all possible combinations of impairment were found, although it was most 
common to see CC or ToM impairment alone or ToM and EF impairments in 
combination. Whilst many children were therefore classified in each domain as not 
showing such deviant performance, it cannot be assumed that all o f these individuals were 
unimpaired; their impairments may have been milder or they may have been able to 
perform the tasks by some other strategy.
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Despite this, a proportion o f individuals in each domain could be seen to show normal or 
even superior performance, indicating that none of these cognitive impairments were 
present in all children with ASD in this sample. Indeed, 39% of children were identified as 
possibly having intact abilities in all three domains simultaneously. Whether these children 
had been diagnosed through over-inclusive application of the present criteria is a question 
that the present study cannot resolve.
The final aim of the thesis was to relate performance on the tasks tapping these cognitive 
domains to real-life behaviour, as indexed by parental interview. This proved a difficult 
task. Structural equation modelling, correlations and regression analyses confirmed 
intricate relationships between both ToM and verbal ability and specific aspects o f the 
behavioural triad.
8.2 Strengths and limitations of study
The work covered in this thesis has been a multiple case study design. This has allowed a 
range of detailed data to be collected from different individuals in an attempt to assess the 
impairments present within each individual as accurately as possible and then to compare 
the pattern of these impairments across different individuals. The relatively large number 
o f children with ASD included here is therefore an asset o f the study, as is the quantity of 
data collected on each child. The inclusion of multiple measures relating to each cognitive 
domain sought to increase sensitivity and reliability o f the overall measure of ability in each 
domain. Whilst many studies in this field assess one particular aspect o f cognition in ASD, 
this design in which data has been collected relating to three different areas of cognition 
within the same children has also enabled the relationships between the different theories 
to be systematically explored, uniting or separating them. Furthermore, by including 
measures of everyday behaviour, this study has allowed the adequacy of current 
behavioural tests to be explored, that is the extent to which they tap into these underlying
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cognitive impairments, and the extent to which they explain the symptoms of ASD, 
assessed through parental report.
Despite the strength of the experimental design, a number of limitations in the 
methodology exist. Firstly, the ASD and control groups were not matched for verbal and 
performance IQ levels. Even though such matching was originally intended and could 
have been achieved by excluding participants in the lower IQ  band, it seemed most 
profitable for the particular design employed in this study to include as many children with 
ASD as possible.
All those children who were included in the ASD group were functioning at a level that 
allowed them to comply with the task demands, and the majority had either verbal or 
performance IQ within the control range. While they might therefore be considered high- 
functioning relative to the autism spectrum as a whole, not all children here were 
functioning at a level equal to the controls. Still, as already mentioned, individual verbal 
and performance IQ  levels were accounted for in all data analyses in order to correct for 
this disparity between the groups. As the relationships between most o f the experimental 
variables and IQ scores were similar between the two groups for the majority of cases, the 
increased range in the ASD group would therefore have little effect on this method of 
correction. However, this was not the case for the EF tests; it is possible that in some 
cases, the children with lower IQs may have affected this correction method in minor ways. 
This had the effect of making children with low verbal IQs appear slightly more competent 
and children with low performance IQs appear slightly less competent than without these 
children. On the other hand, the inclusion of only relatively high-functioning children in 
the ASD group will have led to a sample that is not representative o f the ASD population 
even in the present geographical area. Obviously, the present findings cannot be assumed 
to be applicable to the ASD population as a whole. For this, an epidemiological study with 
a representative sample would be necessary.
Whilst the behavioural tests used here were designed specifically to tap into particular 
cognitive domains, all such tasks will require more than one cognitive ability in order to 
perform the task, as well as being affected by age and general ability. This is inevitable with 
almost all cognitive measures but makes task performance difficult to interpret. A number 
of steps were taken in order to attempt to minimise this problem. Firstly, individual age 
and IQ levels were accounted for by entering these variables into each analysis as covariates 
or by using the residuals from regression analyses with these variables entered as predictor 
variables; this was carried out in order to control for the effect that these factors may have 
had on task performance. In addition, to avoid task specific factors and increase the 
likelihood of the intended underlying cognitive factor being tapped, performance was 
averaged across a number o f diverse tests within each domain. This required a child to 
perform consistently across a number of tasks in order to be categorised as showing 
deviant performance. Furthermore, some of the tasks involved control conditions to 
check that poor performance was not the result of more general task difficulties; in 
particular, there were questions in the ToM battery to control for comprehension, carefully 
matched physical stories and unlinked passages in the Strange Stories and non-switching 
conditions in the Local-Global Switching task.
Despite these attempts to ensure the data reflected specific cognitive abilities, it is still 
possible that other factors may have been contributing to performance. Particularly in the 
CC and EF domains, control conditions were missing and performance across the different 
tasks was inconsistent. This made it difficult to assess whether task performance truly 
reflected these particular cognitive domains. In the ToM domain, consistency may have 
been overestimated because o f the use of only verbal tests; if non-verbal ToM tests had 
been used as well, the results might have been less consistent. The possibility that some 
children may be compensating for their impairments cannot be ruled out and makes good 
performance, or at least performance not classified as deviant, difficult to interpret. 
Compensation has been suggested frequently in the literature, particularly when untimed
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tasks are involved which may allow task completion through slow deliberation. Again, 
applying control conditions and accounting for IQ helps to minimise these possibilities but 
is unlikely to cover all the different possible compensatory mechanisms that could be 
employed.
Given that the motivation of the children to perform well was high throughout and that 
they were given constant encouragement during the testing sessions, task failure is more 
straightforward to interpret than task success. Indeed, the use o f the 1.65 SD cut-off to 
detect individuals with deviant performance was useful in order to explore the pattern of 
impairments present in each individual. While this cut-off represents performance below 
the 5th percentile o f control performance, a common requirement for clinical significance, 
this boundary is in some senses artificial. Particularly, the fact that the distribution of 
scores in the ASD group was sometimes shifted down from the control distribution 
indicates that all children may have been performing slightly below the expected level on 
certain tests, rather than some children showing intact performance and others showing 
deviant performance. Obviously, a bimodal distribution would be the clearest evidence in 
support of the hypothesis that only a proportion of children were impaired on a particular 
test or domain, but such idealised data is rarely seen in practice; this is in part the 
consequence of using quantitative behavioural techniques to tap into cognitive systems, as 
well as the noise present in any data set. Throughout the thesis, interpretation of the data 
has therefore attempted to reflect the limitations of this methodology.
Similarly to the cut-off used for the cognitive tests, the cut-offs recommended on the 3Di 
were found to be rather arbitrary; the data seemed better represented as a continuum. 
Again, this does not mean to say that children with ASD are only quantitatively different 
from normally-developing children, rather that it is difficult to locate qualitative differences 
at the behavioural level and that the 3Di is designed to be a quantitative tool. Since the 
data from the children in the ASD group did seem to indicate that the cut-off for the
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communication domain was relatively low in comparison to the social and repetitive 
behaviour domains, it may well have been that some children who met criteria only on the 
basis of communication impairments were actually rather mild cases.
Another limitation of the data must be the sole use of parental report to assess everyday 
behaviour; such data may produce high consistency between measures within each child, 
possibly artificially high, but high variability between different children. This would result 
from each child being rated by a different person and from different parents perceiving the 
same behaviour differently. If this was the case, this would help to further explain the 
paucity of relations between the reports of everyday behaviour and the test measures. 
Ratings by teachers and direct behavioural observation would have been useful supporting 
evidence, but were not possible due to time constraints.
8.3 Implications of results
The finding that at least two distinct cognitive subgroups of relatively able junior-aged 
children with ASD exist and that only a proportion o f children show each of these profiles 
has implications for ASD research methodology and theory, for genetic studies, and for 
clinical diagnostic and interventional strategies. Methodologically, the multiple case study 
and analysis of individual data design begins to address issues o f causality which group 
studies are not able to approach. It also highlights the need to treat ASD as a 
heterogeneous group o f individuals with different underlying cognitive impairments that 
cannot be assumed to be universal; this is important for both experimental design and data 
interpretation.
Cognitive heterogeneity may also have implications for identifying distinct endophenotypes 
within the autism spectrum, which could aid in the search for candidate genes. Although 
ASD is known to be a highly heritable condition (Folstein & Rosen-Sheidley, 2001), 
specific genetic loci for the disorder have still to be located and reliably replicated
(Bacchelli & Maestrini, 2006), most likely because genetic and therefore neurobiological 
heterogeneity exist in ASD in addition to cognitive heterogeneity; different samples of 
individuals with ASD may contain individuals with different underlying genetics, increasing 
noise in the data and making it unlikely that the same results would be replicated. The use 
of cognitive subtypes as endophenotypes may therefore aid in the search for the genetic 
basis of autism; different genes or groups of genes may be related to different cognitive 
subtypes. The finding in the central coherence domain of a subgroup o f individuals with 
weak central coherence and macrocephaly is encouraging in this respect; it may well 
indicate that head size is one potential biological endophenotype that could be explored.
Given that children on the spectrum are currently being grouped under a single label (or 
categorised in terms of severity and IQ) but differ enormously both in the behavioural 
manifestations they display (Wing & Gould, 1979) and the cognitive underpinnings o f the 
disorder, any interventional approach is unlikely to benefit every child (Hutchins &
Prelock, 2006). Klinger & Renner (2000) reported that the assessment o f cognitive 
impairments is currently useful for treatment planning. Having a better understanding of 
the underlying problems present in different children should enable clinicians to plan 
interventions appropriate to an individual child and allow parents and teachers to respond 
more directly to the child’s needs. It would therefore be beneficial for diagnostic 
assessment to recognise cognitive subtypes in addition to assessing behavioural symptoms.
8.4 Future directions
The outcomes of the present research highlight a number of avenues for future 
exploration. Firstly, it would be useful to follow-up and replicate the finding that weak 
central coherence is found in individuals with autism with macrocephaly. Specifically, it 
would be o f interest to recruit two new groups of children with ASD, one with and one 
without macrocephaly and measure their performance across a variety of different central
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coherence tasks, particularly those with strict control measures that also require fast on-line 
processing and including the Local-Global Switching task used here. Furthermore, it 
would be crucial to extend this causal chain to the behavioural level, exploring those non­
diagnostic behaviours specifically thought to result from weak CC, in order to assess the 
effect that this biological abnormality and cognitive impairment would have on everyday 
behaviours. Current diagnostic measures pay little attention to behaviours such as rote 
memory, hyper- and hyposensitivity, islets o f ability, literal understanding of language and 
poor comprehension o f text relative to word decoding ability. Whilst the CC questionnaire 
included in this thesis failed to relate directly to the present CC measures, it was only a first 
attempt to identify such behaviours and did in fact produce significant group differences; 
this would need to be refined and developed.
The relationship between EF and ToM also deserves further investigation. The proposed 
hypothesis that a poor understanding of implicit task demands in certain executive function 
tasks results from a lack of understanding of the experimenter’s expectations would predict 
problems specifically on tasks without explicit prompting. It would therefore be beneficial 
to explore performance o f individuals with ASD on a task in which either implicit or 
explicit instructions were given in different matched conditions.
A big question mark hangs over those children who showed apparently intact performance 
across all three cognitive domains. In what other way can their reported behaviours, which 
led to their diagnosis, be explained? Were these children in fact able to compensate for 
their difficulties so that they performed abnormally well on tasks that should have 
presented a challenge to them? Firstly, it would be crucial to check on the reported 
behaviours by utilising a more explicit means of assessing everyday behaviours through a 
direct observational method. For instance, the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(ADOS; Lord et al., 1999) could be used to ascertain whether these children differ at all in 
the severity or profile o f autistic symptoms and to further assess whether they truly fit an
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autistic profile. It would be helpful to know whether these children were wrongly 
diagnosed as having ASD, but may be merely delayed in certain aspects of their 
development and have outgrown earlier difficulties. Alternatively, they may have hidden 
impairments not assessed at present. Whilst explicit behavioural measures designed to tap 
into cognitive processes may be insensitive to such impairment, it is possible that more 
implicit measures, such as eye-tracking technology, could be used to detect residual 
cognitive differences.
The use of brain imaging techniques could aid in clarifying the reason for these children 
not displaying significantly deviant performance on cognitive tasks. An informative way of 
differentiating between children with ASD but with intact cognitive abilities and those with 
impaired cognitive abilities but intact performance through compensation is to measure 
brain activity using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. This would involve 
comparing those children with ASD and intact performance in a particular cognitive 
domain to control children, matched on the basis o f their performance on cognitive tasks. 
When comparing brain activity whilst performing experimental tasks designed to tap into 
that cognitive domain as well as control tasks, it would be expected that children with ASD 
with intact performance would differ from control children if they were somehow 
compensating for a hidden impairment, showing similar brain activity to those children 
with ASD who showed impaired task performance. However, if brain activity were similar 
in the children with ASD plus intact performance and in the control groups, this would 
indicate truly intact cognitive abilities.
This thesis has attempted to advance the understanding o f how the cognitive impairments 
in ASD relate to one another and to behaviour. As a developmental disorder, any 
investigation conducted at a particular point in time is therefore certain to fall short of 
providing a full understanding o f how these factors interact. A future aim would therefore 
be to follow up these children in order to study the developmental course and stability of
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their impairments and investigate whether the severity and presence of each cognitive 
deficit was predictive o f future outcomes. This would be useful for providing appropriate 
resources and interventional strategies and for planning for the individual’s future. An 
additional avenue that would also have direct clinical relevance would be to develop a 
standardised battery o f tests tapping into these cognitive domains, for use in clinical and 
educational assessment.
8.5 Concluding thoughts
Is it really plausible to suggest that we can unite so many different individuals under the 
‘autism spectrum’ label? Can the child who hides his head under his coat in order to avoid 
a testing session be reconciled with the child who claimed that ‘G ’ was the capital of 
Greece, with the child who wondered whether Christopher Columbus was the Christopher 
in his class, with the child who only eats yellow food when he goes out to restaurants, with 
the child who is indifferent to the many people who want to be his friend, with the child 
who destroys his school work when it lacks perfection, with the child who can’t understand 
why other children don’t enjoy reading an encyclopaedia, with the child who walks directly 
behind someone they’re talking to, with the child who calls everyone ‘he’ regardless o f their 
gender?
There is no simple answer to this question but it is hoped that, as with the multitude of 
other research in this field, this study will be a small step forward in understanding this 
complex disorder. While each child may indeed appear different on the surface, clinical 
intuition has led us to search at a deeper level for the ‘something’ in common. Indeed, 
much o f the analysis presented here points towards a continuum of severity. Nonetheless, 
the multiple case study approach undoubtedly indicates that children with ASD differ from 
each other in terms o f their underlying problems and therefore that the continuum of 
severity is likely to be composed of a number o f dimensions. The notion of ‘autism’ is
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obviously still highly relevant and valuable but the reality o f its manifestation may be 
broader than our current conceptualisation of the disorder permits.
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Appendices
Appendix I: Novel ever/day  behaviour questionnaire 
Theory of Mind items
• understands the concept o f pretending, eg. someone acting on TV isn't that person in
real life
• unaware that different people enjoy different things, eg. food, work
• lacks the understanding o f how to behave appropriately with different people, eg.
teacher /  brother /  stranger
• aware that a person's knowledge depends on their experience, eg. asks questions to
people who are likely to know the answers
• unaware that adults have limited knowledge, eg. surprised when parent makes a mistake
• understands other people's long term intentions, including failed attempts to get
something, eg. someone may return to the library every week in order to take out the 
latest bestseller but come home without the book as it’s out on loan
• aware that young children may need things explained more simply
• has difficulty recognising surprise in others
• recognises embarrassment in others
• shows pride after an achievement and looks for public praise
• lacks the knowledge o f how to conceal information from others
• confides in others and understands that people keep secrets in order to keep
information private
• apologises for hurting others' feelings; not just a routine "sorry"
• lacks the understanding of how own behaviour affects others, eg. seems unaware that, if
slow getting ready for school, this will also make parents late
• responds to being called or looked at with eagerness to listen
Executive Function items
• finds it hard to think up new ideas on own, eg. a new game to play
• can make hypothetical inferences about factual information eg. if it’s snowing in
Scotland, can infer it must be cold there
• when drawing, only uses a single colour and does not change colours
• can make sensible decisions for self, eg. puts raincoat on when going out in the rain
• prevaricates at every decision, eg. can't chose what flavour o f icecream to have
• appears unable to control own actions; acts without thinking
• once understood, is able to follow the rules o f a game without having to be reminded
• obeys parents/teachers; if told not to do something, will not do it
• unaware of personal safety, eg. when crossing the road or taking part in physical
activities
• happy to wait for rewards; doesn't need them immediately, eg. will tidy room today
when reward is going to the zoo next week
Central Coherence items
• notices small details when others do not, eg. small sounds, small changes in the position
of furniture
• has strong interests which he/she gets upset about if he/she can't pursue them
• usually concentrates more on the whole picture rather than the small details
• good at remembering lists o f items, eg. phone numbers
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• poor at remembering facts, eg. dates o f birth, general knowledge
• has a hobby involving collecting items in a particular category or making lists, eg. stamp
collecting, trains
• hypersensitive to certain noises and objects, eg. agitated by the sound of the vacuum
cleaner, dislikes the feel o f certain materials
Theory of Mind & Executive Function items
• attends appropriately to others' emotional states, eg. celebrates successes, consoles
failures
• finds it hard to initiate flexible small talk, eg. unlikely to chat to newcomers or make
them feel at home
• volunteers important missing information, eg. tells someone, who has missed the
beginning of a TV programme, what has happened so far
• expresses ideas in more than one way, eg. if someone doesn't understand something,
he/she can say it again in a different way to make him /herself clear
• has difficulty when choosing appropriate presents for others, eg. likely to choose
something he/she likes rather than something the other person likes
• says and does things that might embarrass others, eg. scratching/yawning in public,
saying they don't like a present to the person who gave it to them
• reveals private information to inappropriate people, eg. might give phone number to a
stranger
• poor at playing games such as hide & seek or cheat, eg. reveals his/her hiding location,
reveals the fact he/she is cheating
• keeps secrets for as long as appropriate
• weighs consequences o f own actions on others, eg. doesn't eat all the crisps so there are
some left for others, even though he/she wants them all
• dislikes sharing with others, eg. toys, sweets, pens
• commits 'faux pas' without noticing and does not notice this in others, eg. saying
something tastes awful in the presence o f the person who cooked it
• has realistic long-range goals and plans that take others into account, eg. if wants to go
to friend’s house, considers whether parent would be free to drive them there that 
day
Executive Function & Central Coherence items
• repeatedly says/does the same thing
• plays creatively, eg. will build different kinds o f things from lego rather than building the
same model with slight variations
• gets caught up in minor details or a single topic
• can solve puzzles with missing information, eg. hang man, crosswords
• gets so absorbed in one thing that loses sight o f other things
• doesn't grasp the gist o f stories or films; has to ask what's going on
• copes well with changes to daily routine eg. a different route to school
• has favourites and won't try alternatives, eg. piece of music, food, clothes
• likes to keep things in certain places or in a certain order and gets upset if they are
rearranged
• likes to have every detail of an activity he/she is involved in carefully planned (by self or
someone else)
• can think ahead/plan logically for self without help eg. what books needed for school
that day
Theory of Mind, Executive Function & Central C oherence items
• responds to hints and indirect cues in conversation, eg. takes shoes off in response to
someone saying "I've just cleaned the floor"
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• initiates conversation o f interest to others, eg. asks friends about their hobbies as well as
talking about own
• engages in a range o f elaborate make-believe activities, eg. can act different characters
• tends to take things that are said literally, eg. "you're a pain in the neck"
• manipulates others by positive means of flattery, bribery and getting on the right side of
someone rather than by physical or negative means
• understands irony and jokes, eg. "well that's very neatly put away" when the room is a
mess
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Appendix 2: Theory of Mind Tasks
1) Diverse Desires: Snacks (sheet needed)
This is Mandy. It’s snack time so Mandy wants something to eat. Here are two different 
snacks: carrots and cakes.
Own desire: Which snack would you like best? Carrots /  Cakes
Well, Mandy really likes [the other one]. She doesn’t like [child’s choice]. She likes [the 
other one] best.
So, now it’s time to eat. Mandy can only chose one snack.
Test: Which snack will she chose? Carrots/ Cakes
Reality control: Which snack does Mandy like best? Carrots /  Cakes
2) Diverse beliefs: Cat (sheet needed)
This is Linda. Linda wants to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding in the tree or it might 
be hiding in the garage.
Own belief: Where do you think her cat is hiding? Tree /  Garage
Well, that’s a good idea but Linda thinks her cat is hiding in the [other place].
Test: Where will she look for her cat? Tree /  Garage
Reality control: Where does Linda think her cat is hiding? Tree /  Garage
3) Knowledge access: Bear (props needed)
Show child closed box.
Own belief: What do you think is inside this box?
Open box and show the bear to the child.
Put bear back in box and replace lid.
Own knowledge: What’s inside the box?
Polly has never seen inside this box before. Now here she comes.
Test: Does Polly know what’s inside the box? Yes /  N o
Reality control: Has Polly seen inside the box? Yes /  N o
Memory control: When I first showed you the box, what did you think was inside?
4) Contents False Belief: Smarties (props needed)
Show child sealed Smarties tube.
Own belief: What do you think is inside?
Open tube and show that it actually contains a pencil.
Put pencil back in tube and replace lid.
Own knowledge: What’s inside the tube?
In a minute your friend X  is going to come in. He hasn't seen this tube yet. When he 
comes in I'm going to show him this tube, closed up just like this. I'm going to ask him 
W hat's in here?'
Test: What will X say? Smarties /  Pencil 
Why will they say that?
Reality control: What is really inside?
Memory control: When I first showed you the tube, what did you think was inside?
5) Explicit False Belief: Gloves (sheet needed)
This is Scott. Scott wants to find his gloves. They might be in his rucksack or they might 
be in his drawers. Scott’s gloves are really in his rucksack but Scott thinks they’re in his 
drawers.
Test: Where will Scott look for his gloves? Rucksack /  Drawers
Why will he look there?
Reality control: Where are his gloves really? Rucksack /  Drawers
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6) Implicit False Belief: Sally-Ann (props needed)
This is Sally and this is Ann. Sally has a basket and Ann has a box. Sally has a marble and 
she puts her marble in her basket to keep it safe when she goes out. But while Sally is out, 
naughty Ann takes Sally's marble out of her basket and she puts it in her box.
Test: When Sally comes back, where will she think her marble is?
Basket /  Box
Why?
Reality control: Where is the marble really? Basket /  Box 
Memory control: Where did Sally put the marble in the beginning?
Basket /  Box
7) Belief-Emotion: Cereal (props needed)
Show child closed cereal box
Own belief: What do you think is in here?
This is Jane. Rice crispies are her favourite cereal. “I love rice crispies” says Jane. Then 
off she goes to have a wash before breakfast.
Let’s have a look inside. There are really stones inside, and no rice crispies.
Memory control: What is Jane’s favourite cereal? Rice crispies
Now remember, Jane has never seen inside this cereal box. Now, Jane comes back in and 
it’s breakfast time now. Let’s give the box to Jane.
Test: How does Jane feel when she gets the box? Happy /  Sad?
Why?
Open the box.
Emotion control: How does Jane feel when she looks inside the box?
Happy /  Sad?
8) Real-Apparent Emotion: Jokes (2 sheets needed)
Show pictures of faces and check child knows that they’re happy, sad and OK.
Show picture of girl. “This is a story about Penny. I’m going to ask you about how Penny 
really feels inside and how she looks on her face. She might really feel one way inside but 
look a different way on her face. O r she might really feel the same way inside as she does on 
her face. I want you to tell me how she really feels inside and how she looks on her face. 
Penny’s friends were playing together and telling jokes. One o f the older boys called Matt 
told a mean joke about Penny and everyone laughed. Everyone thought it was very funny 
but Penny didn’t. BUT, Penny didn’t want the other children to see how she felt about the 
joke because they would call her a baby. So Penny tried to hide how she felt.
Memory control: What did the other children do when Matt told the mean joke
about Penny?
What would the other children do if they knew how Penny felt? 
Test-feel: So how did Penny really feel inside when everyone laughed?
Happy /  OK /  Sad 
Test-look: How did Penny look on her face when everyone laughed?
Happy /  OK /  Sad
Why?
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9) Ice-Cream Story (props needed)
This is John and this is Mary. They live in this village.
Naming: Which is John/Mary?
Here they are in the park. Along comes the ice-cream man. John would like to buy an ice­
cream but has left his money at home. He is very sad.
"Don't worry," says the ice-cream man, "you can go home and get your money and buy 
some ice-cream later. I'll be here in the park all afternoon".
"Oh good," says John, "I'll be back in the afternoon to buy an ice-cream".
Prompt: Where did the ice-cream man say to John he would be all afternoon?
So John goes home. He lives in this house. Now, the ice-cream man says to Mary, "I am 
going to drive my van to the church to see if I can sell my ice-creams outside there". 
Prompt: Where did the ice-cream man say he was going?
Prompt: Did John hear that?
The ice-cream man drives over to the church. On his way he passes John's house. John 
sees him and says "Where are you going?" The ice-cream man says "I'm going to sell some 
ice-cream outside the church". So off he drives to the church.
Prompt: Where did the ice-cream man tell John he was going?
Prompt: Does Mary know that the ice-cream man has talked to John?
John goes to buy an ice-cream.
Now Mary goes home. She live in this house. Then she goes to John's house. She knocks 
on the door and says "Is John in?"
"No", says his mother, "he's gone to buy an ice-cream".
Test-belief: Where does Mary think John has gone to buy an ice-cream? 
Justification: Why?
Reality control: Where did John really go to buy an ice-cream?
Memory control: Where was the ice-cream man in the beginning?
10) Birthday Puppy (props needed)
Tonight is Peter's birthday and Mum is surprising him with a puppy. She has hidden the 
puppy in the basement. Peter says "Mum, I really hope you get me a puppy for my 
birthday".
Remember, Mum wants to surprise Peter with a puppy. So, instead o f telling Peter she got 
him a puppy, Mum says, "Sorry Peter, I did not get you a puppy for your birthday. I got 
you a really great toy instead".
Prompt: Did Mum really get Peter a toy for his birthday?
Prompt: Did Mum tell Peter she got him a toy for his birthday?
Prompt: Why did Mum tell Peter that she got him a toy for his birthday?
Now, Peter says to Mum, "I'm going outside to play". On his way outside, Peter goes 
down to the basement to fetch his roller skates. In the basement, Peter finds the birthday 
puppy! Peter says to himself, "Wow, Mum didn't get me a toy, she really got me a puppy 
for my birthday". Mum does not see Peter go down to the basement and find the birthday 
puppy.
Nonlinguistic control: Does Peter know that his Mum got him a puppy for his 
birthday?
Linguistic control: Does Mum know that Peter saw the birthday puppy in the 
basement?
Now the telephone rings, ding-a-ling! Peter's grandmother calls to find out what time the 
birthday party is. Grandma asks Mum on the phone, "Does Peter know what you really 
got him for his birthday?"
2nd order ignorance: What does Mum say to Grandma?
Now remember, Mum does not know that Peter saw what she got him for his birthday. 
Then, Grandma says to Mum "What does Peter think you got him for his birthday?"
2nd order false belief: What does Mum say to Grandma?
Justification: Why does Mum say that?
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11) Penny Hiding
We’re going to play a simple hiding game, one that they probably know already.
Hide a coin behind your back and bring hands out again as two closed fists. Ask child to 
guess which hand has the coin. Always use RLRRLR.
Now it’s your turn. See if you can trick me. Hide it really well, just like I did.
Get child to do this 6 times, and note down how successful each trial is.
Triall Trial2 Trial3 Trial4 Trial5 Trial6
Which hand?
Does child hide both hands behind back? (-1)
Does the child bring both hands forward? (-1)
Are hands closed? (-1)
Is the coin hidden? (-1)
Asymmetric hands? (-0.5)
Tricks used?
12) Cow  task
Show child the degraded picture o f the cow.
Own belief: What can you see in this picture?
Allow 10 seconds to look at picture then place transparency over picture.
Own knowledge: What can you see in this picture now? Cow /  Cow with
help
Help child to recognise it as an animal o f some sort.
Remove transparency.
Can you show me the *animal’s* ears?
eyes?
nose?
If answer is negative, replace transparency and repeat process.
“In a minute, one of your friends is going to come in. If  I show him this picture, just like I 
showed you the first time, and I’ll ask him what’s in the picture.”
Test: What will he say?
Justification: Why?
Reality control: What’s really in the picture?
Memory control: When I first showed you the picture, what did you say was in the
picture?
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Appendix 3: Strange Stories 
Mental state stories
Simon is a big liar. Simon's brother Jim knows this, he knows that Simon never tells the 
truth! Now yesterday Simon stole Jim's ping-pong paddle, and Jim knows Simon has 
hidden it somewhere, though he can't find it. He's very cross. So he finds Simon and he 
says, "Where is my ping-pong paddle? You must have hidden it either in the cupboard or 
under your bed, because I've looked everywhere else. Where is it, in the cupboard or under 
your bed?" Simon tells him the paddle is under his bed.
Q: Why will Jim look in the cupboard for the paddle?
2 points reference to Jim knowing Simon lies
1 point reference to facts (that’s where it really is) or Simon hiding it without reference 
to implications of lying
0 points reference to general non-specific information (because he looked everywhere 
else)
During the war, the Red army captures a member o f the Blue army. They want him to tell 
them where his army's tanks are; they know they are either by the sea or in the mountains. 
They know that the prisoner will not want to tell them, he will want to save his army, and 
so he will certainly lie to them. The prisoner is very brave and very clever, he will not let 
them find his tanks. The tanks are really in the mountains. Now when the other side ask 
him where his tanks are, he says, "They are in the mountains".
Q: Why did the prisoner say that?
2 points reference to fact that other army will not believe and hence look in other place, 
reference to prisoner’s realisation that that’s what they’ll do, or reference to double bluff
1 point reference to outcome (to save his army’s tanks) or to mislead them
0 points reference to motivation that misses the point o f double bluff (he was scared)
Brian is always hungry. Today at school it is his favourite meal - sausages and beans. He is 
a very greedy boy, and he would like to have more sausages than anybody else, even though 
his mother will have made him a lovely meal when he gets home! But everyone is allowed 
two sausages and no more. When it is Brian's turn to be served, he says, "Oh, please can I 
have four sausages, because I won't be having any dinner when I get home!"
Q: Why does Brian say this?
2 points reference to fact that he’s trying to elicit sympathy, being deceptive
1 point reference to his state (greedy), outcome (to get more sausages) or factual
0 points reference to a motivation that misses the point o f sympathy 
elicitation/deception, or factually incorrect
Jill wanted to buy a kitten, so she went to see Mrs. Smith, who had lots o f kittens she didn't 
want. Now Mrs. Smith loved the kittens and she wouldn't do anything to harm them 
though she couldn't keep them all herself. W hen Jill visited she wasn't sure she wanted one 
of Mrs. Smith's kittens, since they were all males and she had wanted a female. But Mrs. 
Smith said, "If no one buys the kittens I'll just have to drown them!"
Q: Why did Mrs. Smith say that?
2 points reference to persuasion, manipulating feelings, trying to induce guilt/pity
1 point reference to outcome (to sell them or get rid o f them in a way which implies not 
drowning) or simple motivation (to make Jill sad)
0 points reference to general knowledge or dilemma without realisation that the 
statement was not true (she’s a horrible woman)
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One day Aunt Jane came to visit Peter. Now Peter loves his aunt very much, but today she 
is wearing a new hat; a new hat which Peter thinks is very ugly indeed. Peter thinks his 
aunt looks silly in it, and much nicer in her old hat. But when Aunt Jane asks Peter, "How 
do you like my new hat?", Peter says, "Oh, its very nice".
Q: Why does he say that?
2 points reference to white lie or wanting to spare her feelings; some implication that this 
is for aunt’s benefit rather than just for his, desire to avoid rudeness or insult
1 point reference to trait (he’s a nice boy) or relationship (he likes his aunt); purely 
motivational (so she w on’t shout at him) with no reference to aunt’s thoughts or feelings; 
incomplete explanation (he’s lying, he’s pretending).
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect facts/feelings (he likes the hat, he wants to 
trick her)
Helen waited all year for Christmas, because she knew at Christmas she could ask her 
parents for a rabbit. Helen wanted a rabbit more than anything in the world. At last 
Christmas Day arrived, and Helen ran to unwrap the big box her parents had given her.
She felt sure it would contain a little rabbit in a cage. But when she opened it, with all the 
family standing round, she found her present was just a boring old set of encyclopaedias, 
which Helen did not want at all! Still, when Helen's parents asked her how she liked her 
Christmas present, she said, "It's lovely, thank you. It's just what I wanted".
Q: Why did she say this?
2 points reference to white lie or wanting to spare their feelings; some implication that 
this is for parent’s benefit rather than just for her, desire to avoid rudeness or insult
1 point reference to trait (he’s a nice girl) or relationship (she likes her parents); purely 
motivational (so they won’t shout at her) with no reference to parent’s thoughts or feelings; 
incomplete explanation (she’s lying, she’s pretending).
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect facts/feelings (she likes the present, she 
wants to trick them)
Late one night old Mrs. Peabody is walking home. She doesn't like walking home alone in 
the dark because she is always afraid that someone will attack her and rob her. She really is 
a very nervous person! Suddenly, out o f the shadows comes a man. He wants to ask Mrs. 
Peabody what time it is, so he walks towards her. When Mrs. Peabody sees the man 
coming towards her, she starts to tremble and says, "Take my purse, just don't hurt me 
please!"
Q: Why did she say that?
2 points reference to her belief that he was going to mug her or her ignorance o f his real 
intention
1 point reference to her trait (she’s nervous) or state (she’s scared) or intention (so he 
wouldn’t hurt her) without suggestion that fear was unnecessary
0 points factually incorrect/irrelevant answers; reference to the man actually intending to 
attack her
A burglar who has just robbed a shop is making his getaway. As he is running home, a 
policeman on his beat sees him drop his glove. He doesn't know the man is a burglar, he 
just wants to tell him he dropped his glove. But when the policeman shouts out to the 
burglar, "Hey, you! Stop!", the burglar turns round, sees the policeman and gives himself 
up. He puts his hands up and admits that he did the break-in at the local shop.
Q: Why did the burglar do that?
2 points reference to belief that policeman knew that he’d burgled the shop
1 point reference to something factually correct in story 
0 points factually incorrect/irrelevant answers
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Human physical state stories
Two enemy powers have been at war for a very long time. Each army has won several 
battles, but now the outcome could go either way. The forces are equally matched. 
However, the Blue army is stronger than the Yellow army in foot soldiers and artillery. But 
the Yellow army is stronger than the Blue Army in air power. On the day of the final 
battle, which will decide the outcome o f the war, there is heavy fog over the mountains 
where the fighting is about to occur. Low-lying clouds hang above the soldiers. By the 
end of the day the Blue army has won.
Q: Why did the Blue army win?
2 points reference to both weather conditions and either relative ground superiority or 
inability of other army’s planes to be useful in fog (names o f armies unimportant)
1 point reference either to weather or relative superiority on ground versus air (because 
it was foggy); nothing about why weather makes it especially difficult for planes or nothing 
about planes being affected more than tanks; reference to fog to justify incorrect response 
(the aeroplanes won because the fog meant they could hide from the tanks)
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect information (they won because they had 
better planes); justifications for why tanks are better than planes
A burglar is about to break into a jewelers' shop. He skillfully picks the lock on the shop 
door. Carefully he steps over the electronic detector beam. If he breaks this beam it will 
set off the alarm. Quietly he opens the door o f the store-room and sees the gems 
glittering. As he reaches out, however, he steps on something soft. He hears a screech and 
something small and furry runs out past him, towards the shop door. Immediately the 
alarm sounds.
Q: Why did the alarm go off?
2 points reference to animal which the burglar disturbed setting off alarm by crossing 
beam (type of animal unimportant)
1 point reference to burglar setting off alarm (he was starded by the animal so crossed 
the beam); reference to animal setting off alarm without explaining it crossed the beam (he 
trod on a cat and it set off the alarm)
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors (the animal’s screech set off the 
alarm); alternative reasons for alarm going off (a security camera saw him and set the alarm 
off)
Old Mrs. Robinson is very frail. One day she slips on her icy door step and falls on her 
side. She gets up right away, although she feels quite bruised and shaken. The next day her 
leg feels very stiff and she can scarcely walk. She makes her way to the doctors. As soon 
as the doctor hears about the fall, and sees her swollen side, he says, "Go immediately to 
the hospital". At the hospital they take an X-ray.
Q: Why did they take an X-ray?
2 points reference to possibility that she has fractured/broken her hip/leg; reference to 
wanting to know or trying to find out (i.e. ‘it was broken’ is not enough); must refer to fact 
that X-rays are for broken things or bones (to see if there’s any damage to the bone)
1 point reference to general aim (to see what’s wrong, because o f her fall she might have 
damaged something) or factually correct (it’s bruised and stiff)
0 points reference to irrelevant (because she fell) or incorrect factors (that’s what doctors 
do) or to X-rays being cures themselves (to mend her leg)
John is going shopping. He buys a nice new desk lamp, for his study. He needs a light 
bulb for his new lamp. He goes from the furniture department to the electrical 
department. In the electrical department he finds that there are two brands o f light bulb of 
the right kind. Everbrite light bulbs cost less in single packs than Literite bulbs. However, 
only literite bulbs come in multi-packs o f six. John buys the multi-pack, even though he
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only needs one bulb.
Q: Why does John buy the Literite bulbs?
2 points reference to saving money by buying the multipack
1 point reference to convenience of having more bulbs, or future need for more than 
one bulb; no mention of saving money
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors (Literite bulbs are brighter)
Bob and Jim are best friends. They are both ten years old. Bob has brown hair, green eyes 
and is over 5 foot tall. Jim looks very different to Bob. He has blonde hair and blue eyes 
and he is much smaller than Bob. Bob and Jim go on an outing to the fun fair. They go 
on lots of rides. For the last ride o f the day they decide to go on the big rollercoaster. But 
there is a sign which says: For safety reasons no persons under 5 foot are allowed on.
Q: Why does only Bob go on the rollercoaster?
2 points reference to Jim being too short for the ride or Bob being tall enough (Jim’s less 
than 5 foot)
1 point reference to Jim being short or Bob being tall or both; no reference to height in 
comparison to the limit (Jim’s shorter than Bob)
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors (Jim doesn’t like rollercoasters)
Rupert has never been skiing before and is looking forward to his first skiing holiday this 
winter. All his kit for the holiday has been well prepared; his mum has bought him a pair 
o f goggles and she has thoroughly waxed and polished the bottom of his skis to protect 
them. On the first day of Rupert’s holiday his skis keep slipping from underneath him, 
making him fall over into the snow.
Q: Why does Rupert keep falling over?
2 points reference to Rupert’s Mum having waxed the skis, making them slippery
1 point reference to Rupert’s never having skied before
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors (his skis are loose)
Clare is having her room redecorated; her mother is painting the walls and having new 
curtains hung. Before, Clare’s room  was pink and white with thin net curtains but now the 
walls are dark red, and brand new thick and expensive velvet curtains have been put up.
On the first morning in her new room, Clare fails to wake up at the normal time. As her 
mother rushes to get her out o f bed for school, Clare says it must be too early to get up 
because it ‘feels like the middle o f the night’.
Q: Why did Clare oversleep?
2 points reference to the room  being darker after redecoration (her room is dark now 
that she has thicker curtains)
1 point reference to redecoration; no reference to this making the room darker
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors (she’s too tired, she doesn’t want to
go to school)
Sam decides to go on a long walk to get some fresh air. Unfortunately, just after leaving 
the house, the wind begins to pick up and it starts to rain. Luckily Sam always has an 
umbrella with him. He quickly puts up the umbrella and wraps his coat tighdy around him. 
Suddenly a gust of wind blows the umbrella straight out o f Sam’s hand and it lands in a 
large, very prickly bush. Sam manages to run and fetch it before it blows off again and is 
pleased to find it all in one piece. As he walks home, he notices that his head is starting to 
get wet despite the umbrella.
Q: Why is Sam getting wet?
2 points reference to the bush making holes in the umbrella
1 point reference to either the bush or to holes in the umbrella
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors (it was raining, he hasn’t got an 
umbrella)
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Animal physical state stories
Emperor penguins live in the Antarctica, where it is extremely cold. There is always snow
on the ground and ice on the surface of the sea. Emperor penguins can often be found
standing clumped together in huge, huddled masses. Every few minutes, a penguin in the 
middle of the huddle moves to the edge of the huddle, changing places with one of the 
penguins on the outside o f the group.
Q: Why do the penguins keep changing places?
2 points reference to the middle penguin being the warmest or to taking turns at being 
warm
1 point reference to keeping warm without relating this to the huddle
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
Snakes are remarkable animals. They have very stretchy skin, which they shed once a year 
and can also separate their upper and lower jaws and open their mouths really wide. The 
anaconda is an example o f a very large snake. One day, a deer gallops under a tree, from 
which an anaconda is hanging, as it makes its way towards a lake. Later that day, the snake 
is lying on the ground with a huge bulge in its middle. The deer however is nowhere to be 
seen.
Q: Where is the deer?
2 points reference to the snake having eaten the deer (in the snake’s tummy)
1 point reference to the deer having been eaten or being dead without reference to the 
snake
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
It has been raining for days and days and there are no signs that it is going to stop anytime 
soon. A litde island lies in the middle o f a huge river. The water in the river has been 
slowly rising each day and it has nearly reached the top o f the river banks. The otters swim 
around in the water and the field mice run about the island gathering food. Five days later, 
the rain has finally stopped. The otters still swim in the water, but there are no signs o f the 
field mice.
Q: What has happened to the field mice?
2 points reference to the field mice having drown or being dead because of the water
1 point reference to them being dead without reference to water or to the water taking 
them away without reference to them being dead
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
Lions are fierce hunters. They can run as fast as a car when they are young and fit but they 
get very slow and weak when they are old. One very hot day, an old and hungry Hon is 
standing at the mouth o f a cave, watching a herd o f zebras moving across a large open 
plain. When the herd has passed by, the Hon begins to chase a smaH zebra at the back of 
the herd. One by one, the zebras nimbly jump across a river. But the Hon returns to the 
cave, stiU hungry.
Q: Why is the Hon stiH hungry?
2 points reference to the Hon being old or slow or weak and so not being able to catch 
the zebras (he was too old and weak to jump over the river)
1 point reference to the Hon being unable to catch the zebras without reference to him 
being old or slow or weak (he couldn’t jump across the river to catch the zebras)
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
Some types of birds, like geese and swaUows, only like very warm weather. When it is 
winter in England, it is stiH very warm in other countries that are further south. Last 
autumn, flocks o f swaUows could be seen flying in huge groups in the same direction away 
from England. At the beginning o f summer, these swaUows flew back to England.
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Q: What were the swallows doing?
2 points reference to migration or to flying to the place where it is currently warm
1 point reference to specific examples without a general understanding of finding warm 
places (they were going away from the cold weather in England; they were going away to a 
hotter country) or to keeping warm without any explanation
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
Swordfish come in many different colours; black, greyish blue, brown, purple and bronze. 
They often live in tropical places where the water is very warm. In these tropical places, 
the weather sometimes gets so hot that thunderstorms occur. When this happens, huge 
waves crash onto the beaches and travel a long way up the land. On one very hot day in 
Hawaii, a swordfish is lying on the beach.
Q: Why is the swordfish lying there?
2 points reference to the swordfish having been washed up onto the beach by a huge 
wave or the storm
1 point reference to the storm or sea or waves without reference to the swordfish
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
Seals have very big eyes and long whiskers that help them to sense tiny movements. 
Underwater they use their whiskers to find fish so they can then catch the fish and eat 
them. A seal without any whiskers at all, is lying on a rock in the North Sea. This seal is 
very, very thin and tired.
Q: Why is this seal so thin?
2 points reference to the seal having no whiskers and therefore not being able to find fish
1 point reference either to not having eaten or to not having whiskers
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
Animals that live in groups often have an order o f importance within the group. The 
strongest male is the leader o f the group. This leader will often attack other animals in the 
group who are not as strong as this leader. This shows the other animals how important 
the leader is. In a group o f chickens a very small chicken hasn’t got many of its feathers 
left.
Q: Why hasn’t this chicken got many feathers left?
2 points reference to the chicken having been attacked by the leader/a larger chicken or 
having been attacked because o f its size
1 point reference either to the chicken’s size or to having been attacked (reference to it 
being young rather than small do not count)
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
Natural physical state stories
In stormy weather, rocks often fall from the top o f mountains. One day on a mountain in 
the Dolomites, a very large boulder becomes loose and starts rolling down the mountain.
It rolls and rolls and rolls, gathering speed and spinning and bouncing off the mountain 
side. Suddenly, there is a very noisy splash.
Q: Why is there a loud splash?
2 points reference to the boulder falling into water to make the splash (the boulder must 
have fallen into a lake)
1 point reference to water without reference to the boulder (there was a pool at the 
bottom of the mountain)
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors (it’s very big so it’s very noisy)
A storm is building up over a little village in the mountains. There is thunder and 
lightening. The trees sway in the heavy gusts o f wind, and the rain is pouring down.
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Leaves and even some branches are falling from the trees. After one extremely bright flash 
of lightning, there is a loud crashing noise and the lights go out in all of the houses in the 
village.
Q: Why did the lights go out?
2 points reference to the lightning hitting a tree which fell onto a power line and cut the 
electricity (the lightning hit a tree which crashed into the electricity wires)
1 point reference to lightning hitting power lines
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
It is a very cold winter and has been snowing for days and days. The snow has covered 
everything; the trees, the houses, the hilltops, even the fences are covered in a thick layer of 
snow. Everything looks completely white apart from the dull grey sky. One morning, the 
skies are blue and the sun comes out. The sun beats down on the houses, the trees, the 
hilltops, and the fences. Puddles start to form at the edges of the fields.
Q: Why are there lots o f puddles?
2 points reference to the snow melting or the effect o f the sun on the snow (the sun 
makes the snow turn into water)
1 point reference to the snow without reference to melting or the sun (because of the 
snow)
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
The little village of Littlehurst is close to the river Worrow. A year ago, a wall was built all 
the way round the edge o f the village. The river floods its banks in April every year and, in 
the past, water would flow into many houses and cause lots o f damage. For three weeks 
now the rain has been pouring down. However, this year, all the houses in littlehurst are 
perfecdy dry inside.
Q: Why were all the houses dry?
2 points reference to the wall stopping the water entering the village
1 point reference either to the wall or to the water not getting in but no connection 
between the two
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
The summer has been long and very warm, just the right conditions for producing lots of 
apples. All summer long the orchard has been quiet and peaceful. Now, at the end of 
summer, the apples hang from the trees, glistening in the bright sun, all ripe and rosy. And 
every now and then in the orchard, litde thumps can be heard.
Q: Why are there litde thumps?
2 points reference to the apples falling from the trees or hitting the ground
1 point reference to the apples without mention of them falling or hitting the ground
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
One of the huge parks in the middle o f London has stone statues all around the edge of it. 
It also has lots o f trees, which drop their leaves in autumn every year. On a cold, dry 
morning in November, a huge bonfire is burning all the leaves in one comer o f the park 
and the statues in that com er o f the park can’t be seen. But in the afternoon, it is clear that 
they are still there.
Q: What had happened in the morning?
2 points reference to the smoke from the fire covering the statues
1 point reference to the bonfire or smoke without explaining how this affected the
statues
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors including incorrect reference to the 
fire (it burnt down the statues)
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It is late in April and the sky has been clear and blue all morning. An empty fountain 
sparkles in the middle o f the park. As the day goes on, the sun occasionally disappears 
behind little white fluffy clouds, soon to appear again on the other side. However in the 
late afternoon, the sky becomes dark and filled with lots o f grey clouds. A little after this, 
the fountain starts to spout water.
Q: Why did the fountain spout water?
2 points reference to the rain filling up the empty fountain
1 point reference to either to rain or to the fountain being filled up
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
Iceland is a country where earthquakes often occur. They happen very suddenly when big 
rocks under the ground suddenly move, making the ground shake. One day last year, the 
ground started to shake near a mountain in the south o f Iceland. As the ground shook 
more and more, a large cloud of smoke appeared above the mountain and huge flames 
roared from the mountain top.
Q: Why did this happen?
2 points reference to a volcano or to an earthquake starting a volcano (reference to larva 
or similar is also fine)
1 point reference to the earthquake (because the ground under mountain was skaking)
0 points reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors
Unlinked sentences
The two countries had been at war. A housewife is about to enter the super-market.
Today he is going to buy an expensive new stereo. Mrs. Brown, the post-mistress, receives 
a special parcel. Mrs. Pearson wouldn’t harm a fly. Mary's birthday is in February. Late 
one evening the old man was watching television.
Q: When is Mary’s birthday?
2 points February
0 points Anything else
Young Simon is very robust. She sees that Fred cannot play. Jeremy is always laughing. 
Ruth sees her uncle very often, but today he has gone to Brazil. Richard is packing up to 
go away. Today, at college, it is Jim's worst lecture - statistical mechanics. She has only 
one dollar left, which she must keep for her bus fare. He buys a bright tie, to go with his 
new shirt.
Q: How many dollars does she have left?
2 points One
0 points Anything else
Simon takes the special butter from the refrigerator. Each boxer has won several fights.
He skillfully picks out the imperfect items. They are either in Boston or in New York. She 
has to cut the grass and find somewhere to plant the bay tree. The conductor sees that the 
cellist has broken a string. Tracy took the bus to the station.
Q: Where did Tracy take the bus to?
2 points The station
1 point Anything that seems part way there (eg. the bus station)
0 points Anything else
The four brothers stood aside to make room for their sister, Stella. Gill repeated the 
experiment, several times. The name of the airport has changed. Louise uncorked a litde 
botde of oil. The two children had to abandon their daily walk. She took a suite in a grand 
hotel. It was already twenty years since the operation.
Q: Who abandoned their daily walk?
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2 points The two children
1 point Anything that seems part way there (eg. the children)
0 points Anything else
One day Uncle Simon came to visit Alex. The first part o f the performance had come to 
an end. He put away the letter and stuck his hands in his pockets. She was still holding her 
umbrella. The cats ran back to the boy. Flora came into the middle o f the square. The 
little island had a high rocky shoreline.
Q: Where did Flora go to?
2 points The middle of the square
1 point Anything that seems part way there (eg. the square)
0 points Anything else
At the edge of the road a little grass was growing. He reaches out to find the light switch.
A sailor who has just left his ship is walking to the town. She has to decide where to keep 
the pasta. At last daylight came, and Tommy got out o f bed to open his presents. Jim 
knows all about investing money, as he works in a large bank. They exchanged a few brief 
words about the weather.
Q: Why did Tommy get out of bed?
2 points To open his presents
1 point Anything that seems part way there (eg. coz daylight cam e/it was morning)
0 points Anything else
She is always saying that someone will eventually find the treasure. Everyone is allowed 
two visits and no more. At the psychiatry department they were interviewing the new 
nurses. Jim will win the first race of the meeting. She has taken all the children to visit the 
zoo today. Simon's uncle is wearing a new suit. The same phrase o f twenty three notes 
recurred throughout.
Q: What will Jim win?
2 points The first race of the meeting/the first race
1 point Anything that seems part way there (eg. the race)
0 points Anything else
He needs a new engine for his old car. The prize is an immediate lump sum of $20,000 
tax-free. Japan is stronger than Italy in economic terms. The mother is very brave and 
long suffering. The new book is about statistics and experimental design, and contains 
many graphs. The front room contained a little bird in a cage. Although Jim is only twenty 
one years old, he has an income of $20,000 per year. There are not many people this 
evening in the large rectangular dining room.
Q: Who is brave and long suffering?
2 points The mother
0 points Anything else

